That Bellona's bridegroom : Macbeth's warrior ethic by O'Connor, Robert Francis
That Bellona’s Bridegroom
M acbeth’s Warrior Ethic
Robert Francis O’Connor
May, 1999
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of 
The Australian National University
d e c la r a t io n
Unless otherwise acknowledged, all material presented in this 
hesis is the original work of the candidate.
Robert F. O’Connor
A ck n o w led g em e n ts
I will submit this thesis with only days to spare, but I will stand 
by my oft-asserted opinion that the only rule about the time a 
PhD takes is that it takes as long as it takes.
I would like to thank Professor Iain Wright of the ANU English 
Department for his continuing support, inspiration and faith: if he 
enjoyed our conversations as much as I did, then I will count the 
whole experience as worthwhile.
For their support, through the whole trial-by-endurance that is a 
PhD, but most importantly in the final hectic months, I thank:
Caitlin ‘No Relation’ O’Connor, for never ceasing to believe that I 
could do it, and for always being willing to argue;
Rachel Standfield, whose last-minute proof-reading is the least 
that I owe her;
Drs. Gillian Dempsey and Andrew Greinke, for so many things;
my housemates for the past three years, Alison King and Matthew 
Byrnes, since without the friendly hearth of home I might have 
given up long ago;
my fellow-sufferers at PARSA and University House;
my friends, increasingly scattered across the globe;
and, finally, after too long, my parents and the rest of my family. 
I present to you the product of at least 6,000 games of Solitaire, 
more than 10,000 cups of coffee, 75,000+ kilometres of plane 
travel, too much money and an awful lot of phone calls. If I added 
it all up and said thanks that many times, it still wouldn’t be 
enough.
A b s t r a c t
This thesis attempts to engage with some recent paradigms of 
Shakespearean scholarship through an examination of the 
concepts of ethics, order and masculinity in Macbeth.
It addresses the imbalance in considerations of gender in recent 
historicist analyses of English Renaissance literature b y 
developing a survey of the ideal of man-as-warrior in some prose 
writing of the late 16th Century. This survey is then applied to the 
study of Macbeth and the play’s representation of a ‘warrior 
ethic’; an ethic which was not only an artefact associated with a 
fictional Scotland but also a contemporary ideological framework 
subject to examination both within and outside the playhouses.
In further relating this survey to the representation of 
masculinity and metaphysical order in the play, the thesis 
endeavours to show that no single paradigm of right manly 
behaviour operates in the play; rather, the notion of what is 
appropriate to a man is largely dependent on his position within a 
social, political, and metaphysical hierarchy.
Finally, the play Macbeth is considered in its historical context, 
and is seen largely as both the product and representation of 
ethical and sexual uncertainties brought about by the accession of 
King James. In conclusion, the thesis asserts that there is no one 
interpretative key with which to unlock the play: its fluid 
signification is antagonistic to monolithic or prescriptive single­
meaning readings of the play, and of other literature of the period.
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... in my opinion, the world giveth every writer so large 
a field to walke in, that before he set penne to the  
booke, he shall find him seife ... uncertaine where to 
begin, or where to end.
Stephen Gosson, The Schoole o f Abuse
1. Arma virumque cano
Bellona was a Roman goddess of war, probably inherited from 
the Etruscans. Accompanying Mars into battle, she is variously 
described as either his wife, sister, or daughter; she had a 
temple just outside the Roman city walls, where foreign 
embassies were often met and formal declarations of war were 
made. Her priests were drawn from the gladiators —successful 
ones, it seems prudent to assume. She has a fleeting appearance 
in Books VII and VIII of the Aeneid,  a work which had special 
significance to many of the Elizabethan intelligentsia, 
particularly when it came to the providing of moral exemplars: 
Sir John Harington recommended the Aeneid  to Henry, Prince 
of Wales, not long after James’ accession to the throne, since 
“manly corage ys engendred by soche reeding, and the mynde 
encyted to good & vertuows practyses” (Harington: 2).
In Book VII, Juno — as was her wont — curses (again) 
Aeneas’ band, and in particular the Trojan prince’s newly-won 
Lavinia:
O fatal maid, thy marriage is endow’d 
With Phrygian, Latian, and Rutulian blood!
Bellona leads thee to thy lover’s hand;
Another queen brings forth another brand,
To burn with foreign fires another land!
A second Paris, diff’ring but in name,
Shall fire his country with a second flame.
(Keener: 194)
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In Book VIII, she is invoked again, treading in the steps of 
Discord, and carrying a scourge (Keener: 236). She is, in this 
latter case, explicitly associated with disorder, and a disorder 
beyond that brought by war; as the quotation from Dryden’s 
translation, above, indicates, Bellona brings self-destructive 
strife.
Early in the play Macbeth , the eponymous anti-hero is
described, before we even meet him, as a powerful fighter,
skilled in battle —he is, in fact, given the epithet of “Bellona’s 
bridegroom”: a man literally married to war. From this fleeting 
reference a whole host of implications may be drawn, but this 
is par for the course in the Shakespearean canon: the first few 
scenes of any play provide — out of necessity — a whole
conceptual framework through which to ‘read’ the play.
What is unusual about Macbeth is its setting: Shakespeare 
was to visit Ancient Greece and Rome, contemporary Italy, and 
England itself many times, along with a number of purely 
fictional settings inspired by a broad range of sources. But
there are two places he sees fit to visit only once: Hamlet's 
Denmark, and the Scotland of Macbeth.
To the play-going Elizabethan Londoner, the North meant 
many things, principally trouble: borderline barbarism,
recusancy and crypto-Catholicism, impoverished peasantry and 
frequent revolt. But Scotland? Scotland was even worse: a 
succession of plots, exploding Darnleys, the compound problems
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of two Marys, a highly suspicious alliance with France, and a 
long history of cross-border conflict which remained an issue 
throughout the late 16th Century, and would become a problem 
again. To the play-going Elizabethan Londoner, Scotland was as 
alien a place as Hieronomo’s Spain or Barabas’ Malta, and as 
savage, too.
By the early 1600’s, the heyday of the English History Play 
was largely past, perhaps discredited by its association with the 
Essex revolt, and so it is odd that Shakespeare should dip into 
Holinshed yet again for inspiration, some five or more years 
after his last visit — and, even stranger, this time he would seek 
his story not in the long and gory pageant of English history, 
but in the equally bloody chronicle of Scotland. There is no 
doubt that, for a dramatist, the story of the usurper Macbeth 
offered a wealth of material, and everything that a groundling 
might wish to see for his pennies — kings, witches, battles, 
betrayals, signs and portents, divers alarums and excursions 
and fresh blood from the slaughterhouses down the road, 
dripping from the hacked-off head of a stage traitor.
And yet ... given all of these things in Holinshed —for they 
are certainly there — Shakespeare saw fit to bring so many 
other things to the story. Some of these he also lifted, almost in 
their entirety, from elsewhere in Holinshed: the details of
Duncan’s murder from that of an earlier king, Duff; the brief 
tale of Young Siward from another Chronicle altogether, that of 
England. Other elements, according to various analyses of the
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play, were found in contemporary events, many of them
associated with the then-new king, James. Here, I am 
convinced, is the real inspiration behind Shakespeare’s choice 
of the story of Macbeth: it is a contentious idea, but I too 
suspect that it is highly unlikely Macbeth would ever have 
been written or performed without a Scottish king on the
English throne.
But, even beyond its obvious theatricality, there was more 
appeal in the story of Macbeth than the immediate presence of 
James; as I hope to show, it tapped into a wide range of 
concerns, from the nature and status of manhood, of 
masculinity, of true honour and virtue to the role of the warrior 
in an increasingly complex and threatening world. The play is 
preceded, in the popular literature at any rate, by a protracted 
investigation and defence of these ideas, and it would be 
tempting to say that the fact that these notions were being 
investigated and defended suggests that at least some
Elizabethan writers felt that they were being undermined. I n
the chronicle tale of Macbeth and his various other sources, 
Shakespeare found a way to represent on stage the essence of 
these debates, particularly, I suggest, their engagement with 
masculine identity.
In The Boke Named The Governour (1531), his influential 
treatise on, among other things, the education of young men, Sir 
Thomas Elyot puts forward his idea of the essential male 
identity:
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A man in his naturall perfection is fiers, hardy, 
stronge in opinion, covaitous of glorie, desirous of 
knowledge, appetiting by generation to brynge forth 
his semblable (Lehmberg: 95).
What Elyot does, in effect, is divide the characteristics of a man 
into three categories, the physical (“fiers, hardy”), the
intellectual or metaphysical (“stronge in opinion, covaitouse of 
glorie, desirous of knowledge”), and the sexual. His rhetoric 
gives a kind of structure to his ideas; the physical
characteristics he identifies seeming to take precedence over 
the appetites for glory and knowledge, and these in turn are 
more important than a specific sexual quality, the fathering of 
(male) children — “appetiting by generation to brynge forth his 
semblable”. Despite the religious sensibilities of his age, Elyot 
seems to privilege the physical over the metaphysical in the 
ideal man.
By later in the 1500’s, Elyot’s description of the “natural” 
or ideal man was no longer quite so current, the important 
physical attributes he seems to have preferred having been 
surpassed in significance by metaphysical qualities. He still, 
however, serves as a good example of the aspects of maleness, 
of masculinity, of being a man in Early Modern England that I 
hope to cover in this thesis. The primary archetype of manhood 
at the time was that of the warrior, and to many writers it was 
the warrior who was the embodiment of all the proper, manly 
qualities. Following Elyot’s lead, Chapter 2 will identify the 
concepts of man-as-warrior which may have operated in
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Elizabethan England. These concepts cluster around the general 
themes of virtue, honour, deeds or action, the warrior, and 
hierarchy or degree. These five themes relate to each other in 
particular ways, and all five to a sixth that forms for them a 
kind of metanarrative, namely the ideal of the king. All of these 
themes are to be found woven through the play Macbeth , and 
in illustrating these themes I will be drawing on a number of 
prose sources, primarily from the period between 1570 and 
1600.
Chapter 3 will examine how the themes and ideas 
presented in Chapter 2 can be related to the play Macbeth  — 
how similar notions of valour and virtue are described, 
destroyed, and re-established in the course of the play, through 
its focus on the actions, right and wrong, of the play’s fighting 
men. These notions construct, for the world of the play, what I 
have called the warrior ethic —a set of values and ideals that 
survives the play largely unquestioned. It is paralleled, in
Shakespeare’s Scotland, by a similar but less well-defined 
ethical structure relating to the virtue and conduct of the king, 
and it is the differences —if not antagonisms —between these 
two structures which provides the impetus for much of the 
play’s action. Macbeth is, I think, thematically linked to many 
other tragedies of the period, plays which deal with men, 
usually warriors, and in the upper echelons of their societies. 
As warriors and as noble-men, these characters have a duty to 
defend their society —and, in many cases, it is a duty they do 
not feel they have been adequately compensated for. Many of
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them seek a way to redress this imbalance; Macbeth himself 
operates within rigid ideological and ethical frameworks, which 
he seeks to overcome. Like his contemporary literary fellow- 
travellers, he fails.
Anything I have chosen to call the warrior ethic in 
Macbeth is obviously going to be concerned with men;
concerned not simply with their identity and function as 
warriors but as men, defined and identified in relation to each 
other, to women, to their king and to God —their position(s), no 
less, in Tillyard’s Great Chain. Some of my concern is with the 
purely sexual, the biological, but principally I am interested in 
the cultural construct of gender, which, as a cultural construct, 
is part of the wider milieu, the ethos. It is as much part of the 
metastructure around Shakespearean drama as the monarchy, 
the court, or the Master of Revels. And part of my reason for 
wanting to address these issues is the simple absence of
consideration of them in recent historicist analyses: New
Historicism, for example, may have some interest in gender 
issues, but according to Walter Cohen, it understands gender “in 
relation to the body or to power more than in relation to
women” (Cohen: 38). Even this criticism does not go far enough; 
as I hope this thesis will show, there is more to the
consideration of gender — more to the issue of gender in 
Shakespeare — than the role or representation of women. 
Chapter 4 will therefore further examine the concept of the 
warrior ethic in terms of its being a gender-determined 
structure: one which is constructed, maintained, attacked and
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defended by men. The construction of manhood itself w ith in  
the play is also explored, in particular through its definition v ia  
a series of oppositions. This is related back to the idea o f 
separate but parallel ethical structures in the play, show ing  
how the play appears to suggest a different model of m an h o o d  
for the king.
Chapter 5 will explore the patterns of chaos and order in  
the play; patterns which have attracted no small degree o f 
critical attention in the past fifty or so years, but which also  
reveal the play as a product of its time. The play’s com plex  
dynam ics of disorder are also studied in relation to se v e ra l 
recent critical paradigm s, and are related back to the b ro a d e r  
issues of ethics and masculinity.
The play also has a complex relationship with its sou rce  
m aterial, as a dram atisation of historical events and h is to rica l 
figures — even if not particularly w ell-know n ones. There a re  
significant and extrem ely suggestive differences betw een th e  
source m aterial and the dram atic text, and throughout th e  
following chapters I will endeavour to address some of th e se  
differences, to discover what they can tell us about th e  
dram atic text they relate to, and why the author may h a v e  
chosen to re-tell the story in the way he did.
The final chapter of this thesis will consider M acbe th  a n d  
its various readings — ethical, gendered, and m etaphysical — in  
relation to recent wider criticism of Shakespearean d ram a ,
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particularly the methodologically similar approaches of Cultural 
Materialism and New Historicism. This will then lead to an 
examination of the play within its historical context, relating it 
to something of the circumstances of the time, most 
importantly the accession of James and the affect this had on 
the playwrights, on their material, and on their audiences. I 
will attempt to draw some overall conclusions about the 
relationship(s) between Macbeth and the wider the discourses 
of politics and gender and, in particular, ethics, of Jacobean 
England, ultimately leading to statement of a primary 
hypothesis, and opening up some possibilities for further work.
2. The good and upright souidiar
There is a certain wast[e] of the people for whom  
there is no use, but warre: and these men must have 
some employment still to cut them off ... If they  
have no service abroad, they will make mutinies a t 
home. (Nashe: 25)
Scotland, invaded, beset by savage Irish mercenaries and the  
troops of the Norwegian king, has, it seems, two of its own to 
thank for its troubles. First, there is the rebel Macdonald — an 
evil man, says an anonymous captain. He is assisted, according 
to Shakespeare anyway, by the Thane of Cawdor, who, after the  
aborted coup, confesses to treason, sues for pardon, and goes to 
his execution with a manner that elicits admiration from the  
witnesses. His title passes to one of his fellow lords, the w orthy 
M acbeth.
Here, indeed, is a mutiny at home, which in the world of 
the play Macbeth comes after a long peace under the reign of 
Duncan. Perhaps, as Nashe suggests, this is a mutiny which had  
its cause in the idleness of trained warriors. But a thane of 
Scotland, one would hope, would hardly count as one of the 
“waste of the people”. Macdonald, untitled by Shakespeare, may 
have cause enough in ambition to start a war, but Cawdor has 
lands, position, honour, respect even in death, and it could be 
argued that there is little more he could expect from aiding 
Sweno than he already has. Little except ... more of the same.
2. The Good and Upright Souldiar 
According to Harry Berger
1 1
there is something rotten in Scotland ... something 
intrinsic to the structure of Scottish society 
[which] generates ... tendencies toward instability, 
conflict, sedition, and murder ... it is not something 
the characters of the play ... seem aware of (Berger:
5).
Berger has some interesting things to say about Shakespeare’s 
Scotland and the characters who populate it, and I shall return 
to his arguments later. I have my own ideas about what, 
exactly, it is that is rotten in the state of Duncan; and I feel that 
the clues to this are offered very early in the play.
In the second scene of the play, our first encounter with 
the Scottish king and his thanes, we learn something of the 
circumstances of the battle foreshadowed by the weird sisters; 
a rebellion, begun, as noted, by an ill-regarded man:
The merciless Macdonald —
Worthy to be a rebel, for to that 
The multiplying villainies of nature 
Do swarm upon him ... (I,ii,9-12)1
The rebellious warrior is almost self-evidently corrupt, morally 
questionable; self-evidently because he is a rebel, a rebel 
because he is corrupt. As I shall show later, it was clearly held, 
within the ethical milieu of Macbeth and its creator, that a
1 A.R. Braunmuller, ed., Macbeth  (Cambridge University Press, 1997). All 
quotations from the play are taken from this edition.
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rebel was in violation of fundamental laws of duty and 
obligation, of respect, honour, and right action. A rebel, and 
therefore a villain.
Set against the merciless Macdonald we have another 
warrior, a Scottish thane, “brave Macbeth”. He, we soon 
discover, has almost single-handedly put paid to the traitor, 
and in a particularly gruesome fashion:
... brave Macbeth ...
Like Valour’s minion carved out his passage 
Till he faced the slave,
Which ne’er shook hands, nor bade farewell to him,
Till he unseamed him from the nave to th’chaps 
And fixed his head upon our battlements (I,ii, 14-23)
Such is the ‘rightness’ of this action — the violent
disembowelment of a fellow-countryman — that Duncan, the 
king, lauds him as “valiant cousin, worthy gentleman” (I,ii,24). 
This description of Macbeth seems a little curious, even when 
taking into account perhaps more squeamish late 20th Century 
tastes, and the epithet of “worthy gentleman”, coming so soon 
after the report of a ‘worthy’ Macdonald, must make us wonder 
about Macbeth. Despite this, when he ‘confronts’ Macdonald’s 
fellow-rebel Cawdor with “self-comparisons” and betters him, it 
becomes possible to see his personal victory over both 
insurgents as a mark of both his moral superiority over them, 
and as his status as a superlative warrior. The heroic thane is 
described, later in the scene, as “Bellona’s bridegroom” (I,ii,54).
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But at this stage of the play, we have not even met the 
man after whom it is named. All we know of him is his 
superlative skill as a warrior; and the admiration this elicits 
from his fellow-Scotsmen.
The status of the man-as-warrior in Shakespeare’s England 
was, like so many other things, in a state of flux. Throughout 
Elizabeth’s reign, the country faced a series of military 
challenges, most notably the Armada and the constant threat of 
invasion. The martial exploits of men like Sir Philip Sidney, the 
Earls of Leicester and Essex, Raleigh and others, were widely 
celebrated, the stuff of pamphlets, ballads, and —via the Tudor 
reconstruction of recent history — plays, representing what 
Leah Marcus has called “an aggressive and highly masculinist 
Protestant militarism” (Marcus: 91). And yet as Nashe’s remark, 
however satiric, indicates, behind the celebration of victories — 
usually over the Spanish — there was an increasing uncertainty 
about the place of the warrior in an ever-more fluid society. 
Moreover, any interrogation of the status and role of the 
warrior inevitably led to similar interrogation of — and perhaps 
even uncertainty about —the role and status of men. In trying 
to tease out the nature of these interrogations, it is, I think, 
necessary to go beyond the walls of the playhouse, into the less 
widely-debated area of Elizabethan prose writings.
Elyot, as I have suggested, represents one level of these 
sources — the late books of The Governour elaborate on his 
ideas of the proper manly qualities, discussing specific virtues
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and vices, how they may be encouraged or avoided. But it is 
quite a stroll out of the court and down the streets of 16th 
Century London to find some of the other sources —the diverse 
productions of the pamphletists. In her landmark study The 
Elizabethan Pamphleteers, Sandra Clark notes that the “decay of 
moral standards” was a common theme in the popular 
pamphlets of the period, particularly through “constant
comparisons between the present and the heroic past” (Clark: 
202). As indicators of popular concern — if not debate — the 
pamphlets represent a large and largely untapped resource for 
historicist research. It is clear, I would argue, through 
generations of formal scholarship, what might have been 
thought or argued or represented in relation to a range of 
issues at the play- and poem- and memoir-writing levels of 
Elizabethan society: the upper echelons of the emergent middle 
classes, the court, the more literate aristocracy. But —leaving 
aside the issue of whether such writers sought to reflect or 
mould popular opinion for later in this work —we cannot be 
sure if these more formal considerations of issues like the role 
of the warrior and his function and place in a changing society 
are really indicative of the scope or depth of thinking among 
the groundlings, the newly literate merchant class, the soldiers 
themselves. Hence my attempt to show, through such material, 
something of the concept of man-as-warrior that might have 
circulated through Elizabethan England. In particular, I would 
like to focus on two little known, and, as far as I can tell, now 
little-read pamphlets, Geffrey Gates’ The Defence of Militarie 
Profession (1579), and William Blandy’s The Castle o f
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Commonwealth, (1581), which, represented as the recollection 
of an earlier discussion the two had with their fellow-soldiers
in “Friseland”, engages in a kind of dialogue with Gates’ earlier 
work. These two related pamphlets are, I feel, representative of 
a broader collection of works, works specifically concerned with 
what I call the warrior ethic.
V i r t u e
Certain manly virtues are espoused in much of prose writing of 
Elizabethan England. Blandy, for example, focuses his attention 
on four virtues: “equity”, “puissance”, prudence, and
temperance (Blandy: sig. Di.v), virtues which he ascribes to 
greater or lesser degree to the various “estates” of his
imaginary Commonwealth, of which more later. In going on for 
another ten or so pages in laying out his understanding of these
virtues, he makes it clear that they are — as is the case for
many of the writers on the matter —derived from the four so- 
called ‘moral’ virtues of scholastic philosophy, namely justice 
(what Blandy calls “equity”), fortitude, temperance, and
prudence.
Other examinations of manly virtues expand on these 
notions. Castiglione —or at least Sir Thomas Hoby: in his 1561 
translation of The Book of the Courtier —refers to “the vertues 
of the minde, as justice, manlinesse, wisdome, temperance, 
staidenesse, noble courage, sobermoode, etc” (Hoby: 369). The 
same basic virtues are here, extended by broader ideas which
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could be said to relate to a man’s character, if not to his moral 
worth. Like Blandy, and like many other writers, Castiglione 
goes beyond mere statement of what these virtues or qualities 
are, and attempts some kind of definition of them. What does 
not happen is any kind of explicit relation or connection of 
these virtues to the three ‘theological’ virtues of faith, hope, 
and charity. There is no attempt, in other words, to preserve 
the notion in Mediaeval philosophy of seven ‘Cardinal’ virtues. 
This was a slippery concept at the best of times, never as 
clearly stated or widely accepted as its antithesis, the Seven 
Deadly Sins, but the absence of even a nod in the direction of 
the Cardinal Virtues seems to indicate a decreasing dependence 
on religious ideals in day-to-day didacticism.
What most of the writers on matters masculine did depend 
on was an almost exclusively martial interpretation of the
traditional virtues. Francis Bacon, writing much later in his 
capacity as Attorney-General, saw the quality of fortitude as 
having a particular use to a man: it
distinguisheth the grounds of quarrels, whether 
they bee iust; and not onely so, but whether they be 
worthy; and setteth a better price upon mens lives 
then to bestow them idely (Bacon, Duels: 13).
Bacon’s consideration of this matter was a less than happy one; 
he was, in fact, lamenting the absence of this virtue in the 
duelling young bloods of the Jacobean court, but his treatment, 
though late in the period I am concentrating on, is nevertheless 
typical: discussions of the manly virtues often turn into
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extended examinations of their place in a hierarchical society, 
and their significance to the man-as-warrior.
In describing fortitude in this way — as a quality of 
judgement — Bacon is in disagreement with many other writers, 
since most seem to see this virtue in a martial light, as akin to 
bravery, to courage in battle. Blandy, further, elaborates on 
fortitude as a more kingly virtue, one which “resteth in an
invincible minde” (Blandy: sig. Dii.v). It is in disagreements like 
these, however expressed, that the real value of this material 
lies, when trying to arrive at any idea of the range of ideas 
about masculinity in Elizabethan England. Disagreements in 
definition, however, are not so common as those contradictions 
that arise out of the attempts by various writers to expound 
some kind of hierarchy to the virtues, to identify which of them 
are more important to a man than others. Courage, fortitude
and justice usually come out on top in these discussions,
perhaps for their significance to the man-as-warrior.
There were some willing to consider other, non-martial 
virtues, as of greater import to the modern man. “lohn” Della 
Casa’s A Treatise of the Maners and Behauiours, translated into 
English by Robert Peterson in 1576, has a great deal to say in 
defence of the place of less well-known, less ‘martial’ virtues. 
The work is one in very much the same category as
Castiglione’s earlier and much more influential The Courtier, in 
that it seems to be aimed more at the ‘Renaissance’ man, at the 
courtier whose interests may not be in feats of arms. Like
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Castiglione, Della Casa acknowledges that the better known 
qualities, “iustice, fortitude, and the other greater, more noble 
vertues” are better, in a qualitative sense, but to his thinking 
they are not common —and those possessing them too often 
lack opportunity for deeds to express them (Della Casa: 2-3). He 
suggests further that deficiencies in either virtue or 
opportunities for great deeds can be made up for by what 
might, in late Twentieth Century terms, be called a good 
personality, particularly if one is seeking advancement:
I could name you many, whoe, being otherwise of 
little account, have ben & be styll, muche estemed & 
made of, for their chereful & pleasaunt behaviour 
alone: which hath byn suche a helpe &
advaunceme[n]t unto them, that they have gotten 
greate preferments, leaving farre behinde them, 
such men as have byn endowed with those other 
noble and better vertues, spoken of before (Della 
Casa: 3).
Certainly Della Casa sets himself up in opposition to more 
orthodox theorists here: he prefers to recommend manners and 
attitudes that will help a man with things as they are, rather 
than as they should be. He (or at least his English translator) 
also stands apart from other writers by insisting that there 
may in fact be more to being a man that martial prowess:
albeit Liberalitie, or magnanimitie, of themselves 
beare a greater prayse, th[a]n, to be a well taught or 
manored man: yet perchaunce, the courteous
behaviour and entertaynement with good maners 
and words, helpe no lesse, him that hath them: 
th[a]n the high minde and courage, advau[n]ceth 
him in whome they be (Della Casa: 2).
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Martial virtues alone are not enough, but good manners (like 
justice, according to other commentators — see Blandy, later) 
will stand for themselves:
there is no doubte, but who so disposeth himselfe to
live ... in populous Cities, will think it a v ery
necessarie thing, to have skill to put himselfe forth  
comely and seemely ... civilitie and courtesie,
without other releefe or patrimonie, is riche of
itselfe, & hath substance enough, as a thing [that] 
standeth in speache and gestures alone (Della Casa: 
3-4).
Della Casa’s belief in the virtue (term loosely used) of good 
manners is evident, but he is careful to qualify that they are a 
virtue of the court, or at best the city. The implications of this 
qualification — that different virtues have their different places 
— I shall consider later in this chapter.
Castiglione is less willing to rest on such a division. In the 
“Breef Rehearsal of the Chiefe Conditions and Qualities in a 
Courtier” at the end of Hoby’s translation, he states that the 
Courtier should
be skilfull in all kynd of marciall feates both on 
horsebacke and a foote, and well practised in them: 
whiche is his cheef profession, though his 
understandinge be the lesse in all other things 
(Hoby: 370).
Unlike Della Casa, Castiglione is unwilling to ignore the m artial 
basis to the structure which has given the courtier his place.
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While the virtues which best fit a man may have been 
(generally) agreed upon, there was disagreement over the 
question of what kind of man might be said to best em body 
such virtues. Vested interests certainly came into play; many of 
the authors of obvious military background w ere 
(unsurprisingly) of the conviction that it was the soldier or 
“martialist” who needed, represented and defended the v irtues 
of manhood. Geffrey Gates, for example, asserts “The onely 
meane to uphold the seat of Iustice, & all other estates, is the 
profession of Armes”, and then very quickly shows himself as 
having a very negative view of human nature, arguing th a t 
good laws (and good lawyers) alone are not enough:
But forasmuch as the thoughtes of man are w icked 
even from his youth, and all his wayes natu rally  
inclined to extreme evill, desirous to satisfie his 
owne lusts and affections with iniurie and crueltie, 
to revenge, and to reigne in his owne will and power 
without correction, and yeldeth not unto th e
obedience and direction of any other but for feare of 
stripes: There must bee therefore an other state and 
profession of men, whose power and prudence m ust 
comprehend the maintenaunce and defence, not 
onely of the Seate of Justice (Gates: 10).
More than almost any other author on the topic, Gates defends 
the ‘martialist’ or warrior as a paragon of virtue and the only 
true defender of justice. Alongside the marginal heading “The 
qualities of militarie men”, he sets out his reasons for his 
position:
The man that loveth right and honoreth iustice, is fit 
to be ye defendor of the same: he [that] is m erciful
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to ye poore, and pitieth the afflicted, is a meete m an 
to succour his countrie nation & against the violence 
of tirantes and oppressors: he that loveth the
habitationes of the iust, & the prosperitie of ye 
righteous: he [that] tendereth ye widow and the
fatherles; he that delighteth to se science, social 
amitie, and vertue to floorishe in his countrie, 
devine honour advanced, faith, peace, and equitie to 
reigne in everye fellowshippe, and h a te th  
covetousnes, robbery, theft, extortion, braw linges, 
striffe, murther, fornication, idlenesse and
dronkenesse, that man is worthie and fit to be a 
Soldier (Gates: 35-36).
Gates maintains, therefore, that “Justice and Civil Policie” are
dependent on security of arms, asserting that
where militarie prowesse hath in any part of the  
world moste prevailed, there hath orderly m ost 
flourished, Justice, Noblenesse, Science and all 
manner of veruous and commendable occupations 
both of body & minde ... (Gates: 11).
It is no exaggeration to say that he paints his ‘martialist’ as the 
guardian of terrestrial and cosmic order. In particular, he sees 
the soldier as the real instrument of God’s will; he a ttrib u tes  
the success of the Protestant Reformation to the blessing of God 
on its soldiers:
... the Lord hath shewed and daylie doth more and 
more shewe, his wondeful works and power in th is 
last restitution of his Gospel: which began in
Germanie with peace, but was forced to holde on the  
way, by the ayde of warlike prowesse and fidelitie 
(Gates: 16).
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He insists, via numerous historical, Biblical, and contemporary 
instances, that military success is a sure sign of God’s favour:
And like wise when the Lord meaneth to advance a 
nation and to make any people famous and 
honorable upon earth: he stirreth them up to high 
courage, and maketh their mindes and bodyes apt to 
the warre, and in all points sufficient for the 
pursuite and accomplishment of Militarie travaile 
(Gates: 21).
In a not entirely relevant passage, he goes on to justify his 
position using examples from the then-current war in Holland, 
a cause of much English grief in the last few decades of the 
1500’s. He expresses his contempt for various unhelpful souls — 
particularly the Dutch themselves — before launching upon a 
spectacular diatribe:
Praise God therefore, and geve honor to his faithfull 
Souldiers: & let the covetous merchant, and the
ambitious lawier leave of his drudgreie for greedy 
lucre, despise the delicacie of his belly, & dassh ye 
wantonnes of his eyes, and cast his idol out of his 
servil hart: that is, senseles avarice, and put on 
Armes & furnishe himselfe with policie and warlike 
Prowesse, yf hee will iustely be numbred amongst 
the people of noblenesse & honor (Gates: 35)
Gates’ feelings about lawyers are almost worth a lengthy 
analysis on their own — but that is a project for another time.
William Blandy’s Castle of Commonwealth presents, as I 
have indicated, a kind of response to Gates: trying to tem per 
some of the latter’s more passionate assertions with
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observations of his own. After being excused by his friend 
Edward Morris for his lack of experience as a w arrio r2, Blandy 
then embarks upon a conversation with Gates himself,
ultimately dividing his (Platonically spherical) “Archtecture” of 
“Pollicye” into six parts, and installing therein “A King, A 
Iusticer, A Souldiar, A Marchaunt, An Artificer, A Tiller of the  
Ground” (Blandy: sig. Biii.v). Like Gates, he assigns to each of 
these estates a proper virtue:
To the Prince, preheminence, to the Iusticer,
judgement, to the Souldiar, puissance, to the
Marchaunt, desire to be enriched, to the Artificer, 
delight in his occupation, to the Tiller of the ground, 
true obedience (Blandy: sig. Biii.v).
Blandy also sees the soldier as a man of God, suggesting that his 
service should be directed to “the glory of Christ, the honor of 
our Prince, the cause of our countrye, the defence of our nam e 
and honesty” (Blandy: sig. Diiii.v). He sets up, in other words, a 
clear heirarchy of duty and obligation, and, like Gates, he 
places duty to God at the top of the list. Any other purposes 
than these, he says, are those of “men puft upp with vayne 
desire” .
2 A rhetorical device; the title page identifies the pamphlet as “Handled 
in manner of a Dialogue betwixt Gefferay Gate, and William Blandy, 
Souldiars”. Blandy, according to the Dictionary of National Biography ,  
served in the English army in the Low Countries in 1580. There is n o 
entry for Gates.
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Another point he has in common with Gates is his 
consideration of the position of the lawyer or ‘justicer’ in a 
virtuous commonwealth, calling the justicer and the soldier 
“The two limmes that chiefly and above other, strengthe[n] the 
body of Princely maiestie”, noting that
The one executeth the will of his Soveraigne upon 
the offender at home, the other wreaketh the 
indignation of the Prince in the field, upon the body 
of his enemie. The one is chosen for his prudence, 
the other for his prudence, and puissance, the one 
for his rightfull dealing, the other for his uprigh t 
minde ... The one with his toung keepeth peace, the 
other with the sword restoreth peace in danger 
(Blandy: sig. Eiii.r).
Nonetheless, despite conceding that neither he nor his 
interlocutor may be competent to judge on the matter, he does 
say that “I cannot finde in my poore and simple consideration, 
but that the souldiar in his proper right may challenge a kinde 
of superiority of the Lawyer”, concluding that the “iusticer” 
should “have second place in this our commonwealth” (Blandy: 
sig. Eiiii.v).
Where Blandy differs from Gates, however, is in the  
embodiment of the broadest range of true virtues. To Blandy, it 
is not the warrior who is the defender of justice and order; 
rather he is the servant and defender of the prince, who is 
“garnisht, and deckt with all worthye, and noble vertues” 
(Blandy: sig. Eii.r). As I shall show shortly, the character of the 
king was very much an important part of any consideration of 
manly qualities in the writing of the period.
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In a milieu which believed implicitly in the inherent 
superiority of some men over others, it is not surprising to find 
different thinkers giving such primacy to different kinds (often 
their own kind ...?) of men. Elyot argues simply that there are 
men superior in understanding to others, and in this faculty 
they are “most nyghe unto the similitude of god”; such men 
should, therefore, be held in higher estimation and place, if 
only because they can, by example of their own virtue, direct 
others of “inferiour understandynge ... to the way of vertue and 
commodious livynge” (Lehmberg: 4). There was, in fact, an
almost utilitarian view of such men, virtuous in themselves but 
doubly praiseworthy for the example they provided for others.
William Blandy not only had a didactic purpose in writing 
his Castle of Commonwealth , he had also a quite specific 
example in mind when espousing the virtues of the military 
man. Feeling provoked by a motto “found in a olde monument”, 
Blandy determines “to play the whetstone my seife: whetting 
and setting on edge (by this slender and simple devise) the 
blunt mindes of my countrymen” (Blandy: sig. Aii.r). He
therefore dedicates his work to Sir Philip Sidney, taking him as 
the embodiment of his purpose, a man
who in my opinion is able & sufficient to be both the 
whetstone and the sword ... and to move and 
perswade other to all worthy & laudable actions 
(Blandy: sig. Aii.v).
Elyot’s praise of exemplary men was more general, but Blandy 
and others were more passionate in their defence of a specific
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class or type of person —the soldier — as not only a morally 
superior individual (charged as they were with the defence of a 
divinely-ordered state), but a guardian of morality itself 
(whatever it was). Much of this idea sprang from essentially 
pessimistic views of human nature: Gates, as I have shown, is 
convinced that it is the depravity of Man that makes the 
profession of arms necessary:
For the first foundation and use of Armes was 
erected of necessitie, to restreine and to represse 
the violent crueltie, and beastly disorder of men, 
and to establishe social peace and Justice upon earth 
... for that the nature of man is so evel, and his hart 
so perverse that there is no meane to bridle his 
furies, and to hold him any while in peacable order, 
but by feare of corporal punishment (Gates: 36).
There were some dissenting views: Bacon, for example, in his 
essay ‘Of Goodness’ takes that quality to be the greatest virtue, 
since it is of “the character of the Deity”, and believes that “The 
inclination to goodness is imprinted deeply in the nature of 
man” (Hawkins: 37) —another view of his in which he takes a 
very different stand to that of his fellows. Yet for the majority 
of writers, philosophers and theologians of the period, the 
essential character of Man was corrupt, too easily inclined to 
evil, and therefore needing restraint or redress. Such was the 
origin, according to Gates and others, of the profession of arms. 
To Gates and others there is a direct and two-way relationship 
between the moral strength of such men and their status as 
warriors; Blandy, for example, refers the “good and upright 
minde” of the soldier, endangered if the commonwealth he
2. The Good and Upright Souldiar 2 7
imagines is upset (Blandy: sig. Biii.v). The office of the soldier 
was, to such thinkers, one which grew out of necessity:
Experience is the mother and nurse of the policies 
and governements, civill and martiall, private and 
publicke, guiding the counsailes and doinges of m en 
with orderly discretion. Experience of the inordinate 
iniquities of me[n] founded the lawes and the 
iudgement seat. The experience of the troublesom e 
furies of men founded Armes, and advaunced 
Militarie profession, for the repressing and the 
restraining of the tyrannies and noyfuil malice of 
the wicked (Gates: 5-6).
Such is the need for moral excellence in the ‘martialist’ th a t 
Gates goes further in saying that the worst sort of men are not 
(contrary to the practise and opinion of some) fit to be soldiers, 
charged as they were with the defence of a divinely ordained 
and morally ordered society. Indeed, it is his strength of feeling 
on this issue that has driven him to publish: after elaborating 
further on the lessons of his experience, he adds that his “love” 
for arms and the “martial occupation” has
made me (an unlettered man) to take unto me a 
notarie to sette downe in writing this drift in the 
defence and praise of warlike prowesse, against al 
co[n]temners of the same: for the benefite and
encouragement of my countrie & countrimen (Gates:
6 ) .
Gates’ happy profession of his own ignorance of Tetters’ — he 
has, after all, had to resort to a scribe — is in distinct contrast to 
Blandy’s admitted lack of experience as a soldier, and yet both,
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from very different worlds, as we can see, find themselves 
writing in praise or defence of the warrior.
Among other writers considering the importance of the 
warrior to a threatened England was Stephen Gosson, author of 
the notorious anti-theatrical polemic The Schoole of Abuse  
(1579). Early in his argument, Gosson engages upon a long 
digression upon the lost warrior tradition of the Britons:
Consider with thy seife ... the olde discipline of 
Englande, mark what we were before, & what we 
are now: Leave Rome a while, and cast thine eye 
backe to thy Predecessors, and tell mee ho we 
woonderfully wee have been chaunged, since wee 
were schooled with these abuses. Dion sayeth, the 
english men could suffer watching and labor, hunger 
& thirst, and beare of al stormes w[ith] hed and 
shoulders, they used slender weapons, went naked, 
and were good soudiours, they fed uppon rootes and 
barkes of trees, they would stand up to the chin 
many dayes in marishes without victualles ... The 
men in valure not yeelding to Scithia, the women in 
courage passing the Amazons. The exercise of both 
was shootyng and darting, running & wrestling, and 
trying suche maisteries, as eyther consisted in 
swiftnesse of feete, agilitie of body, strength of 
armes, or Martiall discipline (Gosson: sig. B8?v-r).
The loss of these marvellous qualities is, to Gosson’s thinking, 
something else to be laid at the door of the theatres. He cites 
“Bunduica a notable woman and a Queene of Englande” as an 
example, relating how she berated her Roman foes:
because they were smoothly appareled, soft lodged, 
daintely feasted, bathed in warme waters, rubbed
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with sweet oyntments, strewd with fine poulders, 
wine swillers, singers, Dauncers, and Players 
(Gosson: sig. C5v).
Unlike her own naked, woad-painted Iceni, one assumes.
Like Blandy and Gates, Gosson sees the soldier as somehow 
partaking of the divine, although he expresses this idea in far 
more florid terms than even Gates: after maligning “Fencers”, 
Gosson qualifies his remarks by saying that
I goe not aboute the bushe with Souldiers, Homer 
calleth them the Sonnes of Iupiter, the Images of 
GOD, and the very sheepeheards of the people: 
beeing the Sonnes of Iupiter, they are bountifull too 
the meeke, and thunder out plagues to the proude 
in heart: beeing the Images of GOD, they are the  
Welspringes of Justice which giveth to every m an 
his owne; beeing accoumpted the shepeheards of the 
people, they fight with the Woolfe for the safetie of 
their flock and keepe of[f] the enimie for the w ealth  
of their Countrie (Gosson: sig. D6?v-r).
He rounds off his discussion on the subject by warning
Bee not carelesse, Plough with weapons by your 
sides, studye with a booke in one hande, a darte in 
the other: enjoy peace, but provision for war ... the  
least discontinuaunce of Martiall exercise give you 
the foyle (Gosson: sig. D8?v).
To Gosson, as for many others, the soldier was the constant and 
unheralded defender of both his own and the nation’s virtue, 
too little appreciated by wits like Nashe: “Some there are,” he
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wrote, “that make gods of soldiers in open warrs, & trusse them  
up like dogs in the time of peace” (Gosson: sig. D?7r).
As I have indicated, at the same time that there w ere 
points of agreement on various moral issues, there w ere 
important signs of dissent, particularly in relation to w hether 
what might be agreed upon to be virtuous was virtuous in all 
situations. It is very clear that many writers believed that the 
virtues they espoused in theory for the court and the city did 
not apply to the battlefield. Della Casa, in the passage quoted 
above, makes it clear that he is, after all, m aking
recommendations to men who will “live ... in fellowship w ith 
men, and in populous Cities” (Della Casa: 3).
Like Della Casa, Geffrey Gates seems more of a realist than  
a theorist, since much of his Defence focuses — som ew hat 
disgustedly — on things as they are, rather than how one m ight 
wish them to be — though Gates is entirely clear on how he 
would like them to be. He insists, for example, that a prince 
should ideally be a paragon of virtue, yet he realistically
acknowledges that this is often not the case:
seeing that corruption doth stick so fast in flesh and 
blood, that neither Prince nor vassall can be w ithout 
imperfections: we must allowe more libertie of
infirmities, in the citie then in the field (Gates: 37).
There is an odd couple of ideas here. All through this work, 
Gates insists on the essential depravity and corruption of men, 
and of the need for the soldier, the “martialist”, not only to
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control men’s excesses, but also to somehow rise above them. 
Gates is convinced of the moral superiority of the true 
professor of arms, and of the necessity of the soldier in a 
society where all men are not martialists. Yet he is not only 
willing to allow that some soldier-princes are not paragons, he
■tois — unlike many monarchical apologists — willing recognise 
that this is unavoidable. Further, he maintains that human 
society (in cities at least) is so corrupt that not even a prince 
can avoid being tainted by it. Finally he suggests that this is 
also to be accepted; but contrary to what one might expect, 
moral turpitude is not to be allowed on the battlefield — he 
insists on extreme punishment of transgressive soldiers, for 
example:
For as the Armed hoste is the extreeme remedie to 
chastise, and to represse the insolencie, iniuries, and 
offences of others, so shoulde the regiment of warre 
be free from the same: & every vice in a Souldier 
strongly bridled and extremely punished ... For 
where corruption and libertie is suffered in a 
Souldier, there is the shame and confusion of Armes 
... it is moste true, He that is fitte for the Chappell, is 
meete for the fielde (Gates: 37).
Obviously, Gates believes there is an essential moral difference 
between city and field —but he does not explain (or defend) 
that difference. This is a clear indication of moral pluralism, 
similar to that found in Della Casa: and yet completely 
antagonistic to the moral absolutism of their contemporaries. 
This is an issue I intend to engage further in later chapters.
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The issue of the proper place of specific virtues also 
extended into considerations of social place. The ‘confusion of 
degree’ that was the source of so much anxiety to so m any 
writers resulted in explicit attempts by Elizabethan authorities 
to quell —at least in the lower ranks —the restlessness which 
this confusion caused, and from which it was, in a large 
measure, derived. The most conspicuous result of these efforts 
were the Sermons or Homilies Appointed to be Read in
Churches, collected and published a number of times during
both Elizabeth’s and James’ reigns. Of uncertain authorship, bu t 
possibly revised at one stage by Elizabeth herself, they were, 
according to two modern editors, “designed for the
maintainence of the establishment” (Homilies: viii). A num ber 
of the Homilies dealt, unsurprisingly, with issues of virtue, bu t 
one in particular has some interesting things to say. ‘An Homily 
Against Wilful Rebellion’ was issued as a separate publication 
in 1570, and collected and issued with the rest the following
year (Homilies: vii), and it is quite clear on the subject of at
least one virtue: “obedience,” it says, “is the principal virtue of 
all virtues, and indeed the very root of all virtues, and the 
cause of all felicity” (Homilies: 559). It is, in fact, a v irtue  
understood to belong to the ruled, and not the ruler: “the best 
subjects,” it goes on to say, “are most firm and constant in 
obedience, as in the special and peculiar virtue of all good 
subjects” (Homilies: 564). As I will show, the obedience due a 
king by his subjects is of particular significance to Macbeth. I t  
is presented, more than once, as part of a series of catalogues of 
virtues, catalogues which Shakespeare has various characters
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express at various times. As I will show, the virtues agreed 
upon by Gates and Gosson, Blandy and Elyot and others all 
emerge in the text of Macbeth , often to be subverted —but not 
irredeemably so — by subsequent developments.
Honour, Deeds, and the Man of Action
Honour was an equally important component of the 
construction of masculinity in the English Renaissance. Notions 
of honour in Shakespearean England were still very much 
dependent on Classical Greek and Roman ideals, particularly in 
relation to the man-as-warrior. Elyot, for instance, extols Homer 
as a moral exemplar,
For in his bokes be contained ... the documentes 
marciall and discipline of armes, but also 
incomparable wisdomes, and instructions for the 
politike governaunce of people ...where with the 
reders shall be so all inflamed, that they most 
fervently shall desire and coveite, by the imitation 
of their vertues, to acquire semblable glorie 
(Lehmberg: 36-37).
It is worth noting that Elyot gives the martial values
precedence; it is almost as if Homer would be valuable for this 
alone, even if he (his works) are lacking in representations of 
other virtues.
There were some small departures from the Classical ideal 
— Blandy, for instance, rejects the notion that there can be 
anything honourable in the Roman tradition of falling on one’s
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sword (Blandy: sig. Diiii.r) —but in general the Classical world 
also served as a catch-all moral exemplar; there seemed to be, 
in the minds of many Elizabethan and Jacobean writers, a 
simple rule of thumb: if the Greeks and Romans did it, it had to 
be a good thing. And, of course, the converse held; Bacon 
upholds the Classical ideal in the prosecution of a duelling case, 
cited earlier. Bacon condemns the practise of duelling as not in 
keeping with the ancient models of honour:
memory doth consent that Grecia and Rome w ere 
the most valiant and generous Nations of the world, 
and that which is more to bee noted they were free 
estates, and not under a Monarchy, whereby a m an 
would thinke it a great deale the more reason th a t 
perticuler persons should have righted them selves; 
and yet they had not this practise of Duells, nor any 
thing that bare shew thereof; and sure they would 
have if there had bin any vertue in it (Bacon, Duels:
2 2 ).
The star Chamber Decree which resulted from the case — 
printed with Bacon’s address on the matter — w holeheartedly  
endorses this view, adding that “nothing can be honourable that 
is not lawfull” (Bacon, Duels: 56).
Geffrey Gates, unwilling to let history stand in the way of a 
good rant, was also willing to espouse the Roman and Greek 
ideals as a model for his wayward countrymen. He sees 
particular promise in the way in which both ancient states 
hardened their young men for war, and using the occasion — 
typically — to take a swipe at the more mercenary elements of 
contemporary society. In his Defence, he reports how the
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Spartans hardened their young men for war, and goes on to 
note that:
The like considerations made the Romanes to pursue 
the exercise of warre (for many yeares at the 
foundation of their state) without wages or stipende: 
and whilest they did growe, there was never Citizen 
in Rome esteemed noble for his riches, but for his 
prudence & prowesse. Nay, the man of Rome that 
omitted armes, and became a merchant, for 
gathering aboundance of riches, was rather
reckoned amongst the servaunts, then esteemed as 
a very Romane (Gates: 48).
Gates and other writers early in the period I am examining 
were more certain in their understanding of honour than later 
writers appeared to be. There was concern on the part of the 
latter that the true idea of honour was being lost somehow. 
Bacon lamented the “false and erroneous imagination of honour 
and credit” that lay behind the duelling in James’ court, 
labelling it “a kind of satanicall illusion and apparition of 
honour; against religion, against lawe, against morall vertue” 
(Bacon, Duels: 11-12). As noted earlier, he and his fellow Star 
Chamber magistrates perceived the cause of this 
misunderstanding as a failing of judgement, certainly in 
individuals, but perhaps also in the body politic, the society as 
a whole. Bacon insisted that part of the problem was a lack or 
loss of “Fortitude” (Bacon, Duels: 13). The Star Chamber decree 
that was published with Bacon’s speech also attributed the 
problem to a poor understanding, calling it “no magnanimity or 
greatnes of mind, but a swelling & tumor of the minde, where 
there faileth a right and sound Iudgement” (Bacon, Duels: 56).
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The authors of the decree were quite clear, in their own minds, 
as to the ultimate cause of this deficient understanding: the rise 
of duelling and the misapprehension of true honour were both 
attributable to a “confusion of degrees”, to social turmoil and 
uncertainty — a strange opinion, given Bacon’s common origins. 
This was a manifestation of the chaos with which much 
Elizabethan polemic and religious literature had been
concerned; Bacon himself, in his famous essay ‘Of Revenge’, 
referred to that act as “wild justice”, one which, like duelling, 
arrogated the exercise of that prerogative from the King. I n 
condemning duelling, however, Bacon adds to the charge the 
arrogance of the young bloods in believing that it was they 
themselves who were the arbiters of honour. His concern about 
the loss of life resulting from ill-conceived notions of honour 
was, however, a purely practical one:
it is a miserable effect, when young men, full of 
towardnesse and hope ... in whom the expectation 
and comfort of their friends consisteth, shall be cast 
away and destroyed in such a vain manner 
[duelling]; but much more it is to bee deplored when 
so much noble and gentle blood shall be spilt upon 
such follies, as if it were adventured in the field in 
service of the king & realm, were able to make the 
fortune  of a day, and to change the fortune of a 
kingdome ... what a desperate evill this is; it 
troubleth peace, it disfurnisheth war, it bringeth 
calamity upon private men, peril upon the state, and 
contempt upon the law (Bacon, Duels : 10-11).
In effect, Bacon is reinforcing the notion that it is not only 
honour that duellers are risking, but their lives; to presume to 
throw them away “in such a vain manner” is a sin against the
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complex arrangement of duty and obligation and expectation 
that surrounds them. Again, the associated Star Chamber 
decree likewise lamented the loss, but further saw a 
propagandist purpose to maintaining the strength and passion 
of the nation’s men for the wars. It regrets
the casting away of much good blood, which being 
spent in the field upon occasion of service were able 
to continew the renown, which this Kingdom hath  
obtained in all ages (Bacon, Duels : 41).
Whether this “confusion of degrees” and decline in any 
certainty about notions of honour and virtue was m ore 
widespread is an issue I intend to engage in a later chapter.
To Blandy, as to many other writers of the period, honour 
was a quantity which might be innate in a man, but still had to 
be earned. Such was the quality of the Romans, he notes, “that 
not onely noble men were wonderfully inflamed with the love 
of glorye, but very many of the common people” (Blandy: sig. 
Diii.r). He refers to
a thousand more being no gentlemen borne, which 
notwithstanding through theyr passing skill and 
experience in feates of Armes were advaunced to 
honour, and promoted to high estate, leaving to 
posterity fame and immortalitye (ibid.).
The implications of this are clear: a man of honour could expect 
to have his honour recognised — and rewarded — through 
“feates of Armes”. And that was pretty much it. Della Casa m ay 
have felt that “chereful & pleasaunt behaviour” would gain a
2, The Good and Upright Souldiar 3 8
man advancement, but his is a minority opinion; to Blandy and 
others feats of arms are the only way for a man to signal his 
worthiness. As he indicates, elaborating on the Roman ideal,
herehence the armes and cognizaunces of honor and 
noblenesse, which even in these our dayes are 
borne, and had right worthely in estimation, did 
fetch their originall and first beginning (Blandy: sig. 
Diii.r).
While it was recognised that it was through the 
performance of notable deeds that honour could be attained, 
and therefore one’s virtue amply demonstrated, it was also true 
that deeds alone could guarantee nothing; what was needed 
was an appreciative audience for those deeds. Castiglione notes 
that the courtier should ensure
To undertake his bould feates and couragious 
enterprises in warr, out of companye [ie: alone] and 
in the sight of the most noble personages in the 
camp, and (if it be possible) beefore his Princis eyes 
(Hoby: 371).
He felt that even the rehearsal of martially-oriented activities 
had its proper place: he recommends some courtier’s qualities — 
“To swimme well. To leape wel” and so on — as best done 
“Sildome in open syght of the people”, but others —running at 
tilt and ring, tourneying and so on —should be done “in open 
syght to delyte the commune people withall” (Hoby: 371).
If it was only through noble deeds being witnessed —and 
witnessed, moreover, by the right people —that honour could
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be accrued, then it might be said that honour was m ore 
something conferred than attained, and conferred, obviously 
enough, by those possessing themselves the requisite quality of 
honour. William Blandy makes this same point in defence of his 
position as a writer rather than a soldier; he insists that he too 
has his contribution to make to the discourse of honour, policy, 
and virtue, and in a rather bad prefatory poem he points out 
that not only do both the quill of Pallas and the sword of Mars 
have their uses, but that without the former, the deeds of the 
latter would go unremembered (Blandy: sig. Aiiii.v ).
In general, though, it was understood that —as Castiglione 
points out — there were few who could serve as appropriate  
witnesses to one’s great deeds, few who could confer the 
reward of honour on the doer. Bacon takes this idea of honour 
being conferred to its logical end in claiming that since the 
notable acts of any man should ultimately be done in service to 
his king, it is only through the recognition by the king of the 
quality of a subject’s deeds that honour is conferred upon doer:
The fountaine of honour is the King, and the accesse 
to his person continueth honour in life, and to be 
banished from his presence is one of the g reatest 
eclipses of honour that can bee (Bacon, Duels , 17).
To Bacon, it is only the king who can confer ‘honour’ upon his 
subjects, and he recommends that this idea be exploited as a 
way of checking the rising frequency of duelling in the 
Jacobean court, since “there is noe man that hath any good 
blood in him, will commit an act that shall cast him into that
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darknesse, that he may not behold his Soveraignes face” (Bacon, 
Duels: 17-18). The extrodinarily florid and penitent le tte rs 
despatched earlier in the period by courtiers exiled from  
Elizabeth’s presence show that this shame was one strongly felt, 
even if it meant only that opportunities for influence and 
advancement were being lost.
The relationship of one’s actions to one’s honour was 
therefore clear: it was through one’s actions that one’s honour — 
and, as I have pointed out, one’s virtue —could be recognised. 
The obvious performer of these deeds, the man whose objective 
was always the achievement and preservation of his own
honour — and, therefore, the king’s — was the warrior.
H i e r a r c h y
According to Sandra Clark, the notion of hierarchy, or degree, 
was a “magnetic” concept,
around which was built up a complex of associations 
so vivid, so all-embracing, so universally  
explanatory, that all kinds of tenuously re la ted  
notions were drawn towards it (Clark: 214).
It was, in other words, as much an obsession to pam phleteers 
like Blandy and Gates, to more respected prose writers like 
Nashe and Bacon, as it was to the authors of now better-know n 
poetic and dramatic works of the period. Like their arguably 
more respectable fellows, “The pamphleteers universally
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deplored the breaking of class barriers and the blurring of 
distinctions” (Clark: 185).
There was a definite tension between older, more orthodox 
ideas about society, about honour and masculinity and moral 
absolutes, and what might be called more realistic — perhaps 
cynical — views. The common ground between the two seemed 
to be the belief in the essential corruption of human nature, 
ever needing correction by law and force of arms. The tension 
between orthodox (absolutist) and more progressive (relativist) 
notions of morality was one that spilled over into the theatres, 
precipitating dramas not only on the stage, but in debates 
about the stage. These tensions will also be more fully dealt 
with in later chapters.
There is little questioning, in period literature I have 
examined, of the idea that the monarchical system was 
somehow ordained, that society was ordered in a particular 
way. That there were still fairly orthodox — which is to say 
almost Mediaeval —views of how society was (or should be) 
structured is evidenced by Blandy’s The Castle o f
Commonwealth. The metaphorical physical structure described 
in his imagined conversation with Geffrey Gates, mentioned 
above, is an example not only of this kind of thinking, but also 
its persistence into and beyond the Elizabethan period.
Blandy does more than describe his ideal Commonwealth, 
however; he also tries to justify it, and, in doing so, to priase
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the perfection of the invention. He insists (in response to a 
question from his interlocutor) that no more is necessary to the 
commonwealth than the six estates of “A King, A Iusticer, A 
Souldiar, A Marchaunt, An Artificer, A Tiller of the Ground”; no 
one can “controle this division, adde unto, or diminish the 
number” since “The workmanship is so rare, the strength 
whereof standeth on the combination of the partes within 
contayned” (Blandy: sig. Biii.v). This “Palace” maintains itself in 
its perfection, its “proportion”, and anything which threatens or 
upsets its stability has dire consequences:
That which doth most firmely and stro[n]gly joyne 
and knitte these partes together is Proportion: 
which broken and defaced, not onely renteth and 
plucketh in sunder the frame, but tottereth withall, 
and tumbleth down the Prince, perverteth iustice, 
poysoneth and plucketh downe the good and 
upright minde of the Souldiar, robbeth the 
Marchaunt, ransacketh the Artificer, spoyleth 
utterly the simple and poore laboursome man 
(Blandy: sig. Biii.v).
Blandy subsequently sets forth the roles of both the Justicer 
and the Soldier in preventing this kind of chaos overthrowing 
his design, but it is interesting that in his warning against this 
chaos, it is the Soldier whom he identifies as the conscience of 
his commonwealth: it is “the good and unpright minde of the 
Souldiar” that he seems to most fear for. His belief in the 
significance of the warrior in this ideal social structure is 
explained at length in his book —though he is more willing to 
admit to the necessity of other professions than Gates. 
Nonetheless, it is also clear that, like Gates, he sees the soldier
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as having as much importance to the moral quality of the 
commonwealth as he does to its defence.
What is also found in Blandy’s argument, and is, 
furthermore, characteristic of this kind of work, is a discussion 
of the relative importance of each of these estates. Blandy and 
Gates and others are, as I have said, very much of a mind as to 
the importance of the warrior in the defence of the hierarchy, it 
is therefore, by their arguments, obviously the warrior who 
must, short of the king, take the highest place. Gates certainly  
seems to think that his fellow-Englishmen have forgotten this. 
He begins his Defence by asking which profession is m ost 
“honorable in worldly estates”, which is “most necessarie for 
the maintainence and preseruation of the common w ealth” 
(Gates: 9), and after a (tongue-in-cheek?) compliment to the  
“preheminence” of the lawyer in maintaining England’s peace — 
“happie is the state where this is accomplished by the industrie  
and prudence of the peaceable Lawyer” (Gates: 10) — Gates 
becomes more aggressive. As I have pointed out, he asserts 
that “The onely meane to uphold the seat of Iustice, & all o ther 
estates, is the profession of Armes” (ibid.), then going on to 
betray his real sentiments when he condemns the lack of 
respect afforded his profession. To say that he turns
vituperative would be an understatement; England is lucky in 
being an island, he says, since if the nation “stood in the  
continent of the world environed with mightie nations” it would 
need (and appreciate) its warriors more:
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then should it know ye value of a soldier, & lick the 
dust off the feete of her men of prowesse: then
would the lawer & the marcheant hum ble
themselves to the warders, & be glad to geve 
honour & salary to the martialist (Gates: 18).
He is as sure that he and his fellow-soldiers are not being given 
the respect they deserve, as he is that his country will come to 
regret its disdain. He is not alone in claiming so, either. As the 
imagined interlocutor of William Blandy, in the la tte r’s 
Commonwealth , he is a particpant in their attempts to resolve 
this dispute of precedence. Blandy, too, eventually comes down 
in favour of the soldier, mainly because of the sacrifices he 
must make:
... the souldiar so little esteemeth safety at home, 
content in his mate, pleasure in his children, solace 
with his friendes, that where his fidelity to his 
Prince, love to his countrey, honor of his upright 
minde, shall be brought in question, and stand to be 
tryed, he will not onely most willingly forgoe all 
these, but cherefully vow and consecrate his lustye 
limmes to tiresome labours, his body richly clad, to 
pinching nakednesse, his feeding nature, to starving 
hunger, his fresh and lively lookes to lothsom e 
languishing; his sinowes to be severed, his ioyntes to 
be cut in two, his blood to be spilt, his carcase to be 
stamp to dyrt & myre. Where fore I see noe reason 
but that the souldiar may in the common wealth be 
preferred before the iusticer (Blandy: sig. Eiii.v).
Implicit in the belief in an unquestionable and (hopefully) 
unassailable hierarchy was the idea that men at different levels 
of society were possessed of different abilities, d ifferen t 
qualities, and were therefore bound, perhaps, by d ifferen t
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moral rules. Less consideration is given, in Blandy and
elsewhere, to the “estates” lower down this hierarchy; almost 
all discussions of virtue and honour, of right action and noble 
deeds have as their unstated starting point the fact that these 
are the concerns not only of men, but of men at the top of their 
society. Little in the way of good or right conduct —certainly 
less understanding of it — could be expected of the lower
classes. The corollary to this was that the higher classes were 
proportionally greater bound by duty and expectations, and 
correspondingly more to be condemned for slipping from them. 
In a way, it could be said that the hierarchy described b y
Elizabethan writers was a structure of virtue; of a greater and
more demanding range of virtues at the top, of different 
virtues for different classes. Nevertheless, the primary focus of 
all examinations of virtue and honour was the very top, the 
man held to be the paragon of virtue and the fountain of 
honour, the witness of deeds and the ultimate warrior: the king.
The King
The moral purpose of the soldier was as clear to Bacon, Blandy, 
Elyot and their fellows as the moral excellence of its 
embodiment, the king. To their thinking, the king or prince, 
“The cheefe man”, is at the head of a
militarie order ... ech sovereigne prince in his state 
& governement ... being a man compleat in all the 
vertues & condicions that are behoofull to one of 
that charge and profession (Gates: 36).
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He is (ideally) a man
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wise in counsaile, temperate in life, affable in 
speach, faythful in words, courteous in greeting, 
wakefull in charge, provident in perill, abstinent in 
dyet, continent in life, apt to travaile, prudent and 
couragious in Battell, constant in wisedome, 
prowesse, and vertue: bountifull to the worthie,
amiable to the honest, severe to the wicked, gratious 
to the afflicted, and mercifull to the Captive, modest 
in victorie, and constant in magnanimitie, not 
fearing the frailetie of warlike state and prosperitie, 
nor drowping under the alteration of the same 
(Gates: 37-38).
Gates is fond of providing examples of such men, both Biblical 
and historical, and he does so (at length) here —yet this is the 
same Gates who is willing to admit that too often rulers did not 
measure up to such standards. Gates not only believes that the 
ideal leader should be fit for the battlefield, he also maintains 
that the hot forge of war and the natural moral superiority of 
the true soldier are what make  kings. He is convinced of the 
unshakeable connection between virtuousness and nobility, 
martial prowess, and a man’s fitness to rule:
But this is generally to be noted in the warlike 
Princes and Nobilitie: that as they exceede in 
militarie prowesse and worthines, so doe they excell 
in wisedome and all noblenesse of hart: and hee that 
will worthely bee called a militarie man, must cast 
off all vilanies and basenes of minde: and full charge 
his thoughtes and doinges with honeste inclinationes 
and like effectes. Neither are the commendable 
vertues of the minde so necessarye for any
occupatione, as they are for them that professe and 
exercise armes (Gates: 17-18).
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It was important that the king be free of “all vilanies and 
basenes of minde”, that he be a man self-evidently m orally 
apart from other men.
It is, however, on the issue of the king that Gates seems to 
differ from the majority opinion — an issue, too, where the lack 
of information about him becomes all the more tantalising. As I 
have pointed out, he seems to be a firm believer in the sta tus 
of the warrior as an instrument of God’s will. The warriors he 
chooses to praise tend to be Biblical or Classical; w here 
contemporary they are heroes of the (militant) P ro testan t 
Reformation:
For when the time was come, in the yere of our 
Saviour Christ 1517, that y[e] Lord set foote on 
earth to restore his Sanctuary, he begänne his 
businesse by a poore ministrie under the covert & 
protection of the most worthie prince Duke
Frederick of Saxonie, and so encreased under the  
defence of the most noble Princes, lohn Duke of 
Saxonie, & Philip Lantgrave of Hesse ... (Gates: 22).
and so on, at length, about the military birth of the  
Reformation. He is consistently full of praise for these noble 
leaders of the struggle against “the champions of the kingdom e 
of darknesse ... the troupes of the Philistims [sic]”; equally  
consistent in his condemnation of various Catholic kings. And 
he does also spare some words for those “many Princes of the  
Christians, greatly endued with wisdome, civill vertues, and 
prowesse” (Gates: 40), naming various “Emperours of the olde
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time” and more recent rulers, including “Renowmed [sic] Kings 
of England”, familiar from Shakespeare’s Histories:
And hee of them that exceeded in miltary feates 
and prowesse, the same ... excelled also, in wisdome, 
isutice, and civill vertues. As did Arthur  am ongst 
the Brutes ... William the conqueror himselfe, Henry  
the second, Richard the first, Edward  the first, 
Edwarde the thyrde, Henry the fifte, and Henry the 
seventh, and Henry the eighte (Gates: 41).
But he also shows himself to be a supporter of the ‘rejection’ of 
cruel and overbearing rulers: after expounding again at length 
on a favourite subject —the Protestant Dutch war against th e ir 
Catholic Spanish masters —Gates relates how the Duke of Alva 
failed to recall the long defence by the Dutch of their “ancient 
compositions: and how they shooke of the ty rannous
Soveraigntie of the French kings”. Had he done so, Gates says,
he would have endevoured his wisdome and labour 
to reconcile them by mollifying the government, and 
by gratious gentlenes and bountie, rather then  
proudlye to presse downe the yoke that had already 
wearied them (Gates: 27).
These may be strange sentiments for a proponent of the 
martial virtues —the winning of a kingdom by “gentlenes and 
bountie” — but the more important issue, to Gates, is the Dutch 
defence of their liberties. The kind of oppression they have 
endured, he warns, “cannot prosper ... for the Lord God in his 
Juistice hateth tyrannie” (ibid.). I do not know, however, if this 
is enough to put Gates within the ranks of one of the various 
stripes of miltant Puritans, advocates of tyrannicide, or o ther
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politically unacceptable factions of Elizabethan England. He sees 
a clear difference between a tyrant and a true king, obviously, 
but —as I have pointed out —he is willing to recognise that 
“neither Prince nor vassall can be without imperfections”. He 
will not bear “Dissolute soldiers” within the ranks of his army; 
how much the less is an immoral king to be borne?
To Gates, to Blandy, and to others, it was the essentially
evil nature of humanity that gave rise to the office of kings — 
but only because the first kings were themselves above the
taint of their fellow-men. Blandy, for example, discusses at
length (Blandy: sig. Ciiii.r-Di.v) the primal chaos of human
existence (and in men’s minds) occasioned by the overthrow of 
reason by passion in the Fall. He attributes Man’s escape from 
“this great darknes” to the advent of kings, and their noticeable 
moral strength and superiority:
In this great darknes, in this common miserye, in 
this universall woefulnes, there appeared a man, 
who through his cleane and unspotted handes, his 
cleare & pityfull eyes, his streight and upright 
minde, drewe many extremely handled, to his 
reverence, love, and honor. Whome when they had 
noted, not onely to abstaine himselfe from villainy, 
but bend to Caytives and Murtherers a Sterne and 
irefull countenaunce, and take commiseration of the 
afflicted: then these wretched wormes crawled unto 
him ... of whose sutes and lamentable complayntes, 
when he had taken compassion, and sought by witt 
and pollicie to ayde and assist, became unto them at 
length, a lanterne of Justice, a mirrour of mildnes 
and courtesie ... Behold here ... the fountayne and 
headspring from whence hath flowed the power and 
authoritye of kinges, the preheminence, and
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prerogative of princely government. Herehence 
soveraigntye, and the cause of all renowne and 
glory was derived (Blandy: sig. Di.v).
It was not only the moral superiority of such men that made 
them deserve to be kings, it was what made them kings in the 
first place; Blandy tells his interlocutor Gates that
equitye and puissance were the rootes and raysers 
of royaltie, and that no king can holde long his 
sceptre sure, if his minde become base through 
injustice and dastardly feare (Blandy: sig. Di.v).
Blandy in fact develops as his principal theme the notion of 
the kingly virtue, and does so in far more detail than does 
Gates. He insists, as I have pointed out, that there are four 
“vertues” necessary to a king: “equitye”, “puissance”, prudence, 
and temperance. Of these, he considers justice (equity) to be 
pre-eminent:
each kinde of vertue being voyde of Justice, hath 
lost his honor and estimation, whereas Iustice alone 
secluded from other vertues, retayneth still his 
especiall grace & dignitie (Blandy: sig. Dii.r).
He also, however, discourses at length on ‘fortitude’ as a kingly 
virtue: it “resteth in an invincible minde,” he says, “Attempting 
for the love of some excellent thing, great, difficult, and 
dangerous actions” (Blandy: sig. Dii.v). He does not,
unfortunately, clarify what “excellent thing” this virtue is to be 
exercised for, and indeed is never entirely clear on the nature 
of fortitude as he understands it. Sometimes it seems to be
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conflated with his second-named virtue, “puissance”, sometimes 
with courage. What he is clear on is that it is a virtue deserving 
of “many worthye and noble ensignes, and titles” (Blandy: sig. 
Dii.v). “[I]t is playne,” he says, “that fortitude openeth the way 
to worshippe, and bringeth us most redyly to the beholding the  
exceeding bright and cleare nature of true nobility.” (Blandy: 
sig. Diii.v). He goes on to explain how fortitude in the face of 
“calamities” distinguishes the noble from the base.
Blandy’s third virtue of a king is Temperance, which 
“standeth in the true and iust moderation of our actions” 
(Blandy: sig. Diiii.v). While he insists that it comes “from a kinde 
of propentio[n], or inclynation, which is most deepely by n a tu re  
in us imprinted,” he also seems to say that it is not ‘natural’ or 
‘normal’:
For by nature we waxe hoate, angry, and cholericke 
... This man therefore that can thus governe, and 
moderate the motions of the minde, hath wonne the 
love of Temperaunce, and shall be honoyred of all 
men as one indued [sic] with a rare, and singular 
vertue (Blandy: sig. Ei.r).
Of prudence, the fourth kingly virtue, Blandy assures Gates th a t 
it
is the very orname[n]t and garland of the other two, 
without which, they before spoken of, can no wise 
florish ... Prudence therefore resteth in the 
knowledge of civile governement: which learneth u s 
not onely to governe wisely our sieves, and families, 
but to rule poletickly great Cittyes and 
Commonwealthes (Blandy: sig. Ei.v).
2. The Good and Upright Souldiar 5 2
It is a virtue to be ‘traced out’ “by the love of Eloquence, by the 
honor of chivalrye, by the knowledge and studye of the civile 
lawes” (ibid).
Blandy also puts foward a kind of map of the relationship 
between these virtues of a king, and what might be called the 
trappings or ‘perks’ of monarchy, identifying the ruler as one
whose Scepter iustice raysed, whose soveraigntye 
fortitude defendeth, whose preheminence prudence 
ruleth, whose prerogative temperaunce keepeth in 
most safe and quiet estate (Blandy: sig. Eii.r).
What prerogative is being tempered here is not explained, but 
he does go on to explain that all of these virtues must “reste 
alwayes in perpetuall moving”, so that no one of them may 
wither.
Above all of these virtues, however, is the important point 
of the king’s own, higher, duty — to God:
This is also to be required & chiefely looked for, of a 
king, y[e]t what noble acte soever he take in ha[n]d, 
whether it appertayne to civille governme[n]t in 
tyme of peace, or to martiall prowes, in tyme of 
warre, his clearnes and excellencye, geve most 
manifest notice and signification, that he setteth not 
store by humaine thinges, but doth with most 
earnest indevour & intention of minde, affect those 
thinges that be heavenly, and everlasting (Blandy: 
sig. Eii.r).
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His interlocutor Gates agrees wholeheartedly with Blandy on all 
this, recalling that “As you in our March discoursed in this 
manner”, he and their fellow-soldiers were ‘minded’ of “a 
Queene of place then farre o f’, about whose exemplary natu re  
all then “with one voyce asse[n]ted”. In some ways this seem s 
to have been the cue (so to speak) for which Blandy has been 
waiting: he holds forth on Elizabeth as
the perfection of a Prince ... whose fayth in Christian 
Religio[n], whose knowledge in learning, whose 
policie in governing, whose cleme[n]cy in pardoning, 
whose bountifulnesse in preferring, whose p ittifu ll 
and tender commiseration of the poorest w retch 
that liveth within her dominio[n]s, doth not w ithout 
great cause establish her loving subiects in honoring 
her, powring out dayly most fervently their p ray ers  
for her safe, long, and prosperous governm ent 
(Blandy: sig. Eii.v-Eiii.r).
in short, the absolute model of all that he has put forward. It is 
worth noting here that there is, throughout Blandy’s pam phlet, 
an erratic use of italics, and it is difficult to be sure w hether 
their use is at the instruction of the author — a reasonable 
assumption — or at the whim of the compositor. In either case it 
is hard to see whether their use uniformly signifies em phasis; 
the entirety of Blandy and Gates’ discussion of Elizabeth, 
however, is italicised, in this case obviously to draw the 
reader’s eye to it — which leads me to speculate, given the 
dedication of the pamphlet to Sir Philip Sidney, that perhaps 
Blandy was seeking office.
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For men so devoted to the martial arts and virtues as Gates 
and Blandy — indeed, to any warrior, perhaps to any man of the 
time — Elizabeth’s presence on the English throne must have 
been at best disturbing. As is well known, she went to g reat 
lengths to avoid outright conflict with England’s enemies, and 
this pacifism, combined with her gender, must have led to 
despair those who saw the root of manly virtue in deeds of 
note. ‘Policy’ was often a term of derision in the literature of 
the period, yet this was where Elizabeth’s strengths were m ost 
manifest. The myth of kingship — dynamic, evolving even as 
Blandy and others tried to describe it —required that the tru e  
prince prove his virtue by means other than successful 
negotiation. In somehow dealing with postlapsarian chaos, the  
character of the king — indeed, the office of king —was form ed 
in the same way Gates believed that the heat of was was still 
the test of a true man. To rise as king out of this turmoil was 
not only to be a paragon of virtue, but to be the paragon of 
warriors. To many of the proponents of soldierly virtue, this 
notion was so overriding as to suggest that any king who was 
not a warrior of note was not worth his title. After rem arking  
on the interest of poets in “Bucklers, Battails, Lances” and so on, 
Stephen Gosson notes (from Homer, one assumes) that
Agamemnon beyonde the name of King hath this 
title, that he was a Souldier. Menelaus, because he 
loved his Kercher better then a Burgonet, a softe 
bed than a hard fielde, the sounde of In strum en tes 
then neighing of Steedes, a fayre stable then a foule 
way, is let slippe without prayse (Gosson: sig. D6).
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But by the time Gosson and his fellows were writing this notion 
hardly held any of its former weight; the king had become, 
perversely, a ‘warrior’ who did not fight. Instead, there had 
developed around the king or prince the complex rhetoric of 
monarchy, the notions of the duty or service done for the king, 
that the king was himself the ultimate source of and reason for 
honour, and the generally-accepted idea that the King was in all 
other ways the most virtuous of men.
After expounding upon the virtue of obedience, the 
‘Homily Against Wilful Rebellion’ goes on to explain that for all 
the importance of obedience by good subjects, the “virtue and 
godliness ... wealth and prosperity of a kingdom” rely more on 
“a wise and good Prince” than on the people; it suggests, as 
Gates comes close to, that “an undiscreet and evil Governor” will 
be more destructive to a realm than unvirtuous subjects 
(Homilies: 563). And as clear as the Homiles are on the virtue of 
the ruled, and as other writers are on the virtues of the king, 
Francis Bacon was aware of the “vices of authority”, those 
things which might create or infect an “evil Governor”: “delays, 
corruption, roughness, and facility”, he calls them, before going 
on to prescribe their cure. He gives special attention to 
“roughness”, as “it is a needless cause of discontent: security
breedeth fear, but roughness breedeth hate” (Hawkins: 32-33). 
As we shall see in Macbeth , an understand '^ the possible vices 
of authority was an important part of the picture of its virtues.
sjc sfc s{c
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What I have presented here is an interlinked structure of ideas. 
Beginning with notions of virtue, I have shown how prose 
writers of the period related these to concepts of honour. These 
in turn were manifested in the worth of certain kinds of deeds, 
performed by certain kinds of men in support of a definite 
hierarchy, one which was, in turn, intimately related to — if 
only in theory — the notions of virtue with which I began. 
There were further relationships between these five concepts: 
being granted honour in turn granted or confirmed status in 
the hierarchy, and it was one’s status which determined the 
nature of the honourable deeds one undertook. These deeds 
were, perhaps, held to be a manifestation not only of honour 
but of virtue, and the paragon of all these was, in the first 
instance, the warrior — whose objective, after all, was the 
display or achievement or confirmation of his honour.
At the centre of all of this was the king. It was the king 
who was the paragon of virtue, who, it could be said, 
determined what was virtuous. He conferred honour, through 
‘witnessing’ honourable deeds. He was, in an odd way, the 
paragon of warriors, and at the same time both the head and 
the symbol of the hierarchy the warrior was to protect.
The close interrelationship of all these concepts was —as 
Blandy asserted — the strength of the structure. But it was also 
its most vulnerable feature: a challenge to any one of these 
concepts was a challenge to the whole intricacy of Elizabethan 
society. It was, moreover, a purely theoretical structure, one
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which reflected less and less the true character of the society it 
represented, and the men it gave purpose to.
The texts I have skimmed over here cover a range almost 
a century, from Elyot’s Governour (1531) to Bacon’s Charge 
Touching Duels (1614) and a late (1623) edition of the Homilies. 
Like Gates’ and Blandy’s work, however, most of the pamphlets 
dealing explicitly with the issues of martial virtue and the 
status of the warrior cluster in the last two decades of the 16th 
Century: for example Giles Clayton’s Approved Order of Martiall 
Discipline (1591), Richard Compton’s The Mansion o f  
Magnanimitie (1599), and Barnabe Rich’s A Path-Way to 
Military Practise (1587), with similar works being published 
right up to the Civil War. What this demonstrates, I feel, is an 
on-going concern not only with England’s military security and 
the status of the warrior, but also — as extensive
Shakespearean scholarship and criticism has shown — 
apprehensions about the essential nature of masculinity, and its 
defence in the face of perceived threats from the theatre, 
foreign influences, and a luxurious court — hence two of the 
best-known tracts from the heydey of England Renaissance 
theatre, Hie Mulier: or, The Man-Woman and Haec-Vir: or, The 
Womanish-Man, both published in 1620, and, like Gates and 
Blandy, feeding off each other in a philosophical/moral strange 
loop.
As I have indicated, I have discovered little about William 
Blandy and Geffrey Gates other than the fact that they each
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saw fit to publish their respective pamphlets at a time of on­
going concern about England’s military capabilities and national 
stature. Blandy has a brief entry in the Dictionary of National 
Biography, mentioning only his education and his service in the 
Low Countries in 1580. No other dates are given, and he is 
remarked on only as a writer on political and social mores. 
There is no information for Gates at all: the “unlettered man” 
leaves only a single tract to posterity. It could be suggested 
that the paucity of information about them undermines what 
little status they might have as representatives of a broader 
group of work, that their inclusion with such august company 
as Bacon and Elyot is ... questionable. But there is no doubt, in 
my mind, of their representativeness. They each express, in 
their own way, similar concerns to those voiced elsewhere in
the literature of the period, particularly in the drama. They
each put forward similar ideas about the nature and
composition of the warrior ethic, the qualities and virtues that 
should be possessed by a man, or more specifically by a man 
who calls himself a soldier. They and the other works I have 
used here form the foundation of a debate which, like so many 
other issues, found itself being played out on the stages of 
Elizabethan-Jacobean London. Many of the martial virtues 
trumpeted by Gates and Blandy and others are bruited about in 
almost exactly the same terms by Shakespeare, Marlowe, 
Jonson, and the other leading lights of the theatre.
Whether the work is by Bacon or Blandy, Marlowe or
Middleton, the same concepts arise: prudence, justice, courage,
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fortitude, “perseverance”, “puissance”; the idea that these 
virtues are found, or should be found, in the soldier; that they 
should certainly be seen in the king. Macbeth, as a (fictional) 
soldier fighting his battles in this milieu, is both acting out and 
acting in defence of these ideas. He is, as I have pointed out, 
immediately introduced to us in opposition to a rebel, a disloyal 
countryman, a man possessed of “multiplying villainies”. But, as 
we know, the eponymous martialist of the tragedy Macbeth is 
no paragon of these virtues or any others; he is a figure whom 
Alexander Leggatt suggests “comes closer than any other tragic 
hero in Shakespeare ... to being a figure of pure evil” (Leggatt: 
189). And this leaves us with an apparent contradiction 
between the representation of Macbeth-as-warrior, and the 
wider cultural understanding of what that should have implied.
3. In vertuous maners
For honour is, or should be, the place of virtue; and 
as in nature things move violently to their place, 
and calmly in their place; so virtue in ambition is 
violent, in authority settled and calm.
Bacon, ‘Of Great Place’ 
(Hawkins: 33)
And so we are back to Duncan and his thanes, waiting on the 
blasted heath — on the stage of the Globe, or in Blackfriars, or in 
a dining hall in the King’s Presence. Banquo and Macbeth, both, 
as yet, unmet, are reported in a way as to make them seem 
single-handedly responsible for the victory over the rebels 
Cawdor and Macdonald, and the invading forces of the King of 
Norway. Something in the ferocity of the battle seems to inspire 
the “captains”, we hear —“they were/As cannons over-charged 
with double cracks;/So they doubly redoubled strokes upon the 
foe” (I,ii,36-38). It is only after all of this report, however, th a t 
the unnamed captain making it allows that he is “faint” and 
wounded, and now that this part of his duty to his king has 
been carried out, he is allowed to withdraw with high praise 
from his sovereign: “So well thy words become thee as thy  
wounds;/ They smack of honour both” (I,ii,43-44).
And almost at the play’s outset, we can see some of the 
concepts discussed by Blandy and company being presented. 
The captain is praised not merely for his wounds, obviously, 
but for the actions in defence of his king and the realm that
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they represent. These actions — and his eloquent relation of 
them, even if his own part in them is not mentioned — are 
lauded, and it is since this praise comes from the king that we 
know it to be true. Here is the captain’s reward: the recognition, 
by the “fountaine of honour”, of the honourable nature of his 
deeds.
Blandy, as part of his explanation of the deserts of the true  
warrior, notes from Solon the use of “preferment, &
punishme[n]” as the means for providing “the securitye and 
preservatio[n] of a Commonwealth” (Blandy: sig. Dii.v). With the 
report from Ross and Angus that “The victory fell on us”, w e 
see Duncan put the precept to performance. The battle won, he 
announces
No more that Thane of Cawdor shall deceive
Our bosom interest. Go pronounce his present death
And with his former title greet Macbeth.
(I,ii ,63-65)
The traitor punished; the loyal warrior rewarded. But in this 
case the reward is more than simply praise from the king, it is 
a notable —and noticeable —addition of honour: a new title. A 
captain who is described as a sergeant cannot, obviously, expect 
as much in the way of a reward as a thane described as a 
captain. It is, however, only by Duncan’s description of him as a 
“cousin” and a “gentleman” that we can know, at this stage, of 
Macbeth’s ‘nobility’. It is not until we meet Macbeth himself — 
and he has met the weird sisters — that we can be sure that he 
is numbered among Scotland’s gentry, as the Thane of Glamis;
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so it might seem that it his through his great(er) deeds that he 
merits such great(er) rewards. And so Cawdor’s lost honour is 
added to Macbeth’s, in what various critics have seen as a 
premonitory remark by the king (Braunmuller: 108).
When we finally meet this paragon of warriors, it is, as I 
have noted, as he himself meets the three strange women of 
“prophetic greeting”. Their disappearance is followed hard upon 
by the reappearance of Ross and Angus, fresh from th e ir 
audience with Duncan. Ross mentions twice in seven lines 
Duncan’s ‘praises’ of Macbeth before he informs him of his new 
tit le 1, “an earnest of a greater honour”. Leaving aside some of 
the implications of Macbeth’s response to this honour for a later 
chapter, we can focus instead upon the reactions of his fellow 
thanes. Banquo describes him as “rapt”, noting that “New 
honours come upon him/Like our strange garments, cleave not 
to their mould,/But with the aid of use” (I,iii,143-145). It is not 
immediately clear whether Macbeth’s discomfiture is a result of 
his not being accustomed to praise and reward from his king — 
a bit hard to believe — or some noble modesty; perhaps part of 
the rhetoric of honour and reward which prevails here is a 
certain ‘aw shucks’ stance in relation to them. Gates and 
company give us no clues to this, however: while being clear on 
how one might come to deserve such merit, they do not bo ther 
to describe in what spirit one should accept it. Perhaps the 
truly noble man or warrior simply ‘knows’; perhaps it is part of 
the underlying model of manhood which props them up. In this
1 This is the first of many instances where Ross appears as a herald o f  
what always, ultimately, plays out as bad news — a messenger s imply  
crying out to be shot.
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case, as soon becomes obvious, it is from the play itself that w e 
can find the means to decipher Macbeth’s response.
Before that, however, we have the strange relation of 
Cawdor’s death:
... very frankly he confessed his treasons,
Implored your highness’ pardon, and set forth 
A deep repentance. Nothing in his life 
Became him like the leaving it. He died 
As one that had been studied in his death,
To throw away the dearest thing he owed 
As ‘twere a careless trifle. (I,iv,5-ll)
Unlike Macdonald —untitled, as I have pointed out —Cawdor, 
too, was numbered among Scotland’s nobility. There is no 
reason given for his rebellion, though many could be inferred. 
This, in fact, is the most we learn about him —that, all honour 
lost, he still manages to go to his death in a manner that elicits 
praise from his former fellow-countrymen. But a single rem ark 
here is a telling one: “Nothing in his life/Became him like the 
leaving it”. It is almost as if the nobility that was his by title 
was significantly lacking in his character, only to be manifested 
at the last by his “deep repentance” and Stoic acceptance of 
death. Why, then, if he was so conspicuously ‘unbecoming’ was 
he a gentleman so trusted by his king? And why is it that the 
manner of his death is so admired by those who saw and hear 
of it?
I suspect that the idea, here, is not that an evil man may 
be redeemed by the manner of his death, but that the man was
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so vile that the only meaningful thing he could do was die well. 
This is another important point, one also well established very  
early in the play. The notion of a ‘good’ death is one with a long 
history in Christian philosophy, and an important part to play 
in Macbeth —particularly since it is another action that a m an 
might perform in front of the right audience, another m ortal 
deed by which his honour may be measured or increased. I 
shall return to this point towards the end of this chapter.
But we also have Duncan’s response to the news of 
Cawdor’s death to take into consideration:
There’s no art
To find the mind’s construction in the face.
He was a gentleman on whom I built
An absolute trust. (I,iv, 11-14)
Since we cannot know a man’s soul —or at least thoughts —we 
have to judge them by either their words or their deeds. 
Cawdor has been so judged, and accepted, and yet this 
judgement and acceptance has obviously — from his recen t 
actions — been based upon erroneous perceptions. As m any 
commentators on the play have noted, it is no accident that, 
this warning having been subtly given, Macbeth finally arrives 
in the presence of his king.
Duncan feels, for some reason, that he has sinned in his 
ingratitude to Macbeth (I,iv, 15), who responds:
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The service and the loyalty I owe,
In doing it, pays itself. Your highness’ part
Is to receive our duties, and our duties
Are to your throne and state, children and servants,
Which do but what they should by doing everything
Safe toward your love and honour. (I,iv,22-27)
Macbeth, when not yet fully committed to the murder of this 
king, still perceives his own position within the political and 
ethical structures of Scotland in terms of duty. It is peculiar, 
however, that at this point there is no mention of what the 
king, who lies at the focus of all this “service and loyalty”, may 
owe his subjects beyond the gracious and grateful receipt of 
their “duties”. Even their protection is out of his hands; it is 
clearly another duty of his thanes. The king, the other thanes, 
and all the people of the realm can expect of the thanes and 
warriors their duties, their defence of the realm and the king; 
what the warriors can — and, ideally, should —expect in return 
is gratitude expressed, recognition given, and honour accorded. 
It is worth noting here that at the end of the play pretty much 
the same situation prevails, since it is clear that, even before he 
becomes king, Malcolm can expect the obedience and loyalty of 
the thanes.
The real obligations here appear to flow in only one 
direction —from the lower ranks, the warriors, to the king. 11 
might sound cynical to point out that ‘all’ Macbeth and the 
other thanes can expect in return is greater honour, more 
recognition —that was, after all, how the system worked. But 
the mere fact that Cawdor —and perhaps the more mysterious
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Macdonald — have seen fit to rebel against this ‘system’ (or at 
least its embodiment in Duncan), and the fact that Macbeth will 
shortly do so, are indicative of a feeling among some of 
Scotland’s thanes that more is not enough.
What is clear, from these various exchanges, is that even 
before the first act is over, even before the real juggernaut of 
the play’s plot has begun its motion, certain concepts are laid 
out before an audience or a reader. A framework of right action 
and attitude — a moral framework — is carefully, subtly 
constructed around the principal characters of the play. It is 
this framework that I refer to as the warrior ethic, and it is 
characterised by prowess in battle in the service of the king; 
honesty and openness; obedience; loyalty; duty; honour earned 
through great deeds and recognised by the king; a proper 
bearing in the face of adversity, bordering on Stoicism; and, 
ultimately, a noble death, ideally in battle. Some of these 
concepts are already familiar —they haunt the pages of Gates 
and Blandy’s pamphlets, of Elyot’s treatise and Bacon’s essays — 
and they have stalked the stage in their purest form in the 
earlier history plays. It is this framework, the warrior ethic, 
that is my principal concern in this work, and particularly in 
this chapter — but in this chapter I will limit my examination of 
it to the way it is represented, deliberately demolished, and 
then aggressively restored through the course of the play. 
Many of its wider implications — and many of the play’s 
meatier, well-known scenes —will only be glossed over here, 
saving their consideration for the following chapters, in relation
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to some of the broader issues surround the ideal of the warrior 
ethic.
Harry Berger, like Thomas Nashe, sees cause for concern in 
Scotland’s relationship with its warriors:
In a society which sanctions violence, which relies 
on the contentiousness of its members no less than 
on their solidarity; and in which ferocity and praise 
mutually inspire, intensify, each other, the success 
of outstanding warriors must always be greeted 
with muffled concern as well as “great happiness”. 
(Berger: 14)
He is not alone in feeling so; Carolyn Asp has pointed out that
Duncan’s sentimental joy over the bloody victory 
emphasizes the fundamental weakness of a warrior 
society that condones and rewards in its heroes a 
violence that, unregulated by ritual or power, can 
turn against it (Asp: 154).
So the fundamental flaw of this system is that it is, after all, 
violent deeds — of a particular kind, pre-determined to be 
‘right’ —that it rewards. This is behind even the looser notion 
of ‘deeds’ already discussed in relation to period texts, the 
“couragious enterprises in warr” mentioned by Castiglione. And 
Asp is, I believe, spot on in saying that there is a need, in this 
society, for “ritual or power” to circumscribe the articulation of 
violence in its warriors. In theory, all power is, in such a 
system, vested in the king; with their rather formulaic feel, 
both Macbeth’s remarks to Duncan, and the purely rhetorical 
apology for ingratitude which inspired them, obviously form
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part of the “ritual” which likewise constrains soldierly
aggression.
Yet Duncan scarcely pays attention to Macbeth’s response, 
further skipping over his thanks to Banquo to get on to the 
issue that he is, at this juncture, more concerned w ith -h is 
successor:
We will establish our estate upon 
Our eldest, Malcolm, whom we name hereafter 
The Prince of Cumberland, which honour must 
Not unaccompanied invest him only,
But signs of nobleness like stars shall shine 
On all deservers. (I,iv,37-42)
Duncan is suggesting that by bestowing this honour upon 
Malcolm, he is somehow adding kudos to those he has already 
awarded; as if the reflected glory of Malcolm’s coming accession 
will add to the honour of the other nobles — and, as king, he 
will, as his father, become the fount of honour to his fellow 
Scotsmen. But it is also clear that he is suggesting that such 
rewards must be ‘accompanied’ by other “signs of nobleness” if 
they are to mean anything. Implicit in this is his belief that 
Malcolm is obviously possessed of these signs of nobleness, and 
thus deserving of this reward. We eventually discover that the 
new Prince of Cumberland is certainly of noble character, and 
perhaps deserving of recognition for this alone, but in the 
terms of the warrior ethic of Shakespeare’s Scotland, he has a 
telling flaw.
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Like Macbeth, Malcolm is brought to our attention with no 
explanation of his status; certainly his appearance in I,ii 
contains nothing to let us know he is the king’s eldest son, with 
all that might suggest to both an Elizabethan and a modern 
audience. We do not find this out until after the battle has been 
won, the danger averted, and the rewards doled out. As a 
matter of fact, the first thing that we learn about Malcolm is 
that he’s not much of a warrior: he has to be rescued by that 
“bloody man” who brings the newest report of the war (I, ii,3- 
5). Macbeth, almost single-handed, can turn the tide of the 
battle, but the man eventually named heir to the throne has to 
be rescued by a lowly sergeant — whose reward, as I have 
pointed out, is little more than a pat on the back. Compared to 
Macbeth, or even the sergeant, what has Malcolm done —and 
remember, it is deeds that are supposed to be rewarded here — 
to deserve the title of Prince of Cumberland and the 
anticipation of the throne?
It would seem, from this, that something of a double 
standard is being applied; despite the fact that a single political 
structure prevails in Shakespeare’s Scotland, at least two 
ethical structures exist as well. One of these is the network of 
ideals I have called the warrior ethic; the other, less easily 
identifiable, seems to be associated with the king, and the 
expectations and privileges of that rank. This should be no 
surprise: as I showed in the previous chapter, considerations of 
manly qualities and warrior virtues often extended to the king 
as a special case, as the living embodiment of the principles to
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which other men aspired. Kings were still seen, however, as 
part of the same unified framework.
In Shakespeare’s Scotland, though, the difference betw een 
Macbeth’s deeds and rewards, and Malcolm’s, and the d ifferent 
standards they suggest, place the king and his sons outside the  
structure of duty and obligation which surrounds the thanes, 
locating them, perhaps, in an associated but distinct ethical 
structure of their own. There is a clear distinction between the 
separated structures, too, one which the previously-cited  
‘Homily Against Wilful Rebellion’ helps to illustrate, through its 
insistence on obedience as a virtue of the subject; a v irtue  
belonging to the ruled, and not the ruler. Again, it is an 
expectation which works one-way; there is no countenancing of 
the idea that the king should be obedient to the reasonable 
wishes of his subjects. The duty or virtue of the obedience of 
the subject is another matter which becomes important in the 
play’s resolution, and I shall deal with this later in this chapter.
Given the distinction of the virtues of the ruler and the 
ruled, it becomes obvious from his exchange with Duncan th a t 
Macbeth is a man expected to operate only within one of these 
ethical structures —the warrior ethic —and not the other, the 
shape of which is not yet clear. It is possible even that M acbeth 
is not aware of the existence of this separate ethical structure, 
one based in part on ties of blood. What, then, would a m an 
raised within, thoroughly imbued with, the warrior ethic, make
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of Duncan's reward to Malcolm2? Perhaps the answer lies in the 
fact that it is immediately after this discussion and bestowing 
of honours that Macbeth clearly indicates he has begun to think 
about the weird sisters’ suggestion. As Macbeth leaves, we hear 
Duncan agreeing with Banquo about Macbeth’s ‘peerlessness’. 
This quality is, perhaps, something at the forefront of Lady 
Macbeth’s mind as she receives her husband’s letter in the 
following scene.
Despite Macbeth’s status as a superlative warrior, his 
wife’s first apprehension about his character, on receiving his 
report of his meeting with the weird sisters, is that he is “too 
full o’th’milk of human kindness” (I,v,15) — at least when it 
comes to serving his ambition. Within the ethical framework 
that has, thus far, been established in the play, there has been 
little overt consideration of ambition, though almost any reader 
or attender of the play would be aware of it as a possible 
motive for Cawdor and Macdonald’s rebellion. It was, at best, a 
problematic virtue to the writers of the period. Bacon wrote 
that
Ambition is like choler: which is an humour that 
maketh men active, full of alacrity, and stirring, if it
2 It has been pointed out to me that another issue, here, is that 11th 
Century Scotland did not base the succession on primogeniture; b y 
nominating Malcolm, Duncan was, in fact, skipping over the next i n 
line for the throne — Macbeth — and breaking Scottish law. Whether this 
would have been significant to the way the play was received is 
dependent on the audience’s knowledge of this tradition — a question 
which is, ultimately, unanswerable. I suspect that the familiar territory 
of father to son succession would have been far more important to a n 
audience’s reading of the play, and their reactions to Macbeth, that the  
finer points of medieval Scottish law.
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be not stopped. But if it be stopped, and cannot have 
his way, it becometh adust, and thereby malign and 
venomous (Hawkins: 113)
It was, in these terms, something which, in its proper place, 
was certainly in keeping with the other manly, soldierly virtues 
discussed by Bacon, Blandy, Gates and others — an active man 
was one who, ‘perpetually moving’ to paraphrase Blandy, was 
perpetually demonstrating his virtue. But the authors of the 
Homilies understood some kinds of ambition to be 
unambiguously dangerous, most particularly “the unlawful and 
restless desire in men of higher estate than God hath given or 
appointed to them.” (Homilies: 595). Before this qualification of 
‘unlawful’ ambition is made, however, they make their case 
quite forcefully:
ambition and desire to be aloft, which is the 
property of pride, stirreth up many men’s minds to 
rebellion; so cometh it of a Luciferan pride and 
presumption (Homilies: 581).
The association with the forces of evil is reinforced by the 
comparison of rebellious states to Hell, and the assertion that 
the devil will not allow thoughts of rebellion to remain just 
thoughts, Lucifer being, after all, the captain of all rebels 
(Homilies: 586). Scotland, in this light, is crawling its way out of 
its own descent into Hell, a Hell possibly created by its own 
warrior ethic — after all, we know nothing of the state of 
Scotland before Cawdor’s rebellion, whether his — and others’ — 
ambition was “stopped”
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In Holinshed, this driving ambition belongs to Lady 
Macbeth herself, “burning in vnquenchable desire to beare the 
name of a queene” (Boswell-Stone: 25). This is something only 
implicit in Macbeth , though easy enough to see in her derisive 
concern about her husband's ‘drive’. Shakespeare’s Lady
Macbeth believes ambition should be accompanied by “illness” 
(I,v,18), sentiments which are perhaps the most revealing 
about her character —and they are almost the first ones we 
hear her express. When her husband arrives, she urges on him 
exactly that deceit for which Cawdor — whose title Macbeth 
now bears — died:
Your face, my thane, is as a book where men 
May read strange matters. To beguile the time,
Look like the time, bear welcome in your eye,
Your hand, your tongue; look like th’innocent flower,
But be the serpent under’t. (I,v,60-64)
Transported by thoughts of their future together, she can reject 
any notion of honesty, of adherence to a moral code, in favour 
of pure expedience.
Duncan’s belief that one could “find the mind’s construction 
in the face” (I,iv,12) could be seen as the dearly-held ideal of a 
man himself both honourable and honest — but it is a belief 
which has led him to be dangerously deceived, and Macbeth 
cannot but be aware of this. Coming so soon after Duncan’s 
observation, Lady Macbeth’s remarks cannot go unheeded by 
an audience. Yet they may come as a surprise; though we saw 
him troubled by his earlier encounter with the weird sisters,
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our last sight of Macbeth was of a man apparently resolved to 
pursue the possibilities they presented to him. Despite the 
fact that no one else in the world of the play appears has to 
have seen anything of concern in him, Lady Macbeth sees 
something in his face to make her doubt his resolve — he is 
unable to conceal his mind’s construction from her, and h er 
suggestion that ‘fear’ alters his ‘favour’ may indicate that he 
has again changed his mind —as we know he will do again. 11 
is, perhaps, suspicion of this that leads her to say “Leave all the 
rest to me” (I,v,71).
Alternatively, he may already be practising the kind of 
deception his wife recommends. Either way, both are open to 
the possibility of taking advantage of their king’s trust, of 
subverting the ethical framework of their world.
Duncan’s arrival in the following scene carries on this 
newly-embraced practise of deceit. Once again, appearance is 
misinterpreted — the “pleasant seat” of Macbeth’s castle gives 
no forewarning of the turmoil to come. The martlet, according 
to Banquo, only ‘haunts’ those places where “the air is delicate” 
— but this is not such an atmosphere. Significantly, the b irds 
are also described as “procreant”; Macbeth’s castle is w here 
they breed, yet the castle’s lord is himself childless.
Lady Macbeth repeats her husband’s earlier evocation of 
duty, adding a little to our picture of Scotland’s double ethics:
All our service,
In every point twice done and then done double,
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Were poor and single business to contend 
Against those honours deep and broad wherewith 
Your majesty loads our house. (I,vi,14-19)
The king’s mere presence is a source of honour, another 
opportunity to serve. The real reward of this service is, of 
course, more service, and by her expression of this idea Lady 
Macbeth shows us that, as a woman of the Scottish nobility, she 
too is aware of the debt owed the king. Coming so soon after 
her reunion with her husband, however, her welcoming speech 
has a distinct air of hypocrisy, her duplicitous double doubling 
serving to mock, in its exaggeration, the ideal of service she 
pays lip-service to. Her husband’s absence from this greeting 
scene is perhaps indicative that, unlike his wife, for whom this 
may be a well-travelled path, he is still uncomfortable with — 
or is it ineffectual at? — the practise of deceit.
In the following scene, Macbeth shows that he is 
developing a degree of moral fluidity, though of a particularly 
naive kind —he wishes, child-like, to escape the consequences 
of his actions, to “jump the life to come”. But he has not yet lost 
his awareness of the morality of his situation:
But in these cases,
We still have judgement here that we but teach 
Bloody instructions, which being taught, return 
To plague th’inventor. (I,vii,7-10)
He seems, at this juncture, aware of his status as a moral 
exemplar, that others will imitate his actions, bad and good. He 
has, immediately behind him, the “Bloody instructions” of
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Cawdor’s revolt, and the personal knowledge of the effects of 
this lesson — hence his pause.
There is also, for Macbeth, a further moral issue:
Besides, this Duncan
Hath borne his faculties so meek, hath been 
So clear in his great office, that his virtues 
Will plead like angels, trumpet-tongued against 
The deep damnation of his taking-off. (I,vii, 16-20)
In a telling but subtle deviation from the source material, 
Duncan is portrayed by Shakespeare as a virtuous king. I n 
Holinshed, he is something less than this:
Makbeth [was] a valiant gentleman, and one that if 
he had not beene somewhat cruell of nature, might 
haue beene thought most woorthie the gouernement 
of a realme. On the other part, Duncane was so soft 
and gentle of nature, that the people wished the 
inclinations and maners of these two cousins to haue 
beene so tempered and interchangeablie bestowed 
betwixt them, that where the one had too much of 
clemencie, the other of crueltie, the meane vertue 
betwixt these two extremities might haue reigned 
by indifferent partition in them both, so should 
Duncane haue proued a woorthie king, and Makbeth 
an excellent captaine (Boswell-Stone: 18-19).
Duncan’s “clemencie” was seen as a direct cause of Scotland’s 
troubles:
after it was perceiued how negligent he was in 
punishing offendors, manie misruled persons tooke 
occasion thereof to trouble the peace and quiet state 
of the common-wealth, by seditious commotions
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which first had their beginnings in this wise 
(Boswell-Stone: 19).
He is indeed meek, but too much so; to paraphrase Harry 
Berger, he is the antithetic extreme of softness to Macbeth’s 
hardness (Berger: 27).
There are, in Shakespeare’s adaptation of this material, still 
indications of Duncan’s weakness —the rebellion, the fact that 
he can be deceived by his closest thanes, the fact that he has to 
be fought for —but the more consistent, overt picture is of a 
virtuous man, beatus vir, a “sainted king” as Macduff later 
describes him. It still might be possible, however, for a reader 
so disposed to see Duncan’s saintliness as the real cause of both 
Cawdor’s and Macbeth’s (more successful) revolt — but to 
Macbeth it is far more significant that Duncan is meek and 
virtuous, establishing the two as moral or ethical rivals, rather 
than political ones. The “double trust” he sees in Duncan’s visit 
is an indication that, even on the verge of regicide, he is very 
much in two minds. In fact, he is in transition from the familiar 
moral framework of the warrior ethic to the strange, dim ly- 
perceived and perhaps ill-defined morality of a king. It is, for 
Macbeth, a leap into the unknown — and one he quickly decides 
—temporarily —not to make. He asserts that his recently-won 
honours should be enjoyed (I,vii,32-35), not cast away with an 
act he knows will win no praise from the king — quite the 
opposite. Lady Macbeth’s derision of him, here, is something I 
shall consider at length in the next chapter; for the time-being I 
will note only that her ability to once again sway her husband’s
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opinion is indicative of her weaker allegiance to the w arrio r 
ethic, if not her outright rejection of it. Eventually, her urgings 
have the desired effect, leading Macbeth to revisit the image of 
the deceptive visage: “mock the time with fairest show ,/False 
face must hide what the false heart doth know.” (I,vii,81-82)
In spite of a fresh —and more material —reward from his 
king, Macbeth, re-persuaded, can now go so far as to reject the  
familiarity of the warrior ethic by lying to Banquo, his o ther 
potential partner in greatness, denying that he has had any 
thought of the weird sisters since their encounter with them . 
But while Macbeth seems now willing to follow the w eird  
sisters’ lead, his fellow-nobleman is still uncertain; given almost 
the same temptation as Macbeth, Banquo cannot countenance 
any action that might detract from his honour:
MACBETH: If you shall cleave to my consent, when
‘tis,
It shall make honour for you.
BANQUO: So I lose none
In seeking to augment it, but still keep 
My bosom franchised and allegiance clear,
I shall be counselled. (II,i25-29)
Banquo shows himself to be still very much mindful of the  
proper teaming of honour with ambition — that honour can only 
be ‘augmented’ in certain ways; it is something that can only be 
granted, not seized.
After the murder of Duncan — which will be explored a t 
greater length in a later chapter —Banquo soon has suspicions.
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He ponders upon the prophecy made for him, “that myself 
should be the root and father/Of many kings” (III,i,5-6). For 
him, this seems to be enough “hope”; even with his 
apprehension, he remains clear on one thing —his duty to the 
king, whoever that might be, however he may have come to the 
throne:
Let your highness
Command upon me, to the which my duties 
Are with a most indissoluble tie 
Forever knit. (III,i, 15-18)
Despite the manifest chaos attendant on — and perhaps 
resulting from — Duncan’s murder, Banquo (James’ ancestor, 
after all) at least is still capable of upholding the warrior ethic.
The sentiments he expresses to the new king are almost
identical to those expressed earlier by Macbeth, after his first 
encounter with the weird women, but before — we may 
imagine —he had conceived any plan. Perhaps at the time he 
expressed them, he meant them, but it is more certain that, in 
Banquo’s mouth, at any time, they are sincere sentiments 
indeed. It is possible, in fact, that Banquo was never in any
doubt about the more fitting response to the weird sisters’
promises —to do nothing that might detract from honour. It is 
hard to believe that he ever considered acting in assistance to 
their prophecies, so when, before the murder, Macbeth wished 
him good repose, he would, unlike the sleepless usurper, get it.
Uncertain of the expectations of him in his new role, and 
confused in a new moral environment, almost the first action 
Macbeth performs as king is one born of paranoia, sexual and
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moral insecurity, and a persisting reliance on the better-known 
requirements of the warrior — a violent reaction to any 
(perceived) threat to the monarch. As such, it is an action 
arguably worthy of a warrior — but certainly unbecoming a 
king. It is in this scene that we discover that Macbeth has 
decided to have Banquo and his son murdered, supposedly to 
forestall the “barren” effect of the sceptre. What he also sees is 
a threat of another kind:
To be thus is nothing,
But to be safely thus. Our fears in Banquo 
Stick deep, and in his royalty of nature 
Reigns that which would be feared. (Ill,i,49-52)
Macbeth has no fear of Banquo wanting his own shot at the 
throne —he certainly seems to think that Banquo is sincere in 
his obeisance, marking him, in his unwavering adherence to the 
martial code, as a morally superior being. This is almost 
certainly an invention of the dramatist’s — the Holinshed 
Banquo is complicit in Duncan’s murder (Boswell-Stone: 27), but 
in Shakespeare’s scheme he becomes an important moral 
contrast to Macbeth. We already know Banquo to be a warrior 
the equal of Macbeth, but clearly someone who seeks to be no 
more, since he is a man who knows the appropriate limits to 
the warrior’s deeds:
‘Tis much he dares,
And to that dauntless temper of his mind,
He hath a wisdom that doth guide his valour 
To act in safety. (Ill,i,52-55)
He is not only ‘royal’ of nature, but brave — brave within 
reason, not foolhardy, a subtle addition to the warrior model.
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“Under him,” says Macbeth, “My genius is rebuked”. M acbeth 
pales in comparison to this paragon.
But even with his personal rejection of the warrior ethic he 
has supported all his life, Macbeth still knows that it is 
something respected in Scotland, upheld by his fellow thanes, 
now his subjects. Despite the fact that this code persists, 
however, he is now too aware that others may find reason to 
try and escape from its strictures, much as he has done. It is, 
therefore, something he must now maintain as king, for its 
usefulness to him; in the banquet scene in III,iv he is m ore 
than happy to be toasted by the assembled thanes with “Our 
duties and the pledge” (III,iv,92). Again, this is a reminder of 
the ‘duty’ Macbeth himself claimed— as thane — to owe Duncan.
It is easy to imagine the earlier scene at Scone, after the 
tragic death of the old king. The new king, cousin to his 
predecessor, is sworn to protect Scotland, and receives the oath 
of allegiance from his friends, his colleagues, his fellow 
warriors. The oath would, I suspect, be similar in form to th a t 
made by Macbeth on receiving the new honours from Duncan; 
similar to that made by his wife on welcoming the king to h e r 
house; similar to the vows made personally by Banquo and 
collectively by the feasting thanes. But at both Scone and the  
banquet a particular was figure was conspicuous — to M acbeth 
— by his absence: Macduff. I say conspicuous to M acbeth
because, like Macbeth himself, and like Malcolm, Macduff is 
introduced to us with little information — even his name
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escapes us for some time. At his first appearance, admitted 
with Lennox by the drunken porter, he is just another thane, 
though he soon becomes a horrified ‘witness’ to the king’s
murder. He even seems, in his subsequent conversation with 
the hapless Ross, to accept the ‘evidence’ of Malcolm and 
Donaldbain’s flight as proof that they have murdered their 
father the king. We, in the audience, or reading the play, have 
no reason to single him out from his fellow-Scotsmen, no reason 
to read any special significance in his absence, later, from 
Macbeth’s coronation, and the (celebratory?) banquet.
But this absence is noted. At the end of the disordered 
banquet we discover that Macbeth did not “send to him” direct; 
as king, he could expect Macduff’s obedience to his “great
bidding” —even, it seems, a bidding un-made. His absence is 
material enough that, perhaps when combined with the shock 
of the grisly visitor to his feast, Macbeth can resolve to re-visit 
the weird sisters — where he quickly learns enough to turn his 
fears from the now-dead Banquo to the still-living Macduff. 
Indeed, there is, from this point of the play, a subtle shift in the
focus of the action. Even in his persistent absence, it is now
Macduff who seems to matter more, to become the subject of 
most interest to the weird sisters, to Ross, to the other thanes, 
and eventually to Malcolm. Someone we may have thought, up 
to this point, to be a minor figure, part of Scotland’s martial 
ethos, becomes the single most-discussed character in the play.
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After Macbeth’s decision to consult the weird sisters, and 
their (in some versions of the play) fleeting frolic with Hecate, 
there is a confusing scene which does little for the development 
of the play’s plot — little, that is, beyond first introducing to the 
audience the suspicions of Macduff, and now, perhaps, other 
thanes, about Duncan’s murder and the real character of his 
successor. It is a scene whose confusion has been attributed by 
Nicholas Brooke and others to either uncharacteristic untidiness 
on the part of the compositor, or to a poor manuscript (Brooke; 
52). He goes so far as to suggest that the scene is, in fact, 
unperformable as is — and it is, indeed, often cut in 
performance. Yet to do so is to deprive an audience of a key 
turning-point in the play’s consideration and representation of 
moral issues. Lennox’ speech, here, indicates more than his 
apprehensions about Macbeth. It also indicates a deep, if 
satirically expressed, moral disgust at what has transpired, as 
shown by the particularly value-laden terms he uses to relate 
what has happened: “gracious Duncan” is murdered, as is the 
“right-valiant Banquo”. The moral of the latter tale, he suggests, 
is that “Men must not walk too late”, a remark which might, if 
recalled later, undermine the both manliness of the sleepless 
(and therefore late-walking) Macbeth, and the inhumanity of 
the usurper and his sleep-walking wife. His doubts about 
Macbeth are confirmed by the carefully ambiguous gloss on 
Macbeth’s murder of Duncan’s grooms: “Was not that nobly 
done?” (Ill,vi,1-24).
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Malcolm, the legitimate heir, as we must now see him, is, 
we learn, at “pious” Edward’s court, and has become the focus 
of Scottish hopes; through him, says the nameless Lord
... we may again
Give to our tables meat, sleep to our nights,
Free from our feasts and banquets bloody knives,
Do faithful homage and receive free honours,
All which we pine for now. (Ill,vi,32-37)
There is an explicit desire for a return to the former state of 
things, when both homage and honours were freely given 
rather than constrained and extorted.
All of this is clear enough; the real confusion in the scene 
relates to Macduff, and from whom he received his sum m ons 
(Dl,vi,40). This is not something I intend to try and resolve here  
—more important is that Macduff responds “with an absolute 
‘Sir, not F” (lU,.vi, 41). From this peremptory response, even  
though it is something we hear reported, rather than see for 
ourselves, we can discern something more of Macduff’s so-far 
obscure character. Short-tempered, perhaps even aggressive 
his answer may be (though we already know this to be no fau lt 
in Shakespeare’s Scotland), but it is also indicative of strength. 
Unfortunately, it also indicates the kind of moral absolutism  
which Shakespeare seems often to condemn. And so he rem ains 
ambiguous, mysterious; it is not until Macbeth’s second 
encounter with the weird sisters — about which more later — 
that Macduff’s importance becomes clear to the reader, to the 
spectator, and to Macbeth.
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Arguably, Macbeth’s second action as king — after deciding 
upon Banquo’s murder — is to visit those same supernatu ra l 
solicitors whose urgings have, apparently, led him to abandon 
the moral security of the warrior ethic for the constant 
uncertainty of the crown. This alone is enough to suggest — as if 
we needed the hint — that he is not fit to be king, a notion 
confirmed by the witches’ anticipation of him as “Something 
wicked”, and by his reactions to the various apparition’s 
prophecies. The Child crowned’s advice to Macbeth — “Be lion- 
mettled, proud, and take no care/W ho chafes, who frets, or 
where conspirers are” (IV,i,89-90) — is certainly not good
advice for a king — any king — to follow, yet M acbeth 
immediately takes it to heart.
After the parade of phantom kings which so d isheartens 
him, Macbeth is informed of Macduff’s flight to England. Hard 
on the heels of the apparitions’ warnings, it is doubly 
dismaying to Macbeth, and perhaps precipitates his vow th a t 
“From this moment,/The very firstlings of my heart shall be/The 
firstlings of my hand” (IV,i,145-147). What this prom ise 
represents is the fulfilment of part of the Third A pparition’s
be
‘bodement’ — Macbeth has already begun toAproud and careless. 
The intemperate behaviour he has now embraced is 
unbecoming of any man, and noble, any king, if only because it 
represents a resignation to the impulses of emotion, of feeling, 
since it is the ‘firstlings’ of his heart he will follow. He follows 
this vow with a decision to “crown my thoughts with acts, be it 
thought and done” (IV,i,148). Following hard upon this is his
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third action as king, one as unbecoming as his earlier royal acts: 
to determine upon another murder, this time of Macduff’s 
“wife, his babes, and all unfortunate souls That trace him in his 
line” (IV,ii, 151-152). He seeks to perform the same total 
erasure of a Scottish noble line as he did with Banquo, and 
perhaps we can believe that his attempt, this time, will b e 
equally ineffective, though equally bloody.
Poor Ross, again the bearer of bad news which he barely  
understands, tries to deliver warning of Macbeth’s plans to 
Lady Macduff. An unfortunate effect of his warning, for the  
audience at least, is to further complicate whatever p icture 
might be developing of her husband’s character, particu larly  
his moral standing in this increasingly immoral milieu. Having 
learned —from Lennox, in the previous scene — that “Macduff 
is fled to England” (IV,i,141), we hear Lady Macduff a ttrib u te  
his flight to “fear” (IV,ii,4). Ross suggests instead that it m ay 
have been from “wisdom” — a proposition she promptly rejects. 
She questions the ‘wisdom’ of his departure, and in addressing 
the puzzle there is a particular hierarchy of importance — in 
her mind —to what he has abandoned: “his wife ... his babies, 
His mansion, and his titles” (IV,ii,6-7), in that order. “He loves 
us not,” she says, “He wants the natural touch” (IV,ii,8-9). There 
is a degree of histrionics here, sure, but Macduff’s flight is one 
of the great mysteries of the play, one of the great callous 
deeds of the canon. It may, however, be an action questionable 
on emotional grounds — but it is the action of a warrior loyal to 
his true king above all else. Is this more important? Not to his
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wife: to her it “runs against all reason” (IV,ii,14). And it is not 
only unreasonable to desert his family, it is unnatural — she 
cites the wren, “most diminutive of birds”, as more willing to 
defend its brood than her husband.
But Ross disagrees. Macduff has his reasons, he asserts: “He 
is noble, wise, judicious, and best knows/The fits o’th’season” 
(IV,ii,16-17). From the stand-point of the warrior ethic, 
familiar ground to Ross, this loyalty to the true king is perfectly  
understandable — yet the action that has precipitated this 
dialogue suggests — even to a modern audience, with less w ell- 
articulated or deeply held notions of honour —that Macduff is 
not noble, wise, or judicious.
It would be more true to say that Macduff is fit fo r  the 
season, a season of uncertainty and violence:
... cruel are the times when we are traitors
And do not know ourselves, when we hold rumour
From what we fear, yet know not what we fear,
But float upon a wild and violent sea,
Each way and none. (IV,ii, 18-22)
The moral fabric of Scotland is now so disordered that its 
thanes feel lost, and even Macduff’s young son has a notion of 
the Zeitgeist: “the liars and the swearers are fools, for there are  
liars and swearers enough to beat the honest men and hang 
them up” (IV, ii, 55-56). The Messenger’s arrival, how ever, 
suggests that there are some remaining in Scotland w ith 
enough honour to know the right thing to do and to act on it,
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but Lady Macduff’s response to his warning highlights — as if 
we needed reminding —the inverted moral values which now 
prevail:
Whither should I fly?
I have done no harm. But I remember now 
I am in this earthly world where to do harm 
Is often laudable, to do good sometime 
Accounted dangerous folly. (IV,ii,70-74)
Like the wren, whatever efforts she may make to protect h er 
brood are futile.
The murder of Macduff’s family marks the point at which 
the old ethics of Scotland — of unquestioning defence of the 
realm and the king, of duty and honour — are cast aside, at 
least for the duration of Macbeth’s reign. We know, by now, 
that we cannot even expect Macbeth to uphold those vaguely- 
defined values that might be associated with the king, since 
with this premeditated slaughter of innocents he corrupts the 
very raison d ’etre of both warriors and the warrior ethic. 
Gefferey Gates described the ideal soldier in part as “he [that] 
tendereth ye widow and the fatherles” (Gates: 35), and while 
such sentiments are never explicitly expressed in the course of 
the play, they are, I think, so much part of the broader m oral 
fabric — particularly the tradition of chivalry — behind the play 
that they would have been taken as givens by the original 
spectators. The warrior — and more importantly the king — as a 
champion of justice is supposed to defend the weak, not wield 
the sword himself.
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The murder of Macduff’s family also leads into the m ost 
morally complex scene of the play: Malcolm’s ‘interview’ w ith 
Macduff. There is something about the prince’s early lines in 
this scene — the first we have seen of him since his precip itate 
flight from his father’s murder — which suggest that he is 
suspicious of Macduff, and part of the basis for this suspicion is 
the latter’s relationship with the tyrant: “you have loved him 
well — He hath not touched you yet” (IV,iii,13-14). He appends 
to this his first insinuation of his own ‘fault’; a comparison to 
Macbeth that would warrant his, Malcolm’s, sacrifice, ra th e r  
than let him grow to become another tyrant. Macduff’s
response to this tacit invitation — “I am not treacherous” —cuts 
straight to the heart of Malcolm’s concerns, and is a foretaste of 
his later replies to Malcolm’s imputation of his own sin; he will 
excuse almost any fault in a true king, and will not embrace the 
treachery of acting against one.
Malcolm’s counter-charge contains within it an echo of 
Gates: Macbeth is treacherous, he points out, and, as if 
explaining how this has come about, notes that “A good and 
virtuous nature may recoil/In an imperial charge” (IV,iii, 19- 
20). Gates may have been willing to entertain the possibility 
that kings might be less than virtuous, but there is, I think, 
something more in Malcolm’s words here. Malcolm is allowing 
that there is something in the nature of an “imperial charge” 
that may corrupt a good man, yes, but he is also suggesting that  
the charge requires something more than the nature proper to 
a man —indicating a belief that being a king is beyond ‘mere’
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men, even ‘virtuous’ ones. His use of angels as a symbol is a 
pointer to his thinking: theologically they are more than men, 
distinctly not men, and a king, as a being approaching the 
angelic, even the divine, is likewise more than a man. And if 
this is so, a usurper is surely something approaching the 
infernal.
His real concern, however, is that Macduff may have 
‘fallen’ under Macbeth’s influence. He is sure of Macduff’s 
constancy — “That which you are, my thoughts cannot 
transpose” (IV,iii,21) — but he is not sure of what Macduff may 
be constant to. When he finally voices the source of his “doubts” 
we discover that they are very much the same as our own:
Why in that rawness left you wife and child,
Those precious motives, those strong knots of love,
Without leave-taking? (IV,iii,26-28)
An action that we already feel to be morally questionable, and 
which we know to have had tragic consequences, is of primary 
concern to this young prince, and the concern that a reader or a 
spectator might have felt about it is now related to the broader 
issues of ethics which run through the play. Macduff has, as I 
have tried to indicate, been a figure who has remained, thus 
far, of uncertain morality. He was introduced to us in 
anonymity, without the accolades that heralded the appearance 
of Macbeth, and even Banquo. We have seen or heard of him 
doing a number of very strange things, things which might 
serve to suggest that he is at best aloof, at worst heartless and 
careless, culminating in this notorious action which no one else
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in the play, sharing the same ethical framework, operating with 
the same notions of right action and duty, can understand.
Malcolm is Duncan’s nominated successor, the legitimate 
king, and, therefore it is now he who is, for the Scottish 
noblemen, the true fount of honour. It then follows that any
action he can call into question cannot be honourable. Thus, 
Macduff’s desertion of his family receives the ultimate
condemnation of a true king — and so Macduff’s standing
reaches its nadir in the eyes of an audience. It is this same 
betrayal that makes Malcolm cautious, apprehensive of a lesser 
treachery anticipating a greater one, treachery to the king.
Macduff complains “I have lost my hopes” (IV,iii,24), but to 
Malcolm —to us —the abandoned wife and children are these 
‘hopes’, and as his hopes they should have been more 
important. Macduff is so offended by this slur upon his
character that he threatens to leave.
Malcolm withdraws, slightly, voicing his concerns for the 
state of his kingdom, and begins his real trial. He makes his 
second insinuation that he is possessed by ‘vices’ (IV,iii44-47) 
— and it is a measure of Macduff’s attitude towards him that he 
does not, at first, believe that Malcolm’s oblique reference is to 
himself:
MACDUFF: W h a t sh o u ld  h e  b e?
M A LCO LM : It is myself I mean — in whom I know 
All the particulars of vice so grafted 
That when they shall be opened, black Macbeth 
Will seem as pure as snow ...
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... I grant him bloody,
Luxurious, avaricious, false, deceitful,
Sudden, malicious, smacking over every sin 
That has a name. But there’s no bottom, none,
In my voluptuousness ... (IV,iii,49-53, 57-61)
The odd thing about the vices attributed to Macbeth — the same 
vices that Malcolm grants himself —is that we, in the audience 
or reading the text, have seen little of them. We have seen 
malice, yes, towards Banquo, towards Macduff, and we have 
also — as I have elaborated —seen deceit. The closest we have 
seen to luxuriousness, however, is the banquet scene, a scene 
more significant, I suggest, for the appearance of Banquo’s 
ghost than for any moral overtones. Indeed, any indication of 
luxuriousness that might be read in to the scene would be very  
much dependent on the inclinations of a director or an 
individual reader. The only other hint in the play is one 
contradicted by the play’s broader strokes — the same saintly 
Duncan whom Malcolm is to succeed is described, shortly  
before the king’s murder, as having been engaged in “unusual 
pleasure” (II,i, 13). Perhaps the king’s habitual abstem iousness 
has fallen by the wayside under the influence of the scheming 
Macbeths. The suggestion of over-indulgence is also one w ith 
possible implications to the world outside the play: Anne 
Somerset notes Bishop Godfrey Goodman’s lament on the  
extravagance of James’ court: “Being a time of peace,” he says, 
“we fell to luxury and riot” (Somerset: 37).
With Malcolm’s condemnation of Macbeth it is, in some 
ways, as if we have returned to the same kind of m oral
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reductivism observed at the beginning of the play. Much as 
Cawdor and Macdonald were seen as evil men because of their 
rebellion — and later elaboration on Cawdor’s character does 
little to suggest otherwise —so Macbeth, as a usurper, is now 
being seen as the embodiment of all sin. Perhaps, in the moral 
hierarchy of Scotland, treason and regicide are first in the rank 
of evil, and any man capable of them must, perforce, have come 
to them via an whole array of other sins —but this is not what 
we have seen.
The denigration of Macbeth represents another significant 
departure from the source material. In Holinshed, after the 
murder of Duncan, the new king “Makbeth” immediately sets 
out to undo those ills which had arisen in Scotland through “the 
feeble and slouthfull administration of Duncane”:
Makbeth ... set his whole intention to mainteine 
iustice, and to punish all enormities and abuses ... 
shewing himself thus a most diligent punisher of all 
iniuries and wrongs attempted by anie disordered 
persons within his realme, [he] was accounted the 
sure defense and buckler of innocent people; and 
hereto he also applied his whole indeuor, to cause 
yoong men to exercise themselves in vertuous 
maners (Boswell-Stone: 32).
He is, in other words, a paragon of the chivalric ideal: a
defender of the weak, a champion of justice. He does, however, 
ultimately prove a bit of a let-down:
such were the woorthie doings and princlie acts of 
this Makbeth ... that if he had atteined therevnto by
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rightfull means, and continued in vprightnesse of 
iustice as he began, he might well haue beene 
numbred amongest the most princes that anie 
where had reigned ... But this was but a counterfet 
zeale of equitie shewed by him, partlie against his 
naturall inclination, to purchase thereby the favour 
of the people. Shortlie after, he began to shew what 
he was, in stead of equitie practising crueltie 
(Boswell-Stone: 32-33).
Macbeth the upright soldier and worthy king soon shows 
himself to be Macbeth the political opportunist. His major 
failing — mentioned at the beginning of the Chronicle, and 
alluded to earlier in this chapter —is cruelty, and later in his 
reign this becomes his most notable — or notorious — 
characteristic. It is something inherent in him, and it is seen, 
again from the outset, as a problem; it is not even excused as 
something fitting to or useful in a warrior. Its re-manifestation 
in Macbeth the king has a particular cause: his wrongful seizure 
of the crown:
the pricke of conscience (as it chanceth euer in 
tyrants, and such as atteine to anie estate b y 
vnrighteous means) caused him euer to feare, lest 
he should be serued of the same cup, as he has 
ministred to his predecessor (Boswell-Stone: 33).
Other than his abiding faith in “wizzards”, this cruelty is the 
only vice attributed to Macbeth in Holinshed; certainly the 
litany of sin given from Malcolm’s lips is nowhere to be found.
So the charges of corruption that so colour our perception 
of Macbeth in the play do not spring from the source: they are
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an an invention out of whole cloth, one owing extensive debts 
to the latent mediaeval notion of the Deadly Sins and the Vice 
tradition in the Mystery Plays. They are, here, an invention 
necessary to the advancement of various moral propositions in 
the play, propositions which are either wholly absent from, or 
not materially relevant to, Holinshed’s telling of the tale. In 
Macbeth  the play, these propositions lead to the establishment 
of various moral antipodes between Macbeth and a succession 
of other Scotsmen: Macdonald, Cawdor, Duncan, Banquo,
Macduff, and eventually Malcolm himself.
In Shakespeare’s version of the story, Malcolm, having 
thoroughly maligned Macbeth’s moral worth, continues his test 
of Macduff with an interrupted point-by-point elaboration of 
his own supposed corruption. The first sin he details is 
“voluptuousness”, as he calls it, but Macduff places it with the 
broader category of intemperance. Perhaps an astute observer 
of human nature, Macduff is willing to gloss over this defect b y 
assuring Malcolm —and himself — of the sexual appetites of 
Scotland’s “willing dames”, something of which he seems 
strangely proud.
Malcolm then assumes the vice of “avarice”. This, too, 
Macduff is able to excuse, again with an odd kind of patriotism, 
a faith in Scotland’s wealth. Surprised, Malcolm abandons his 
elaboration to insist upon his complete immorality:
MALCOLM: The king-becoming graces —
As justice, verity, temp’rance, stableness,
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Bounty, perseverance, mercy, lowliness,
Devotion, patience, courage, fortitude —
I have no relish of them, but abound 
In the division of each several crime,
Acting it in many ways. Nay, had I power, I should 
Pour the sweet milk of concord into hell,
Uproar the universal peace, confound 
All unity on earth. (IV,iii,91-100)
He would, in other words, do exactly as Macbeth has — or a t 
least exactly as he suggests that Macbeth has. He com pares 
himself, both at the beginning and the end of this exercise, w ith 
the usurper, and claims, moreover, to be even worse. He seeks, 
point by point, to test the limits of what Macduff is willing to 
excuse in a king, and in the short but comprehensive catalogue 
of absent graces he hits his mark:
MALCOLM: If such a one be fit to govern, speak. 
I am as I have spoken.
MACDUFF: Fit to govern?
No, not to live. (IV,iii,101-104)
For Macduff, the charges that Malcolm has laid against him self 
are so incredible as to make him doubt the ‘truth’ of Malcolm’s 
origins:
Thy royal father
Was a most sainted king; the queen that bore thee,
Offner upon her knees than on her feet,
Died every day she lived. (IV,iii, 108-111)
Macduff proclaims Malcolm’s enumeration of his sins to be the 
end of his — Macduff’s — “hope”. This is the hope which 
surpassed the one he abandoned —his wife and child —and is, 
from his reaction, the superior hope which drove him to weigh
3. In vertuous maners 97
the two against each other and act as he did. It is no wonder, 
then, that he despairs as much has he does at Malcolm’s words.
This exchange between Malcolm and Macduff is another 
significant deviation from the play’s source. Much as in 
Shakespeare’s rendition of the scene, the Holinshed Malcolm 
decides to test Macduff by accusing himself of a succession of 
vices. In the Chronicle, however, there is a definite hierarchy of 
vice involved: the first, “intemperancie”, is conceded b y
Macduff to be “a verie euill fault”, but one which he can 
nonetheless overlook —so long as it is indulged in secret. The 
second, avarice, is “a far woorse fault than the other”, but again, 
Macduff manages to let it alone. Perhaps exasperated, Malcolm 
plays his trump card:
I am furthermore inclined to dissimulation, telling 
of leasings, and all other kinds of deceit, so that I 
naturally reioise in nothing so much, as to betraie 
and deceiue such as put anie trust or confidence in 
my woords. Then sith there is nothing that more 
becommeth a prince than constancie, veritie, truth, 
and iustice, with the other laudable fellowship of 
those faire and noble vertues which are 
comprehended onelie in soothfastnesse ... you see 
how vnable I am to gouerne anie prouince or region 
(Boswell-Stone: 39).
This, finally, is more than Macduff can take: “This yet is the 
woorst of all,” he responds, “and there I leaue thee”. Of this 
particular self-recrimination by Malcolm there is no sign in 
Shakespeare; it is an exchange telling in its absence from 
Macbeth. Here is one of the faults we can be sure Macbeth
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himself possesses, yet it remains unconsidered by
Shakespeare’s Prince of Cumberland. When assumed by the 
Chronicle Malcolm it provokes in the Chronicle Macduff the 
reaction that needs a whole, if compressed, catalogue of sins in 
the play.
Truthfulness is, clearly, an important virtue to Holinshed, 
but for Shakespeare it is encompassed by the whole of
Malcolm’s “false telling”, and is claimed, with a host of other 
qualities, in the prince’s confession. The allusion to “constancie, 
veritie, truth, and iustice” is the closest Holinshed’s Malcolm 
comes to the recitation of “king-becoming graces” that he utters 
in the play, and when he has received from Macduff the 
reaction he has sought, he does not even follow it up in the 
Chronicle with the systematic recantation we see in the play — 
saying that “I haue none of these vices before remembred” 
(Boswell-Stone: 40).
In Shakespeare’s version of this discussion, Macduff’s 
reaction to his prince’s putative immorality is far stronger than 
that found in the source, and to Malcolm, this response is ‘right’; 
it is a true and manly “passion”:
MALCOLM: Macduff, this noble passion,
Child of integrity, hath from my soul
Wiped the black scruples, reconciled my thoughts
To thy good truth and honour. (IV,iii,l 14-117)
His “modest wisdom” has led him to be cautious in dealing with 
newly-arrived refugees from Macbeth’s Scotland,
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... but God above
Deal between thee and me, for even now 
I put myself to thy direction and 
Unspeak my own detraction, here abjure 
The taints and blames I laid upon myself,
For strangers to my nature. I am yet 
Unknown to woman, never was forsworn,
Scarcely have coveted what was mine own,
At no time broke my faith, would not betray 
The devil to his fellow, and delight 
No less in truth than life. My first false speaking 
Was this upon myself. (IV,iii, 120-131)
Again, he gives us a list of virtues, this time his own. He 
repudiates lust, deceit, covetousness, faithlessness, disloyalty 
and falsehood — essentially the same charges he has laid 
against Macbeth. The correspondence to his earlier-recited list 
of “graces” is not exact, but it is clear enough, now, from his 
recitation of them that Malcolm knows exactly what they are, 
and holds each of them dear and true. Perhaps ironically, 
however, these virtues appear to give him little insight into his 
fellow-Scotsmen: he sees fit to ask the astonished Macduff,
“Why are you silent?”
Malcolm’s list of “king-becoming graces” also does not quite 
match the earlier list of vices, but what it does correspond with, 
and very closely, is the range of martial and kingly v irtues 
explored by Geffrey Gates, by William Blandy, by Bacon and 
Elyot and others. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, m ost 
of the relevant texts (with the exception of Bacon’s Charge 
Touching Duels) were written and circulated in the latter half of 
the 16th Century, anywhere between ten and eighty years
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before the ill-defined first performance date of Macbeth . Yet 
despite this span of time here are the same ideas, catalogued 
and represented on stage, being — we are encouraged to 
believe, for a short time —enthusiastically tossed out by the 
legitimate heir to the Scottish throne; and this action itself, in a 
situation the implications of which I will deal with later, is 
being performed before a king who is, in the world outside the 
play, the incumbent on both the Scottish and English thrones. 
More relevant here, however, is the fact that this list of graces, 
unlike the preceding catalogue of sin, is not entirely a creation 
of the dramatist, but an appropriation of matter from an earlier 
and obviously extensive debate.
The various lists in this scene — Macbeth’s vices and 
Malcolm’s own, supposedly absent and then suddenly restored 
virtues — show that Malcolm is possessed of a clear moral 
sense, even if he is representing it, here, by inversion. By so 
demonstrating his awareness of the warrior virtues under siege 
in Scotland, and forcefully declaring his allegiance to them, 
Malcolm is establishing himself as the obvious candidate to 
oversee their restoration. A spectator of an early performance 
of Macbeth would have been no more convinced by Malcolm’s 
self-accusations than a late 20th Century reader, intimate with 
the whole of the text, since there are, after all, certain 
inescapable ‘rules’ to the development of plot in Elizabethan 
and Jacobean drama, and one of them — rarely violated — is 
than some hope of redemption must remain in the play. Even 
without an appropriate knowledge of 11th century Scottish
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history and the but-newly-crowned King James’ ancestry, an 
astute spectator of the play would, after the debate w ith 
Macduff, have readily targeted Malcolm as the choice 
candidate. Alongside his now-obvious moral worth, he is also— 
as I have pointed out several times — the named heir, and that, 
in itself, would have been enough for a London playgoer, still 
recovering from the uncertainty about the succession which 
had dogged most of Elizabeth’s reign.
In falsely likening himself to Macbeth, Malcolm establishes 
the final moral antipode to the usurper. Much as the form er 
thane confronted Cawdor with “self-comparisons”, so, it seems, 
will this Prince of Cumberland confront this new rebel, with the 
same result —the triumph of a morally upright man, one tru e  
to the warrior ethic, over another possessed of “The multiplying 
villainies of nature”. And yet — again — an observer with the 
privileged position of an experienced reader will know th a t 
things do no, in fact, fall out in quite this way. It will not be 
Malcolm who ultimately deals with this new rebel, but his 
subject, the far less morally unambiguous Macduff. Malcolm’s 
conspicuous absence from the ultimate violent resolution of 
moral conflict in the play is not, I suggest, without precedent in 
the world of the play — but this is a point I shall cover tow ards 
the end of this chapter.
I will insist, however, that at this stage Macduff does 
remain a morally ambiguous character. Integrity he m ay 
possess but, however strong his ultimate indignation, his
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desperate willingness to excuse increasingly outrageous vice in 
his liege lord do little to encourage us to see him as any 
paragon himself. He remains tainted by his aloofness, by his 
abandonment of his family —until, that is, his obvious grief at 
the report of their murders. In a return to the beginning of his 
trial, he again rejects tears as a fit response to this new crime, 
choosing instead a vow of “manly” action: “Front to front/Bring 
thou this fiend of Scotland and myself;/Within my sword’s 
length set him” (IV,iii,235-237). Much of the implications of 
Macduff’s grief-waxing-wroth, and Malcolm’s feeding of it, I 
will leave until the following chapter; for the time-being I will 
return to my main theme here and note that Macduff’s promise 
of action is one certainly consonant with the warrior ethic. 
Moreover, it is a promise which signals Malcolm’s final 
commitment to the re-establishment of this ethic within 
Scotland.
This is certainly borne out in the following scene, where 
the other Scottish thanes are preparing to abandon the usurper 
and join the true king. Lennox notes that in the ‘file’ of 
Malcolm’s men are “many unrough youths” (V,ii, 10) of untried 
mettle. They are, we soon realise, participants in a moral 
struggle, between the inverted morality of the usurper, and the 
ancient order of duty and obligation he has overthrown. 
Caithness reports of Macbeth that
Some say he’s mad; others that lesser hate him 
Do call it valiant fury, but for certain 
He cannot buckle his distempered cause 
Within the belt of rule. (V,ii, 13-16)
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Macbeth’s ‘cause’ is beyond rule, beyond order. Since the 
proper order of things has been disrupted by his actions, he 
cannot rely upon it helping him. “Those he commands,” notes 
Angus, “move only in command,/Nothing in love” (V,ii, 19-20). 
The ‘service’ and ‘loyalty’ Macbeth admits owing to Duncan are 
not due to him, and he is aware of this, lamenting, in the 
following scene, that “honour” and “obedience” are no longer 
things he can claim to possess, or look forward to (V,iii,24-26). 
Those thanes who have not already deserted him recognise this 
as well: “march we on”, adds Caithness, “To give obedience 
where ‘tis truly owed” (V,ii,25-26). The forces of the Scottish 
nobility are now, as they were at the play’s outset, com m itted 
to the defence of Scotland’s king, and the warrior ethic they  
have seen undermined. In some ways, moreover, this late 
moral awakening of the other thanes might do something to 
redeem Macduff to us — he has, after all, already give his 
“obedience” to the ‘right’ person.
Malcolm is certainly aware that the obedience he is owed 
as legitimate heir is something he can now count on. He has 
been appraised — possibly by the defecting thanes — of the 
state of things in Scotland; that Macbeth, now a true ty ran t, 
cannot rely on, and does not deserve, the loyalty of his people: 
“none serve with him but constrained things/Whose hearts are 
absent too” (V,iv,13-14). Macduff immediately underscores the 
legitimacy of Malcolm’s efforts, declaring
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Let our just censures 
Attend the true event and put we on 
Industrious soldiership. (V,iv, 14-16)
There is no doubt —obviously — that this is what is needed 
now. It is the warrior ethic that binds these men together, 
“industrious soldiership” under the leadership of the legitimate 
king that will restore the code to Scotland. Malcolm himself 
acknowledges this by observing that “certain issues strokes 
must arbitrate” (V,iv,20).
One curious feature of the battle which began the play is 
that Duncan, lord of the realm, is not a participant in it. This is 
not, I concede, stated explicitly in the play’s text —and l a m  
sure that there is a long performance tradition of Macbeth  
which would have Duncan entering, armed cap-a-pie, in 
vigorous defence of his realm. But amidst a host of other kings, 
true and false, who enter the stage fighting furiously, Duncan is 
presented to us with alarums and attendants, “meeting a 
bleeding Captain”, who is obviously coming from the battle in 
which it is difficult to imagine the saintly Scottish king 
participating. Like a modern-day general he inhabits — one 
may imagine —his field tent, receiving the latest despatches 
and reports, perhaps sending off his instructions, but leaving 
the actual fighting to his thanes. There are a number of possible 
explanations for this — Duncan is, after all, old, and his absence 
from the field may be due to no other reason. But to Gates and 
Blandy and company, the warrior was the paragon of virtue, 
and the king the paragon of warriors. It was through testing
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and proof in battle that men showed themselves fit to be kings 
—and yet, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, they were 
writing in defence of this idea at a time when it was highly 
unlikely that a king would take to the field in defence of his 
own kingdom. That successive English kings were later to do so 
in civil wars which would, I think, have led Gates and Blandy, 
had they still been alive, to fight on opposite sides, was not 
something that either of them would have been able to believe 
possible —certainly not with the example of Elizabeth before 
them.
None of the virtues in Malcolm’s catalogue of kingly graces 
— “justice, verity, temp’rance, stableness, Bounty, perseverance, 
mercy, lowliness, Devotion, patience, courage, fortitude” — are 
explicitly martial. All of them, certainly, are set out by Gates 
and Blandy as martial virtues, but none of them — with the 
possible exception of courage — relate to a man’s capabilities on 
the battlefield; only to his moral fitness to properly exercise 
those capabilities in the service of his king. The king, in turn, is 
the embodiment and focus of these virtues; he has other men, 
lesser men, to fight for him; he himself has nothing to prove, no 
greater honour to earn. This is confirmed by the nature of 
Malcolm’s repudiation of his own supposed vices: whereas the 
warriors of Scotland are measured by their deeds, their moral 
worth gauged by things they have done, the legitimate future 
king asserts his own moral worth in terms of things he has not  
done. This absence of action is, to my thinking, the most 
impotant difference between the well-established warrior ethic
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of Scotland’s thanes, and the connected but distinct m oral 
framework of the king which was so subtly mapped out at the 
beginning of the play.
Macbeth, when we return to him, is holed up in Dunsinane. 
He has called for —and, eventually, received — his armour; he 
has vowed that he will “fight till from my bones my flesh be 
hacked” (V,ii,32). But despite the assurances of the various 
apparitions, he now seems reluctant to venture the field. We 
have been told (V,ii,12) that he has strongly fortified the castle; 
now, as we have already learned from Malcolm and his 
followers, he is prepared for a siege:
Our castle’s strength
Will laugh a siege to scorn; here let them lie
Till famine and the ague eat them up.
Were they not forced with those that should be
ours,
We might have met them dareful, beard to beard,
And beat them backward home. (V,v,2-7)
Macbeth has been assured of an almost-invulnerability; it is he 
who is to “laugh to scorn” the power of men. But here he is 
relying on the strong defences of a castle to protect him. He 
wishes the sickness of Scotland upon his foes, and uses the 
‘betrayal’ by the thanes as an excuse to not fight. Where is th a t 
“brave Macbeth ... Valour’s minion”, of whom we were told a t 
the beginning of the play? Where is the model of m artial 
prowess, “Bellona’s bridegroom”? Perhaps, as a king, he is 
aware that — as king — he does not have to fight. But unlike 
Duncan, he cannot count on his thanes and fellow -countrym en
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to fight for him. Like the long-defeated rebel Cawdor, he has 
had to resort to savage Irish mercenaries. But after report of 
his wife’s death, and a series of increasingly despairing 
soliloquies, Macbeth finally shows himself to be —in the p lay’s 
own terms — no true king, by undertaking to fight. It is alm ost 
as if he has, somehow, been spurred on by Lady M acbeth’s 
death; without his dearest partner of greatness — w ithout 
“honour, love, obedience, troops of friends” (V,iii,25), as he 
laments earlier — he can seen no other option but to hasten the 
end. After a final wish for chaos, for and end to his life and 
everything else, he returns at last to the familiar standards of 
the warrior ethic, still entirely inappropriate to a king: “Blow 
wind, come wrack;/At least we’ll die with harness on our back” 
(V,v,50-51). Like Cawdor at his end, Macbeth is still subject to 
the soldierly paradigm which sees a death in battle as the only 
way to go.
He soon shows himself, however, to have becom e 
something of a coward. In an echo of Blandy, Macbeth refuses 
suicide, the escape of the “Roman fool” (V,viiil-2), and then  
admits that, despite the second Apparition’s warning —
contradicted by the first — he has “avoided” Macduff. The 
confrontation is inevitable, however, and when they finally 
meet he shows traces of guilt, remorse, perhaps even mercy, all 
of which spring only from the fear he must feel for the man he 
now faces, the man whose wife and son he had killed, ra th e r  
than from any resurrected moral sense. The fear takes its 
deepest root when Macduff confirms his bloody birth, and
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Macbeth realises the way he has been deceived. The true 
measure of how far he has fallen from the warrior ideal comes 
when he refuses to fight Macduff (V,viii,22). To the latter, 
another man thoroughly imbued with Scotland’s warrior ethic, 
this refusal is a clear indication of Macbeth’s cowardice, and, by 
extension, his lack of fitness to be either king or warrior; it is 
only in the face of degrading comparisons, to monsters and 
things less than human, that Macbeth finally fights.
Unlike Macbeth, Malcolm’s only appearance on the field is 
after the battle has been lost and won, and even then, it is in 
association with a conspicuous lack of martial violence, when he 
is welcomed to Macbeth’s “gently rendered” castle (V,vii,25). 
Like his father —like, we may suppose, any true king —there 
has been no need for this prince to fight, and this might suggest 
a return to the two-fold moral order represented at the play’s 
outset. There is further evidence to support this in the source 
material, evidence which suggests that the virtuous Malcolm 
may be even more like his saintly father than might b e 
immediately obvious. Early in the Chronicle version of the story 
Duncan is described as having “small skill in warlike affaires”, a 
deficiency which leads Macbeth, “speaking much against the 
kings softnes”, to take charge of the battle:
he promised notwithstanding, if the charge were 
committed vnto him and vnto Banquho, so to order 
the matter, that the rebels should shortly b e 
vanquished & quite put down (Boswell-Stone: 20).
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In the similar warrior ethic of Holinshed’s Scotland — and in the 
thinking of Gates and Blandy — Macbeth’s success in this 
enterprise would clearly indicate his greater suitability for the 
throne. Yet it is Duncan who is King of Scotland, and his son 
Malcolm — who we may still assume to be a less-than-
competent warrior — who succeeds him: both men who are poor 
representations of the warrior ethic.
Malcolm’s accession to the throne indicates that the p r e ­
existing kingly ethic (for want of a better term) has been
restored; our confirmation that the warrior ethic once again 
prevails comes with the report of a new, if posthum ous,
embodiment of the warrior ethic. Siward, reassuring the new  
king that the day was won cheaper than they might expect, is 
told that the price is dearer than he knows, and just as Malcolm 
has stepped into his father’s role, we hear of another young 
nobleman who has fulfilled his father’s — very different — 
expectations3. Once again it is Ross who must deliver bad news, 
and once again he is completely wrong in his expectations of
how it will be received:
Your son, my lord, has paid a soldier’s debt;
He only lived but till he was a man,
The which no sooner had his prowess confirmed 
In the unshrinking station where he fought,
3 In Holinshed, this anecdote is related to the story of Macbeth, but on l y  
in the report of an earlier English invasion of Scotland during his reign 
— one led by the same “warlike Siward”. This encounter likewise results  
in Young Siward’s death, with much the same sentiments b e i n g  
expressed. That Shakespeare chose to include it in his version o f
Macbeth’s tale only confirms, to me, the importance of the story to h i s 
picture of the warrior ethic.
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But like a man he died. (V,ix,5-9)
Young Siward has confirmed his adherence to the warrior w ith 
a bloody chrism, through fighting —and dying —in a battle to 
restore a true king. Ross, characteristically, puts the best spin 
he can on things, but even with this distinctly positive rep o rt 
behind him, it could be that he — and certainly Malcolm — 
expect more of a reaction from Siward:
SIWARD: Had he his hurts before?
ROSS: Ay, on the front.
SIW ARD: Why then, God’s soldier he be;
Had I as many sons as I have hairs,
I would not wish them to a fairer death.
And so his knell is knolled. (V,ix,12-17)
To “warlike Siward”, this is, if not the best he could have hoped 
for in his son’s first protestation of manhood, certainly among 
the better outcomes: a fair death and a proven worth. Malcolm, 
however, obviously feels more of an epitaph is needed; “He’s 
worth more sorrow,” he says, “And that I’ll spend for him”. 
Siward is nonetheless adamant: “He’s worth no more;/They say 
he parted well and paid his score, /And so God be with him ” 
(V,ix, 18-20). Malcolm has accepted a king’s role; Young Siward 
has played out a soldier’s. With the nominated successor about 
to troupe off to Scone with his troops of friends, and with an 
expression of admiration for a noble death like — yet totally 
unlike — that granted to Cawdor, it is easy to believe th a t 
Scotland has come full circle, and returned to the same ethical 
structures which it inhabited before, capped of by a v irtuous 
king on the throne. We even have, perhaps, a replacement for
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Macbeth —for the original, virtuous Macbeth —in the ty ran t­
slaying Macduff.
This possible circularity in Macbeth  is an issue I will 
discuss at greater length in Chapter 5; for the present, I will 
suggest only that at play’s end there has in Shakespeare’s 
Scotland been no moral evolution, only restoration, and a 
restoration entirely unquestioned. No one in the world of the 
play seems to see the root of Scotland’s recurrent ills in its 
warrior ethic, in its pattern of duty and obligation that appears, 
to the cold eye of the critic, to flow all one way. Malcolm’s 
reaction to Siward’s phlegmatism is the only hint, here, that 
there may be a more complex ethos evolving in Scotland, but I 
suspect it is a misleading hint. This is the same Malcolm who, 
after all, turned Macduff away from an emotional response to 
the news of his family’s murder. He is not, however, being 
inconsistent and urging Siward to a greater display of emotion; 
rather, he is urging the better recognition of a soldierly, manly 
death — the same kind of recognition that could give respect to 
Cawdor even on the block. And so the same warrior ethic which 
was represented so graphically in the play’s opening scenes still 
prevails, bloodily reinforced by the new comfort of a traitor’s 
head.
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C la udio : O, what men dare do! what men may do! what 
men daily do, not knowing what they do!
Much Ado About Nothing, IV,i,17-18
“The artifice of theatre reveals the artifice of gender.”
(Dollimore: xxxvi)
The title of “Bellona’s bridegroom” immediately introduces, 
through Macbeth, the question of gender relations in the play: 
between a man and his wife, certainly, but also, through its 
explicit connection of an aggressively male warrior with a female 
god of war, a man’s notions of his own sexuality, and, through the 
understanding of war as a collective (male) effort, his relation to 
other men, other warriors, around him. It also raises questions 
about a man’s identity in relation to a pagan god, perhaps even, 
by extension, to the Christian one.
But before Macbeth is granted this deeply allusive label, we 
have already heard something of him, through the offices of the 
three witches and their portentous remarks. The weird sisters 
have been the subject of extensive analyses of the play’s gender 
and power relations: marginalised, re-centred, dissected and
reconstructed. They do, I concede, represent one of the extremes 
of gender identity in Macbeth, particularly since their gender is,
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so early in the play, called into doubt. Certainly the witches, as 
powerful women, constitute a potential site of subversion in the 
play, even when their superficial female exterior is balanced 
against the interior male substance of the actors playing the roles. 
This, in itself, is also a focus of a great deal of critical attention, 
some of which I will touch upon in the course of this chapter, but 
in general I am deliberately avoiding any examination of the 
witches’ status as contentious women; my interest here is on the 
less well-mined vein of Scotland’s men. Some of the ideas of 
manhood which are represented in the play do, however, consider 
Scotland’s men in relation to its women, most notably Macbeth’s 
complex relationship with his wife.
If Macbeth is “Bellona’s bridegroom”, how then are we to see 
his wife? Can we see her as this ancient personification of armed 
conflict? Obviously not: she takes no part in the two battles
which frame Macbeth — but, as is well known, she provides to her 
husband a strong impetus early in the play, one which, puzzlingly, 
frustratingly, seems to disappear after Duncan’s murder. Lady 
Macbeth’s relationship with her husband, her understanding and 
endorsement of the warrior ethic, and her failure to maintain her 
early and — in the context of the play — thoroughly masculine 
aggression, are all at the core of an important aspect of Scotland’s 
ethical structures: their gender specificity.
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Michel Foucault notes, with particular reference to Classical 
Greek ethics, that
It was an ethics for men: an ethics thought, written, 
and taught by men, and addressed to men ... it did not 
try to define a field of conduct and a domain of valid 
rules ... for the two sexes in common; it was an 
elaboration of masculine conduct carried out from the 
viewpoint of men in order to give form to their 
behaviour (Foucault, 1992: 22-23).
Historically, this has continued to be the case, and it is certainly 
the case in M acbeth: the play’s warrior ethic is one constructed 
and operated by, for, and about men, and there is little sign of a 
parallel, even limited structure for women.
When Lady Macbeth receives her husband’s letter relating his 
first encounter with the weird sisters, it inspires in her — as I 
have shown — a concern for the strength of her husband’s 
ambition. She manifests what would be, to Elizabethan 
sensibilities, a particularly unwomanly lack of compassion in 
fearing Macbeth’s too-kind nature. This is soon followed, however, 
with a promise to employ a woman’s weapon — her tongue (I,v,25) 
— to “chastise” Macbeth to the crown. Across the Shakespearean 
canon, words are seen as the woman’s domain, almost antithetical 
to the manly prerogative of action. Related to this is the notion of 
silence as a virtue in women, noted by Catherine Belsey; the ‘fault’ 
of volubility she analyses in relation to Coriolanus’ Volumnia is
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also ascribed to Lady Macbeth (Belsey: 183), suggesting that in 
more general terms it underlines the absence of a fixed place or 
voice for women. For a woman to presume to speak for herself 
was to usurp the role of her husband or father, to try to become a 
man (Belsey: 180).
In her short speech after reading her husband’s letter Lady 
Macbeth manages to identify herself as a woman, but one seeking 
to empower herself through both womanly words and manly 
cruelty:
Come, you spirits 
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here 
And fill me from the crown to the toe topfull 
Of direst cruelty; make thick my blood,
Stop up th’access and passage to remorse
That no compunctious visitings of nature
Shake my fell purpose nor keep between
Th’effect and it. Come to my woman’s breasts
And take my milk for gall, you murd’ring ministers,
Wherever in your sightless substances
You wait on nature’s mischief. (I,v,38-48)
In this, one of the play’s more notorious passages, Lady Macbeth 
manages to provide meat for generations of critics, many of whom 
have focussed on the gender-related aspects of her wishes. 11 
could be argued that “unsex me” expresses a desire to be re-sexed, 
as it were: to become male, to partake of the male potency which 
obviously determines everything of weight in this world. But 
there is also another implication to this small element of her
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fantasy. If, as is a common pun in Elizabethan drama, female 
(genitalia) is equivalent to nothing, then unsexing her, removing
her physical sex, is to make her less than nothing, and therefore 
less than human, rather than male.
The problem with looking at things this way, however, is that 
‘sex’ was a broad signifier; it could not be taken, here or almost 
anywhere else, to refer only, or even principally, to primary or
secondary physical sexual characteristics. In most cases in 
Elizabethan/Jacobean literature, it performs a semantic function 
similar to the broad range of meanings associated with the term 
‘gender’ in modern usage. I feel that her cry of “unsex me here” 
would, to a contemporary audience, have lent itself to the notion 
that she was becoming something less than human, if only b y 
seeking to abandon her divinely-ordained sex/gender role. She 
immediately rejects both the female nurturing role which is 
antithetical to cruelty, and the decidedly non-martial, unmanly 
feelings —such as remorse —associated with it. As cruelty is an 
explicitly male ‘quality’ both within the play and without, her
embrace of it serves to further undermine her status as a woman 
and as a human being. Her husband may be cruel, or at least 
violent, but it is — again, in the play’s own terms —a ‘just’ cruelty 
(at this stage, anyway); she wishes for an unprincipled,
unrestrained cruelty beyond even his.
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Confusingly, Lady Macbeth wishes to be ‘unsexed’, yet to 
retain a more obvious secondary sexual characteristic, her breasts. 
Their milk — immediately suggestive of her recent use of the word 
— is first associated with kindness, and then with bitterness, 
murder and mischief — with, perhaps, infernal qualities. A mother 
or nursemaid’s milk could be a source of some concern in 
Elizabethan England. It was suspected to have some influence 
other than merely nutritive on a child, particularly in moral 
terms. Elyot notes that “some ancient writers do suppose, often 
times the child sucketh the vice of his nurse with the milk of her 
pap” (Lehmberg: 15), suggesting a direct, causal link between a
bad choice of wetnurse and, one assumes, a depraved and 
shameful child — or adult.
In the thinking of the period, Lady Macbeth’s wish for a 
corrupted, bitter milk would have been a source of some alarm, 
particularly in relation to her children — and remember, at this 
stage of the play a naive reader or spectator of the play would 
have no reason to suspect the Macbeths to be childless. Her status 
as a nurturer has been undermined, if not completely destroyed, 
since she rejects archetypical maternal female attributes. But she 
is not necessarily substituting them with masculine ones, unless 
we take murder and cruelty to be masculine ‘qualities’. In any 
case whatever substitution she makes is not, as we will see,
permanent.
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As I have noted, her decision having been made, she urges 
upon her newly-arrived, newly-elevated husband the practise of 
deceit, “To beguile the time”. The putative moral influence of her 
corrupted milk, transmitted through her tongue, through 
womanish words, begins to cause in her husband unmanly — in 
the play’s terms — behaviour.
When Lady Macbeth later berates her husband for his 
decision that they “will proceed no further in this business” 
(I,vii,31), she confirms that she is fully aware of Scotland’s 
warrior ethic. But her awareness of it is flawed, like her concept of 
masculine aggression. She berates her husband for his inability to 
act, understanding that it is by action that a man earns recognition 
and honour, but she forgets that the character of a warrior’s action 
is an important factor in its contribution to his worth, his 
manhood. She simplifies things further with her notion that living 
itself is equivalent to doing —that without ‘acting’ on his desire, 
Macbeth will only have an “ornament” — a sham, an illusion —of a 
life. His response to this accusation elicits from her a scathing 
dismissal of Macbeth’s manly worth, his virtu and virility. In an 
exchange which serves to subtly sexualise the killing of the king, 
Lady Macbeth taunts of her husband with imputations of 
impotence; as Carolyn Asp puts it, “she challenges an essential 
element of his self-image, that of the potent male” (Asp: 160). She 
also notes that after the murder is carried out, Lady Macbeth
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addresses her husband as husband for the only time in the play — 
indicating, perhaps, a kind of consummation has taken place. The 
sexual basis of the scene is also confirmed by Macbeth’s own 
oblique comparison of himself to Tarquin; as David Norbrook 
points out, it was Tarquin's rape of Lucretia which led to the 
downfall of the Roman kings (Norbrook: 101); the almost sexual 
penetration that Macbeth and his wife are about to perform on 
the inviolable —politically and morally chaste —body of the king 
will have almost the same effect on Scotland.
With the suggestion of impotence, Lady Macbeth succeeds in 
re-moulding her husband’s notions of proper manhood —and his 
own masculinity —by tapping into the existing streak of cruelty 
we have already heard report of. Her equation of manly action 
with cruelty is, as I have said, reductive, yet by the end of the 
scene Macbeth is convinced that this kind of behaviour —violent 
treachery and deceit —is quintessential^ male; in the face of his 
wife’s “undaunted mettle” he abandons his fear of unmanly daring 
and grasps the nettle.
Lady Macbeth may have developed an extremely limited and 
limiting idea of proper manhood, but it soon becomes obvious that 
she fails in her attempt to take it upon herself. Macbeth has 
inspired, particularly over the past twenty-five years or so, a 
number of psycho-analytic readings which often descend into an 
almost cliched use of Freud: every sword becomes a phallic
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symbol, every stabbing a pseudo-sexual penetration, or —in any 
passage relating to Macduff —a combination castration/caesarean 
section. There is, however, certainly something sexual in Lady 
Macbeth’s short speech before the murder of Duncan, when she 
enters, drunk:
That which hath made them drunk, hath made me
bold:
What hath quenched them, hath given me fire
( I U U - l )
But then we soon hear, after her husband’s entrance, that she has 
not in fact carried out the murder of Duncan — “Had he not 
resembled/My father as he slept, I had done’t” (II,ii,12-13). In 
essence, Lady Macbeth admits, immediately after suggesting 
sexual failure on her husband’s part, to a kind of alcoholic 
impotence, identical to that described by the soon-to-be- 
encountered gatekeeper — who speaks specifically of drink’s effect 
on men. The fact that it appears to have the same effect on Lady 
Macbeth might suggest that she has succeeded in her desire to be 
re-sexed — rendered male —by being unsexed. Yet once the deed 
has been consummated, she becomes capable of the necessary 
follow-through; in a strange transference of sexual potency, she 
insults Macbeth as “Infirm of purpose!” when he admits his 
reluctance to return the two, decidedly firm, phallic daggers to the 
murder scene — and promptly does so herself.
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The whole of Duncan’s murder scene —the murder of a m an 
we last heard was at “unusual pleasure” — is framed b y 
intemperate remarks on the effects of drink; remarks which, in 
the broader historical context of the play, seem even m ore 
intemperate. James’ court — scene of one of the earliest, if not the 
first, performances of the play — was one which quickly becam e 
renowned for overall indulgence. In describing the licentiousness 
of James’ court, Anne Somerset notes the King’s own reputation as 
a drinker, and the excessive consumption of alcohol which becam e 
a noted feature of his court (Somerset: 36). In particular, she
relates various observations made on the “stupendous drinking 
bout” occasioned by the visit of the Queen’s brother, King Christian 
IV of Denmark — the occasion of the aforementioned early  
performance. Sir John Harrington, writing of the same visit, paints 
it as one long and increasingly incoherent drunken debauch: 
“those whom I could never get to taste good liquor,” he says, “now 
follow the fashion and wallow in beastly delights” (G.B. Evans: 
2 0 1 ) .
Yet, in front of such a distinguished audience, and in the face 
of their probable inebriation, we have a series of scenes which 
themselves stumble drunkenly along. The Porter in particu lar 
elaborates, with relish, on the specific sexual effects of alcohol, 
telling Macduff and Lennox that drink provokes “sleep” — an
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effect it conspicuously does not have on Macbeth or his wife. But 
then he goes further:
Lechery, sir, it provokes, and unprovokes: it provokes 
the desire, but it takes away the performance. 
Therefore much drink may be said to be an 
equivocator with lechery: it makes him, and it mars 
him; it sets him on, and takes him off; it persuades him 
and disheartens him, makes him stand to and not 
stand to. (II,iii,24-8)
It doesn’t take much imagination to see the sexual innuendo 
behind the Porter’s lines: indeed, this is the common part-reading 
usually given. The connection to Lady Macbeth’s speech is less 
obvious, and yet the parallel is there. Whatever tipple she has 
served up to Duncan’s guards “hath made them drunk”, and made 
her “bold”; yet, like an over-indulging man, it robs her of the 
ability to carry out her intended deed.
A fundamentalist Freudian could have fun with this: the 
drink she has shared with Duncan’s grooms certainly sets her on, 
to a metaphorical penetration of the inviolable, masculine and 
arguably paternal body of the king — a penetration which she 
then finds impossible to carry through. Like a man (according to 
the Porter) she is set on, and taken off, persuaded and 
disheartened, and is certainly forestalled in the performance of 
her desire. I find, almost against my will, that I lean towards such 
a way of seeing things myself — and I have come to do so through
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a minor etymological point. The word ‘foin’ is a fencing term 
meaning a stab or thrust; in some schools it also indicates the 
pointed fore-part of the blade itself, the part used to stab or 
thrust. But it is also an Elizabethan slang term for fornication, for 
sexual penetration, suggesting that the parallel between the thrust 
of a weapon —a dagger —and the thrust of a penis is one that 
could have been made even at the time the play was written: it is 
entirely possible, in other words, that the relatively recent 
Freudian way of looking at Lady Macbeth’s drunken ‘impotence’ is 
not so outrageous.
But does Lady Macbeth’s failure underline, or undermine her 
unnaturalness? To her way of seeing things, aggression is a 
fundamental male characteristic, expressed in prowess in battle, 
the ability to wield a sword. In the warrior ethic, the sword is to 
be wielded, however, in defence of the kingdom and the king, not 
in assault upon it — the latter inherently and inescapably an 
ignoble action. Lady Macbeth’s flawed understanding of the 
warrior ethic fails to encompass this, and it might be that her 
weaker womanly understanding is what leads her to fail. As a 
supposedly weak woman, she is incapable of performing the 
quasi-sexual, quasi-martial action she has determined upon, and 
this does, to a certain extent, undermine her unnaturalness —she 
has not, after all, been able to escape her sex, her essential gender 
role. But to the extent that she has been capable of conceiving the
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action, she is still reinforcing her assumed unnaturalness, through 
her rejection of female nurturing, filial duty, and the p roper 
respect due a man and a king.
It is this failure to perform that is, I suspect, behind Lady 
Macbeth’s puzzling lack of spine in her later appearances in the  
play. Her fainting after the ‘discovery’ of Duncan’s murder could 
be a manifestation of this weakness, but its first real appearance 
comes after her husband has been crowned king. Just before the  
haunted banquet, she allows a hint of creeping despair —perhaps 
even guilt — to show through:
Nought’s had, all’s spent 
When our desire is got without content.
‘Tis safer to be that which we destroy
Than by destruction dwell in doubtful joy. (Ill,ii,4-7)
The woman who urged her husband to screw his courage to the  
sticking-place, who advised him to “Beguile the time”, is now, after 
the deed has been done and the prize gained, disturbed by 
Macbeth’s wrathful passion. When he himself encourages her to 
deceive Banquo, to “make our faces vizards to our hearts”, she 
shies nervously from the topic: “You must leave this” (III,ii,35). 
The same woman who could be an active agent in the murder of a 
king is now deliberately kept “innocent of the knowledge” of a 
similar “deed of dreadful note” —and it seems that she is happy  
with this arrangement.
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The only thing that re-ignites her passion is the by-now 
familiar question of Macbeth’s manliness. When confronted with 
Banquo’s ghost, he is “unmanned” by fear, and she once again 
enthusiastically harps upon her theme —but by the end of the 
scene (III,iv) she is reduced to one or two line statements, acting 
only as a narrative foil to her husband. Ultimately, she too falls 
victim to sleepless delusions; our last sight of her is of an 
unnaturally troubled babbling somnambulist; our last word of her 
her death, allegedly a suicide. It could be that, in seeking to 
subvert the fundamental identity proper — according to the 
thinking of the time — to her sex, she shakes her own state; that in 
unsexing herself she has, literally, become nothing.
The notion that there was, in fact, an essential gender identity 
for men and women was one fiercely defended at the time, 
particularly in the face of the perceived threat of the theatre. 
According to Laura Levine, there was a serious contradiction in 
the gender-related attacks on the theatre: in seeking to defend the 
idea that there was, in fact, an essential gender, the antitheatrical 
pamphletists such as Gosson were falling victim to “the fear that 
costume could actually alter the gender of the male body beneath 
the costume” (Levine: 3); the fact that the sight of an ungendered 
and eventually unstable Lady Macbeth might also defend the idea 
of an essential gender was, to those concerned, secondary to the 
fact that the representation was being performed by a male actor.
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How exactly that essential gender was constituted was never 
made clear — many of the discussions of the idea in the literature 
of the time rest on simple assertion, backed up with Biblical 
‘proof. As I have already made clear, in the previous chapter, at 
least part of the constitution of manhood — particularly for 
warriors —was through deeds. Levine has also shown, however, 
that even this idea was underpinned by uncertainty: she notes,
before considering a range of texts from the period 1579 to 1642 
that
it is the peculiarity of the texts ... to think only of 
masculinity as needing to be performed in order to 
exist; it is as if femaleness were the default position, 
the thing one were always in danger of slipping into 
(Levine: 8).
It is action that is the point of conflict between Lady Macbeth and 
her husband —his refusal, initially, to act on the suggestions of 
both the weird sisters and his wife; her inability to act in his 
stead. As much as anything else, this observation highlights the 
contrast between manly action and woman’s words —and this, in 
turn, points to the whole series of binary oppositions through 
which masculinity in particular, and gender in general, is 
constructed in the period, and in Macbeth.
When Macbeth tells his wife of his decision to “proceed no 
further in this business”, she responds with a vituperative slur
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upon his manhood, one resting partially, as I have indicated, on 
suggestions of sexual impotence. But her disgust also introduces 
into the play the first of the oppositions by which masculine 
identity is constructed. His rejection of acting further is based, in 
part, on the warrior ethic’s ideals: “I dare do all that may become 
a man; /Who dares do more is none” (I,vii,46-47). To Macbeth, 
killing his king does not ‘become’ a man; it is, in fact, the act of 
someone very much less than a man. His manhood is something 
which has recently been confirmed, publicly displayed in battle 
and rewarded by the fount of all honour (and the very object of 
his murderous plan). His manhood is among those recently- 
purchased honours he is reluctant to “cast aside”; the erosion of 
this hard-won honour would make him no-man, less that a man; 
in the stratified perception of gender which prevailed, it would 
perhaps even equate him with a woman.
Lady Macbeth responds by introducing another alternative: to 
her, no-man, less than a man, equates with animal, and it must  
have been some animalistic impulse which made Macbeth resile 
from manly action:
Lady M acbeth: What beast was’t then
That made you break this enterprise to me?
When you durst do it, then you were a man.
And to be more than you were, you would 
Be so much more the man. (I,vii,47-51)
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She inverts her husband’s sentiments — he was a man in daring to 
do what was planned, but in actually carrying it out he would 
have become more than a man. To Macbeth, to be a man is to 
know one’s place, and not to seek to be more than you are. To 
Lady Macbeth, it is at least to strive.
To be no man — to be less than a man — is to be a boy, a child, 
a woman, a beast — perhaps even a devil; this much is clear. To be 
more than a man is a more complex, less well-defined option. To 
be more than a man is, perhaps, to be an angel, to partake of the  
divine. But in the wider moral rhetoric of the play, to be m ore 
than a man — to be something outside or beyond the warrior ethic 
— is to be the king. As I will discuss in a later chapter, this kind of 
thinking may not have been terribly acceptable to a king like 
James; the notion that one may ‘become’ a king, and so become 
more than a man, is subversive to the whole idea of the divine 
right, of a divine mandate to rule. Macbeth’s eventual fate is 
perhaps the only thing that makes the suggestion acceptable, w ith 
its subtle implication that he is never a ‘real’ king. Much of the  
play’s consideration of ethical questions and kingly and m anly 
virtues, as I demonstrated in Chapter 3, certainly reinforces this 
reading —that Macbeth, in seeking to become more than a man, 
more of a man, becomes less.
Duncan’s murder, successfully carried out, quickly ren d ers 
Macbeth uncertain of his position in a wider m etaphysical
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hierarchy. Circumstances dictate that he not only feign shock at 
his king’s killing; they also dictate that he both dispose of 
potential witnesses and provide credible suspects — and so he 
hastily kills Duncan’s grooms. It is an action immediately called 
into question by his fellow thanes, and perhaps a source of some 
of their (and Malcolm’s) suspicions. In explaining this action, he 
sets up another description of not-man: “who can be wise, amazed, 
temp’rate, and furious,/Loyal and neutral, in a moment? No man” 
(II,iii,101-2). I am, he seems to insist, a mere man, incapable of 
this kind of almost-divine, almost kingly self-restraint. But in 
announcing that it was his “violent love” for Duncan which “Outran 
the pauser, reason”, he is, in fact, emphasising his own newly 
revealed status as not-man, as less than man, “a beast which 
wants discourse of reason”. It has been suggested that this may be 
the common complaint of all the stunned thanes: Macbeth’s
instruction that they all “put on manly readiness” (II,iii, 126) 
indicates “that the observers have been unmanned, weakened, b y 
Duncan’s death” (Braunmuller: 157). But the association of
‘manliness’ with ‘readiness’ reminds the other thanes not only of 
his unpreparedness, therefore serving as a feeble alibi, it also 
reminds them of the fact that this murder has, after all, taken 
place in his own castle; his unpreparedness to either commit (as 
we know) or prevent Duncan’s murder must further call his 
manhood into question.
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The haste Macbeth indulged in killing Duncan’s grooms seems, 
later, to infect his own ideas of proper manly qualities: he asks the 
murderers he has engaged to slay Banquo, “Do you find your 
patience so predominant in your natures?” (Ill,i,86-87), as if 
somehow patience is antithetical to the nature of manhood — 
unencumbered by it, they should be ‘real’ men. But after this 
weak flattery he calls their manhood into question — “in the 
catalogue ye go for men,” he says, but —in a conceit Shakespeare 
uses frequently — notes that ‘men’ are distinguished by a 
“Particular addition”, a single ‘gift’ or quality. Their quality, to 
Macbeth, is that which is expressed by the Second Murdere*":
I am one ...
Whom the vile blows and buffets of the world 
Hath so incensed that I am reckless what I do 
To spite the world.
First M urderer: And I another,
So weary with disasters, tugged with fortune,
That I would set my life on any chance 
To mend it or be rid on’t. (III,i,107-113)
It is their recklessness which is useful to Macbeth, and their 
recklessness which marks them as kindred spirits. William Blandy 
condemns recklessness along with suicide, seeing as contemptible 
all those who “hasten theyr dying day”. Those who “offer 
themselves to daunger, not with iudgeme[n]t, and prudent advise”, 
but out of “rage or fury of minde conceived either of hatred, envy, 
or some other earnest & hoat affection”, are not to be esteemed as
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true soldiers, as real men, as they have missed “the true & good 
purpose of Action” (Blandy: sig. Diiii.r-Diiii.v). Macbeth manifests 
this kind of intemperance and impatience when he kills Duncan’s 
grooms, unintentionally suggesting afterwards that this marks 
him as no-man, and by attributing the same deficiency to these 
‘men’ he is aligning himself with them. They are, almost b y 
definition, dishonourable men, perhaps persecuted by Macbeth 
himself in his earlier incarnation as an upright thane, a champion 
of justice —men whom he grants as being “Not i’th’worst rank of 
manhood”. We soon realise this to mean that, if they have not yet 
hit rock bottom, they are not far from it, and Macbeth’s 
comparison of the “catalogue” of men with the variety of dogs 
reinforces both their beastliness and his own.
Macbeth’s lack of action — and therefore his manliness — 
again becomes an issue when Banquo’s ghost visits the celebratory 
banquet. His horrified reaction leads Lady Macbeth to once again 
question her husband’s manhood, but this time he gives a more 
emphatic, though still unbelievable response:
Are you a man?
Macbeth: Ay, and a bold one, that dare look on that 
Which might appal the devil. (Ill,iv,58-60)
Lady Macbeth berates him again as womanly, as no true man — 
“quite unmanned in folly” (III,iv,73), but he still insists on his
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manliness, resorting to the familiar terms of the warrior ethic and 
the construction of masculinity through violent though noble 
deeds:
What man dare, I dare;
Approach thou like the rugged Russian bear,
The armed rhinoceros, or th’Hyrcan tiger,
Take any shape but that, and my firm nerves 
Shall never tremble. Or be alive again,
And dare me to the desert with thy sword;
If trembling I inhabit then, protest me 
The baby of a girl. Hence horrible shadow,
Unreal mock’ry hence. (Ill,iv,99-107)
Banquo’s unreal, unnatural (in several senses of the word) 
appearance is beyond the ability of a mere man to deal with; but 
the most dangerous natural challenges a man may face are, 
because natural, within his capabilities. Perhaps significantly, the 
first three natural challenges mentioned are beasts, inhabitants of 
the natural rather than the human world. By seeking to exceed 
the limitations of his manhood, his nature and his place, Macbeth 
has brought upon himself only unnatural challenges — spectres, 
weird sisters, unborn foes and walking trees. Nonetheless, he must 
assert his courage when confronted with normal, natural
challenges. By the end of the play, however, the excess of strife 
that he has survived has purged from him the ability to fear 
anything at all from him, leaving him immune to any horror 
which might assault an ordinary man:
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I have almost forgot the taste of fears;
The time has been, my senses would have cooled 
To hear a night-shriek and my fell of hair 
Would at a dismal treatise rouse and stir 
As life were in’t. I have supped full with horrors;
Direness familiar to my slaughterous thoughts 
Cannot once start me. (V,v,9-15)
But before he descends so far, he asserts his masculinity in the 
face of ‘normal’ challenges, contrasting it with as unmanly an 
image as he can conjure: “The baby of a girl”. Again, there is a 
clear opposition being established between the appropriate manly 
response to dangerous beasts and the “trembling” of a woman — 
but there is more to this almost casually tossed off remark. A 
“baby of a girl” could be taken to mean a female baby, doubly 
weak through its age and its sex. It could also, however, mean the 
baby of a girl, a child, suggesting perhaps that the baby of a 
young, immature female would somehow be smaller, sicklier, than 
an infant born of a mature woman. It is as weak and pathetic an 
image of an unmanned man he can think of —and one he knows 
to be too fitting in this instance; as soon as Banquo’s ghost 
vanishes he announces “I am a man again” (III,iv, 108). Macbeth is 
disturbed by how far the appearance of the ghost has driven him 
from his ‘normal’ being; it makes him “strange Even to the 
disposition that I owe” (III,iv, 112-113); the disposition, we must 
suppose, towards aggressive manliness.
When, after his post-banquet visit to the weird sisters, 
Macbeth is informed of Macduff’s flight to England, he vows that
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“From this moment,/The very firstlings of my heart shall be/The 
firstlings of my hand” (IV,i,145-147). Hard on the heels of the 
apparitions’ warnings, the news is doubly dismaying, and the 
promise it precipitates represents the fulfilment of part of the 
Third Apparition’s ‘bodement’ — Macbeth has already begun to “Be 
lion-mettled, proud” and careless. The intemperate behaviour he 
has now embraced is unbecoming of any man, and particularly 
any king, if only because it represents a resignation to the 
impulses of emotion, of feeling, since it is the ‘firstlings’ of his 
heart he will follow. He has given up his divinely-granted (manly) 
reason to become more of a beast, a not-man, than ever; h e 
follows his vow with a decision to “crown my thoughts with acts, 
be it thought and done” (IV,i,148). Even so, Macbeth can delude 
himself into believing that he is still acting like a man — “No 
boasting like a fool”, or a woman, no unpacking his heart with 
words.
The appearance, during his visit to the witches, of two 
children — one bloody, one crowned — must also strike at 
Macbeth’s fears in a way additional to the disheartening 
information they offer him. As I have noted in passing before, the 
Macbeths are childless; the “procreant cradle” of their castle is, for 
them, an empty one. Elyot suggests that the propagation of 
children, particularly male children, is an important part of the 
‘natural’ and ‘perfect’ man; in measuring himself as a man,
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Macbeth must know that he has failed in this regard —failed to 
visibly demonstrate his sexual capabilities by the fathering of a 
child. In the face of this failure of Macbeth’s, the supposed, arch- 
Bradleian mystery of ‘how many children had Lady Macbeth?’ is 
irrelevant: more important is that Macbeth recognises her sexual 
potential, and in particular her capacity to produce male children:
Bring forth men-children only,
For thy undaunted mettle should compose 
Nothing but males. (I,vii,72-74)
Unfortunately, this, like other aspects of her character, is 
manifested in her claim to excess masculine cruelty —the ability 
to dash out the brains of a (male) infant to serve her ambition. It 
might be that this observation of Macbeth’s inspires the 
retrospective interpretation of Lady Macbeth’s “unsex me here” as 
meaning to make her male. In all of the oppositional definitions of 
manhood which she seeks to thrust before her husband, the one 
he eventually offers himself — the baby — must be the most 
galling.
However, the challenge to Macbeth’s sense of himself as a 
sexually capable — virile — male comes not only from his wife and 
her “undaunted mettle”, but also from the men around him. All of 
Macbeth’s significant foes are fathers; moreover, they are fathers 
of sons — Duncan, Banquo, and Macduff all have with them or
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leave behind them male children, all of whom he seeks to destroy. 
According to Joost Daalder, their status as fathers, as
demonstrably sexually capable males, is enough reason for 
Macbeth to single them out for bloody action (Daalder: 376-377). 
His impotence — his inability to “to brynge forth his semblable” as 
Elyot puts it — is certainly the root cause of his antipathy tow ards 
his old friend Banquo:
Upon my head they placed a fruitless crown 
And put a barren sceptre in my gripe,
Thence to be wrenched with an unlineal hand,
No son of mine succeeding. If’t be so,
For Banquo’s issue have I filed my mind;
For them, the gracious Duncan have I murdered,
Put rancours in the vessel of my peace 
Only for them, and mine eternal jewel 
Given to the common enemy of man,
To make them kings, the seeds of Banquo kings.
( I l l , i ,62-71)
Having bowed to supernatural solicitation, Macbeth becomes 
completely aware of what he has done, of what it will mean for 
him personally, and of the morality he has firmly, and
irrevocably, rejected. But what galls him most is that he will 
remain childless, while the virtuous, valorous, vigorous Banquo 
will sire a line of kings, and this fear preys upon him even before 
his second visit to the weird sisters; even before they have shown 
him the fruitlessness of anything he does. The bloody child of the 
witches’ prophecies is not only a representation of M acduff’s
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violent birth — it is also an anticipation of the murder of M acduff’s 
unnamed son, a recollection of the attempt upon Fleance, and a 
reminder of the imminent end of Macbeth’s own line.
All of Shakespeare’s martially-inclined tragic heroes — all 
those for whom the resolution of their tale is at the point of a 
sword — are characterised in part by their (sexual) relations w ith 
women. It could be said further that these relations are 
fundamentally flawed, almost without exception resulting in the 
death of the female counterpart as well as the tragic hero himself. 
The connection between martial prowess and sexual energy was 
one observed at the time, with Bacon noting that
I know not how, but martial men are given to love: I 
think it is but as they are given to wine; for perils 
commonly ask to be paid in pleasures (Hawkins: 30).
We can see, in Macbeth , that all of Scotland’s warrior caste —w ith 
the exception of Macbeth — are “given to love”, in the physical 
sense. Macbeth’s impotence sets him apart, but not in a positive 
way; in a sense, it could serve to undermine his status as a 
warrior, as well as his manhood.
But the other obvious exception to Macbeth 's array of 
manifestly sexually potent male enemies is Malcolm; he m akes 
much of his virginity — or, rather more importantly, his chastity —
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when recommending himself to Macduff. It could be that this is 
another example of the (true) king’s separate status in Scotland’s 
moral schema —yet the fact that the heir to the throne remains 
sexually untried means that he is also sexually unproven, and that 
he will bring with him to the throne the uncertainty of no clear 
heir. There is also the apparent contradiction of holding up both 
the sexually experienced, sexually capable — but obviously not 
‘luxurious’ — Duncan and his very much less sexualised son as 
paragons of virtue.
The virtuous Malcolm’s testing of Macduff is another of the 
play’s scenes where its construction of masculinity becomes a 
foreground element —and it does so from the scene’s first lines, 
from Malcolm’s suggestion that they “seek out some desolate 
shade and there/ Weep our sad bosoms empty” (IV,iii,l-2). Like 
the use of words, weeping — expressing grief generally — is at 
worst seen as womanish, at best rejected as simply unmanly. The 
notion is introduced earlier, at a critical juncture of the play, 
through Malcolm’s apparent lack of grief at his father’s death. “To 
show an unfelt sorrow,” he says, “is an office/Which the false man 
does easy” (II,iii,129-30). With the privileged knowledge of the 
reader, we can see that the “false man” is Macbeth, showing a 
false grief at a murder he is responsible for. Malcolm is declaring 
himself to be no “false man”; he is also rejecting Macbeth’s false 
grief, but not necessarily the demonstration of grief itself. It has
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been noted that Malcolm’s refusal to mourn his dead father is 
‘"unusual” (Braunmuller: 89) in the wider Shakespearean canon,
and the society which produced it — but it is not inconsistent w ith 
the fictional Scotland’s construction of masculinity, and the 
warrior ethic which is crucial to it.
Malcolm’s suggestion that he and Macduff indulge in 
womanish weeping is, in the broader context of the scene and the 
play, the first movement in his testing of Macduff. As someone 
who has already rejected unseemly grief himself, Malcolm wishes 
to see how his fellow Scotsman, possibly corrupted by M acbeth’s 
influence, might entertain the idea. Macduff rejects it thoroughly:
Let us rather
Hold fast the mortal sword and like good men 
Bestride our downfall birthdom (IV,iii,2-4)
As a good man, as a good warrior who wishes to fight to resto re  
the proper king to his “birthdom”, Macduff evokes the symbol of 
the warrior’s role: the sword. The manly, possibly virile (phallic) 
symbol is set up in antithesis to the supposedly female position 
espoused by Malcolm; manly action is opposed to wom anly 
weeping.
When he receives word of his family’s murder from the  
hapless Ross, Macduff is, initially, silent. Malcolm urges him to
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give vent to his grief, seemingly contradicting his own espoused 
position:
What, man, ne’er pull your hat upon your brows:
Give sorrow words; the grief that does not speak,
Whispers the o’erfraught heart and bids it break.
(IV ,iii,210-212)
It is important to note, again, that Malcolm has previously 
rejected the ostentatious display of false grief — but has denied 
himself the opportunity to express it, at least in public. In urging 
it upon Macduff, here, he is demonstrating yet again the separate  
‘rules’ for Scotland’s ordinary men, and for its true king — M acduff 
is allowed his ‘manly’ grief; Malcolm is not.
But Malcolm suggests that Macduff speak of his grief only 
quietly, as if a great outpouring of grief — ranting and raging — 
would be as unbecoming a display as false grief. But the true king 
Malcolm, with a greater purpose in mind, may also be trying to 
limit his liegeman’s outpouring of sorrow so as to encourage its 
transmutation into a useful (to him) anger:
Let’s make med’eines of our great revenge 
To cure this deadly grief ...
Be this the whetstone of your sword, let grief 
Convert to anger. Blunt not the heart, enrage it.
(IV ,iii,216-217, 231-232)
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He is urging Macduff to a righteous revenge, to express his anger 
and grief through deeds, as becomes a man —and through violent 
deeds, as becomes a warrior. And he is strong enough in w anting 
this useful wrath that he urges Macduff to act on his grief not 
once but twice.
Macduff’s response to his true king is, however, one of those 
points in the play where the previously clear paradigms of 
manhood are suddenly muddied. When told to “Dispute it like a 
man, “ Macduff replies, “I shall do so;/ßut I must also feel it as a 
man” (IV,iii,223-224). He obviously understands — here, at least — 
that a man is composed of feelings, of emotions, as well as deeds 
and action. And yet even for him there are limitations to the 
manly expression of manly feelings:
O, I could play the woman with mine eyes
And braggart with my tongue. But gentle heavens,
Cut short all intermission. Front to front 
Bring thou this fiend of Scotland and myself;
Within my sword’s length set him. If he scape,
Heaven forgive him too. (IV,iii,233-238)
Macduff’s reaction to the imagined “fiend”, Macbeth, is identical to 
that of the usurper to Banquo’s ghost —the desire to translate the 
encounter into the familiar province of manly action. Like 
Malcolm, like Macbeth, Macduff also holds fast to the idea th a t 
weeping and taking refuge in words are options only for women,
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for those who are not men. He embraces the possibility of manly 
emotion, but rejects its expression through tears and words, 
adding to the distinction between man and not-man (and, in this 
case, between man and woman) that the play develops. In doing 
so, however, he seems to be adding something to the map of 
manhood that the play may be trying to set out. To Malcolm, this 
is hardly important: in rejecting womanish grief, Macduff has, as 
far as Malcolm and his paradigm of manhood is concerned, chosen 
the right path. “This tune,” says the Scottish prince, “goes manly”.
But is it really the case that Macduff is elaborating on the 
play’s kingdom’s paradigm of manhood? There is another way to 
read what happens here. Macduff is almost overcome with grief; 
he cannot even begin to articulate his feelings, possibly because of 
the limiting paradigm of masculinity he has been raised within. 
His inability to express himself at this moment is remarkable — 
literally —even to those with him, even to the prince who can 
only see this moment as a useful emotional lever. Silent, he is
urged to speak, but in doing so he is obviously expected to say
certain things, to express himself in a certain way. Perhaps to 
Malcolm’s surprise, Macduff is not quite so thoroughly
indoctrinated as to be only able to think of bloody revenge. He
clutches at the opportunity to feel  his grief ... and it is snatched 
from him, by the prince who needs every anger-whetted sword 
he can bring to his side. In the face of Malcolm’s urgings, Macduff
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rejects his womanly emotions, and embraces action. There is, after 
all, only one way for a man — a warrior — to conduct himself.
In one of the more interesting debates the play has provoked, 
Macduff ends up at the focus of conflicting claims about who, in 
Shakespeare’s Scotland, represents the true ideal of a well- 
rounded, well-balanced and morally upright man. Much of the 
recent critical inspection of the play has focussed on its 
representations of gender, on the way it presents men and women 
and the interactions between them. Given that Shakespeare’s 
Scotland is a male world, it is not surprising, then, that the issue of 
masculinity in Macbeth becomes a major concern. To Maryanne 
Horowitz, these issues are an interest of Shakespeare’s which are 
not limited to Macbeth — she sees a kind of ‘play’ in Shakespeare’s 
representations of men and women, suggesting that
the much-acclaimed Renaissance self-fashioning goes 
hand-in-hand with playful and creative experi­
mentation with gender distinctions (Brink et al.: ix).
But — as she notes later — “playing with gender” may not b e 
enlightening or liberating: it may lead to “increased opportunities 
for some and increased repression for others” (Brink et al.: xiii). 
The twin possibilities of opportunity and repression mirror the 
antithetical poles of man/not-man which are continually stated in
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the play. Perhaps the most important of these oppositions is that 
between ‘man’ and ‘woman’.
Lady Macbeth presents for her husband a range of carefully- 
expressed possibilities, possibilities which extend from the 
physical to the metaphysical. Her exposition of the place and 
character of a man comes after the expression of her desire to 
embrace them herself, a desire which leads her to reject those 
‘female’ characteristics — “love, compassion, pity, remorse” — 
which she also seeks to repress in her husband. According to 
Robert Kimbrough, this is not simply a rejection of her ‘sex’, but 
her humanity — “she moves,” he says, “toward the demonic.” 
(Kimbrough: 181). Furthermore, the desire for masculine potency 
which she expresses is one which no one in the play is free from; 
even Macduff’s unnamed wife has, according to Linda Bamber, no 
purer a vision of her husband’s manhood, despite his 
abandonment of her and their family:
In Macbeth and Coriolanus, the two most important 
representations of the feminine are even more 
committed than the heroes to a code of manliness that 
emphasizes power, honor, war, and revenge. They both 
prefer a bloody ambitious sort of honor over 
traditionally feminine values in general and womanly 
love in particular (Bamber: 91).
Part of the reason for this is the lack of any alternative to the 
dominant paradigm of the warrior ethic, and she suggests further
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that it is this absence of a basis for comparison or contrast which 
leads to both Macbeth’s overstated masculine aggressiveness and 
a supposed confusion about his gender roles and identity. The 
principal female characters in the play, she notes, “are not Other 
to the hero ... They do not present him with the challenge of the 
Other” (Bamber: 92), leaving the masculine values apparently 
unchallenged.
But in some ways, Lady Macbeth is ‘other’ to the play’s 
warrior ethic. According to Bamber, she is “hostile to the hero’s 
public role when it calls him away from her”. His absence cannot 
be justified to her, and so she is overtly antagonistic to a code 
which privileges ‘state’ over family; she is, however, “left 
unanswered” (Bamber: 93-4). It is this separation of male from 
female, of husband from wife, that is, to Bamber, fundamental to 
the “tragic process” in Shakespeare, since it is “always paralleled ... 
by the process of separation from the feminine” (Bamber: 92).
To Carolyn Asp, however, it is Lady Macbeth’s “assumption of 
a masculine role” which “distances” her from her husband: “As
long as he retained elements of so-called feminine sensibility” — 
the supposedly female qualities of compassion and kindness —“he 
was susceptible to her appeal” (Asp: 161) — in this case, her 
appeal to that daring which would usurp his king. As Macbeth 
becomes more than a man (“assumes the stereotype”, as Asp puts
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it), Lady Macbeth is less able to manipulate him, and, ironically, is 
forced into the secondary position that the male-dominated 
hierarchy demands of her sex:
By making him “manly” she has guaranteed that he 
will think of her as a subordinate and unworthy of 
truly sharing power (Asp: 162).
To Janet Adelman, however, the actions of the men in the play — 
and particularly those of the eponymous usurping thane — 
represent attempts to escape or exclude the feminine, specifically 
the maternal (Adelman: 130).
But the supposed antagonism between male and female in the 
play is, I believe, too simplistic a reading of its gender dynamics, 
if only because in Lady Macbeth, Macduff’s wife, and the once- 
seen nurse, we do not have enough (contrasting) examples of 
‘female’ characters behaving in ‘female’ ways to construct an 
unambiguous alternative model —a point reinforced by Banquo’s 
confusion about the gender of the weird sisters. Most of 
Shakespeare’s plays are set —unsurprisingly —in predominantly 
male worlds, but this does not prevent him from putting on his 
stage convincing and even admirable female characters. His 
fictional Scotland, however, is too much of a man’s world to admit
women.
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But Shakespeare’s artful representations of gender conflict 
have allowed other critics to maintain that his position on matters 
of gender in Macbeth is more ambiguous than most are willing to 
entertain. According to Robert Kimbrough,
By Shakespeare’s day ... Two worlds had evolved, two 
cultures had been created, masculine and feminine — 
not in a parallel relationship, but hierarchial 
(Kimbrough: 175).
Certainly few of the previously mentioned critics would disagree 
with this, but there is, according to Kimbrough’s reading of things, 
“a tendency in Shakespeare to want to break down the barriers 
between the sex-genders”. He goes on to suggest that
Shakespeare sensed that humanhood embraces 
manhood and womanhood. Shakespeare sensed that so 
long as one remains exclusively female or exclusively 
male, that person will be restricted and confined, 
denied human growth. Each will be the prisoner of 
gender, not its keeper (Kimbrough: 175).
I find this assertion hard to accept, myself; for anyone with 
historicist leanings, even a casual trawl through the non-dramatic 
literature would, at the very least, question whether any of the 
concepts Kimbrough so densely packs into these two sentences 
would have been even possible within the admittedly broad 
Elizabethan mindset. And which ‘Shakespeare’ is it who so 
delicately senses these things? The Shakespeare of the histories,
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for whom female characters are rarely more than ciphers,
mothers of heirs, victims of plots? The Shakespeare of the 
comedies, whose women often verbally better their male foils — 
but who eventually seem, for the most part, glad to step back into 
their women’s weeds, and back into the shadows? Or the 
Shakespeare of the tragedies, whose heroines range from the 
hapless victim, Lavinia, to the emasculating Volumnia? Or the 
Shakespeare who penned the six female characters of Macbeth, 
four of whom stoke the fires of the gender war, another who ends 
up one of its more pathetic victims, and the last, another cipher, 
who frets her hour and is heard no more, except, perhaps, as a 
wail from off-stage?
All of the above? None of the above? Certainly not, I think, 
the last.
Despite this vagueness, Kimbrough asserts that “the drama of 
Macbeth contains a fierce war between gender concepts of
manhood and womanhood played out upon the plain of humanity” 
(Kimbrough: 176). In doing so, however, he prioritises gender 
issues in the play, seemingly above all else; he claims that
Macbeth’s death ... stems from his failure to allow the 
tender aspects of his character to check those tough 
characteristics which are celebrated by the 
chauvinistic war ethic of his culture ... we are moved 
through pity to understand and to fear the personal
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destructiveness of polarized masculinity and 
femininity. (Kimbrough: 177)
But I think he would have trouble making his case to the many 
militarist apologists of early modern London. His is an interesting 
reading — but one which is in many ways an oversimplification of 
the play.
Even more surprisingly, to Kimbrough the true hero of the 
play — or at least of the gender war —is Macduff. He “declines to 
be merely manly” when he hears of the murder of his family. 
And, according to Kimbrough, Malcolm recognises this. As should 
be clear from my own analysis of the scene earlier in this chapter, 
I do not agree with his reading of their exchange, as Macduff 
actually rejects ‘womanish’ manifestations of grief. Nonetheless, 
Macduff rises to the peak of Kimbrough’s estimation: “he
expresses a fuller range of his being: his humanhood ... [his] 
response is a fully-realized human response.” (Kimbrough: 178).
The goal is not to respond, to feel, or even to act as ‘man’ or 
‘woman’, but as a sexually complete being, as an androgyne, since
While Shakespeare in Macbeth criticises the 
destructive polarity of masculine versus feminine, 
constantly informing the play in his recognition of a 
fuller, healthier way of life, his vision of potential 
human wholeness, his androgynous vision (Kimbrough: 
188).
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Shakespeare: front-line shock-trooper in the gender war.
This, too, is not a reading I am comfortable with. Much of 
Kimbrough’s analysis focuses on a few — too few — passages which 
he stretches to their ideological limits, and in a thoroughly 
predictable way. Lady Macbeth’s “unsex me here” could be taken 
to mean a reduction to the androgynous —but it is accompanied 
by destructive imagery elsewhere (both in Macbeth and other 
canonical texts) associated with male actions and desires.
Kimbrough is not, however, alone in finding androgynous 
leanings in the play. Joost Daalder likewise turns his attention to 
Lady Macbeth’s dark plea —but he sees her attempt to cross the 
gender divide as a failure, because in crossing it she leaves too 
much of herself —too much of the womanly —behind. The same 
applies to the Weird Sisters; to Daalder, the true sign of their evil 
is the confusion about their gender evinced by Banquo (Daalder: 
373). They, too, have abandoned the feminine —something which 
Macbeth fails to notice, or at least to comment on.
Like Kimbrough, Carolyn Asp argues for Macduff as a 
“complete”, sexually integrated human being, and as such he is the 
only one who “can confront and conquer the “fiend” that Macbeth 
has become” (Asp: 155). Like Kimbrough, however, she does not 
address the issue of Macduff’s abandoned family. Perhaps it is this
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act of sacrifice which forges the complete being? I think not. She 
seems to suggest that this model of fully-integrated humanity can 
be possessed of overweening and unhealthy ambition himself: she 
ascribes Macduff’s complaint of “He has no children!” to “his 
frustration at being baulked of complete vengeance” — to carry his 
revenge beyond the prime agent of evil. A paragon indeed.
Janet Adelman is unable to so easily ignore Macduff’s 
abandonment of his family. In an analysis of the play which too 
often descends into Freudian cliche, she allows that he is able to 
expand the play’s prevailing definition of manhood to encom pass 
“humane feeling” (Adelman: 143), but notes that his “accession to 
full masculine power” is at the cost of his family, and is for this 
reason alone unwilling to see him as the play’s ideal. In contrast to 
Kimbrough and Asp, Adelman assigns the role of androgynous 
‘ideal’ to Duncan:
he is the centre of authority, the source of lineage and 
honor, the giver of name and gift; but he is also the 
source of all nurturance, planting the children to his 
throne and making them grow (Adelman: 132).
One can’t help but feel that Adelman would have made a fine 
apologist for the divine right, expressing the quasi-mystical view  
of the king as progenitor that she does. But she does acknowledge 
that Duncan fails to live up to this ideal; she sees him as “largely 
ineffectual”, and, like Harry Berger, is inclined to ascribe the 
rebellion to his weak kingship. With his death, he becomes “an
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emblem not of masculine authority but of feminine vulnerability” 
(Adelman: 132). This vulnerability is, she says, a “taint deriving 
from women” (Adelman: 141), one which Macbeth is (initially)
credited with having avoided —though I cannot myself see how. 
But it later becomes manifest that Malcolm, by his own admission, 
is free of this ‘taint’ (Adelman: 146), and so, in a different way, is 
Macduff (Adelman: 143-4).
The same issue — Macduff’s abandonment of his family —has 
led other critics away from suggesting him as the play’s masculine 
ideal. According to Alexander Leggatt, Macduff’s origins suggest 
“not a miracle but a horrible perversion,” a work of the hand of 
man, not God:
When he deserts his family, his wife declares, ‘He 
wants the natural touch’ ... as though from his birth 
there was something not quite human about him 
(Leggatt: 190).
Marilyn Williamson likewise has no delusions about Macduff. To 
her, he is “the totally male instrument of inherited authority” 
(Williamson: 163), a weapon which Malcolm tests, primes, and 
aims at the throat of his enemy.
The apprehension about the blurring of predetermined 
gender roles provoked no small amount of debate throughout the 
flowering of English Renaissance theatre, in part being driven b y 
the playhouses themselves. The level of apprehension manifested,
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and the way that various pamphletists and others engaged with it, 
make it hard for me to believe that the play is seriously 
suggesting any kind of androgynous ideal, at least to anyone but a 
late 20th Century literary critic. No more so is it offering Macduff 
— or any of the other thanes — as a paragon of manly virtue, 
sexual potency and firmly established gender integrity: I doubt 
that Macduff’s abandonment of his family could be seen by any 
audience, anywhere, as an altogether admirable action. There is a 
further question surrounding Macduff, one associated with the 
apparent circularity of events in Shakespeare’s Scotland. As I 
have suggested in the previous chapter, and as I will show further 
in the next chapter, the warrior ethic is firmly re-established at 
the end of Macbeth , suggesting that the gender-determined ideas 
which underpin it have also survived — or been restored — with as 
little likelihood that they have been subjected to any 
interrogation. Macduff occupies the same site at the heart of this 
restoration that Macbeth did at the play’s beginning, with almost 
precisely the same potential for becoming a source of future 
turmoil. That historically he did not is not a reassurance that could 
be drawn from the play itself.
The search for a single paragon of manhood in Macbeth is a 
pointless as the search for a single paragon of virtue — not 
forgetting, of course, the root of the word ‘virtue’ in the Latin v/r, 
man, and in virtus , excellence overall but manly excellence in
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particular. Any man in Macbeth who could be seen as a model of 
virtue is, almost by definition, a model of manhood — but as I 
have shown, there was more than one ideal of manly virtue being 
offered in the play — and if Malcolm cannot be judged by the 
same moral standards as Macbeth, Banquo and Macduff, no more 
so can he be judged by the same standards of manhood.
The chastity which sets Malcolm — and to a much lesser 
extent, Duncan — apart draws on a long philosophical/religious 
tradition which was still influential during the English
Renaissance. Michel Foucault notes that certain “themes, anxieties, 
and exigencies ... marked the Christian ethic and the morality of 
modern European societies” (Foucault, 1992: 15), and that these 
‘themes’ were largely drawn from pre-existing Graeco-Roman 
thought. A feature of this ‘ethic’, according to Foucault, was “an 
example of abstinence”:
In some people, such extreme virtue was the visible 
mark of the mastery they brought to bear on 
themselves and hence of the power they were worthy 
of exercising over others (Foucault, 1992: 20).
He notes further the insistence on moderation and self-control in 
Greek thought, and one of its implications:
the man who ought to lead others was one who had to 
be completely in command of himself: both because,
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given his position and the power he wielded, it would 
be easy for him to satisfy all his desires, and hence to 
give way to them, but also because disorderly behavior 
on his part would have its effects on everyone 
(Foucault, 1992: 80).
Preceding the above, but perhaps contingent upon it, Foucault 
claims that Greek focus on self-control did not mean that they 
expected it of the lower orders:
the person who, owing to his status, was under the 
authority of others was not expected to find the 
principle of his moderation within himself; it would be 
enough for him to obey the orders and instructions he 
was given (Foucault: 1992, 80).
The influence of Aristotle, Plato and others on Elizabethan English 
thinking is open to debate —what influence there was occurred 
principally through other, later, Roman and Latin writers. 
Inasmuch as the same thinking permeates Christian New 
Testament attitudes towards sexuality —particularly those found 
in Paul’s epistles — the same ideals of self-mastery and the proper 
exercise of (moral) power would have been part of the milieu in 
which Shakespeare was writing, if not, strictly speaking, the 
milieu of  which he was writing. Yet it may be that, as Foucault 
suggests, these ideals were not expected to be adhered to by the 
hoi polloi; as I pointed out in the previous chapter, the Homilies 
show that the expectations of the lower orders were not as high — 
it was enough that they merely obeyed.
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All of these ideals are clearly applicable to Malcolm, and they  
thoroughly displace him from the ethical framework which 
surrounds his morally and politically subordinate thanes. To a 
lesser extent, they also distance him from the supposedly splendid 
moral example of his father, who after all got married, ‘knew’ a 
woman, sired children. During Malcolm’s testing of him, M acduff 
describes Duncan as “a most sainted king”, adding “the queen th a t 
bore thee,/Oft’ner upon her knees than on her feet,/Died every day 
she lived” (IV,iii, 109-111). His mother is the only woman w ith 
whom Malcolm is associated, and then only in this fleeting 
reference — but this is enough to confirm the purity of his origins, 
enough to confirm — through the evident sanctity of his mother — 
his freedom from the ‘taint’ of women.
Janet Adelman’s psychoanalytic readings aside, the notion of 
women as a source of corruption was certainly present —perhaps 
even prevalent — at the time. Elyot’s idea’s about the potential 
moral effects of breast-milk, quoted above, confirm this suspicion 
— at least in some writers. But Elyot also sees a potential positive 
moral influence in the presence of
another woman of approved virtue, discretion and 
gravity, who shall not suffer in the child’s presence 
any act ... dishonest, or any wanton or unclean word to 
be spoken; and for that cause all men, except 
physicians only, should be excluded and kept out of 
the nursery (Lehmberg: 15-16)
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He is obviously speaking, here, of very young children, and indeed 
explains later that this state of affairs should continue only until 
the child is seven, from which age his companions should be only 
“an ancient and sad matron” and a tutor (Lehmberg: 19). It is
almost as if the principal cause for concern is women of child­
bearing age, women who are therefore assumed to be sexually 
active, sexually capable, and —therefore? —a possible source of 
immoral influence. Indeed, Elyot does prohibit young women from 
the presence of his future governor, but it is also obvious, from 
the above, that he is worried — perhaps even equally — about 
young men, who obviously cannot be trusted to behave 
themselves. Even so, the principal source of concern was women: 
Jean E. Howard notes from various anti-theatrical tracts 
(especially, in this case, Philip Stubbes’ Anatomy of Abuses)  that 
“women and actors are constructed, interchangeably, in the same 
rhetoric of contamination and adulteration” (Howard and O’Connor: 
169).
Malcolm is considered to be of exceptional virtue, but it is a 
virtue totally distinct from that embraced by his fellow-Scotsmen, 
and it is one measured not by his prowess in manly, martial 
deeds, but — as I pointed out in the previous chapter — one 
asserted in terms of things he has not done. Foremost among his 
virtues is chastity, the absence of potentially destructive, 
potentially corrupting carnal knowledge. But the standards b y
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which Malcolm’s moral worth are measured are not only d ifferen t 
to those applied to other Scots noblemen; they are, in fact, not 
even Scottish.
Both Malcolm’s parents — particularly, in this instance, his 
mother — are ft*«- shown as people of exceptional worth, 
characteristed, at this late stage of the action, in overtly religious 
terms which are notably absent from the rest of the play; the only 
exceptions — and those minor ones — are all associated w ith 
Duncan: the allusions to St. Colm’s Inch (I,ii), the prayers of his 
grooms (II,ii,29-36), and his burial at Colmkill/Iona. The exchange 
between Malcolm and Macduff takes place during the form er’s 
sourjourn in the court of the English king, Edward — a figure of 
almost legendary sanctity himself, later made a saint and alm ost 
certainly immediately recognised as such by an Elizabethan 
audience. We have had fore-taste of this with the anonym ous 
Lord’s description of him as “pious Edward” (III,vi,27); after 
Macduff’s frantic lament for Malcolm’s parents — but before he 
learns of his own, personal tragedy — we hear further of Edward’s 
amazing qualities:
A most miraculous work in this good king,
Which often since my here-remain in England 
I have seen him do. How he solicits heaven 
Himself best knows, but strangely visited people,
All swoll’n and ulcerous, pitiful to the eye,
The mere despair of surgery, he cures,
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Hanging a golden stamp about their necks
Put on with holy prayers, and ‘tis spoken
To the succeding royalty he leaves
The healing benediction. With this strange virtue,
He hath a heavenly gift of prophecy,
And sundry blessings hang about his throne 
That speak him full of grace. (IV,iii,149-161)
In what has been seen as a late interpolation to the text of 
Macbeth , the explicity (but ‘strangely’) virtuous Edward is 
described almost enviously by Malcolm, who has just asserted his 
own self-worth, but in terms nowhere near as glowing as these. 
As I will demonstrate in the following chapter, however, it may be 
that some of Edward’s miraculous capabilities rub off on Malcolm.
While Duncan’s virtue is largely an invention of
Shakespeare’s, Edward’s is not. The same qualities are found in 
Holinshed’s portrait of the Confessor, with the same interesting 
observation that Shakespeare makes, namely that he “left that 
vertue as it were a portion of inheritance vnto his successors the 
kings of the realm” (Boswell-Stone: 40). There is a subtle 
suggestion, in this, that the saintly Edward is, among his other 
virtues, possessed of the sexual fertility proper to a man, hence he 
will pass on this gift to his heirs. But the suggestion is a 
misleading one: in an extra-textual point which could not have 
been lost on the audience at the time, Edward did not, in fact, 
leave any direct heirs. His piety may have been seen by his 
subjects as impressive, but he was also “so devout that he refused
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to give his wife a child and his realm an heir” (Bryant, 1984: 82); 
something which Malcolm also conspicuously failed to do. The 
confusion over the succession which Edward left behind him was 
largely responsible for the Norman Conquest, and the ensuing 
generations of turmoil, but in Malcolm’s case his childlessness is 
less of an issue — we know, from the play itself, that it is Banquo, 
through Fleance, who will become the progenitor of a dynasty of 
kings, stretching out “to th’crack of doom”, guaranteeing for Scots, 
one might suppose, a continuity and security that their English 
cousins might envy. In the wider context of the play, there was, 
of course, a special significance to this, Fleance being the 
legendary ancestor of the House of Stuart.
Edward’s piousness ties him, indirectly, with Duncan and his 
unnamed wife; his chastity with his Scottish parallel, young 
Malcolm. His gift of prophecy also connects him, obliquely, with 
Macbeth, who is criticised twice in Holinshed for his faith in 
“wizzards” and prophecies (Boswell-Stone: 36, 41) — the same 
prophecies made by the weird sisters’ three apparitions in 
Shakespeare’s version. But Edward’s gift of prophecy is obviously 
divine in origin, a “heavenly gift”; Macbeth’s information comes 
from arguably pagan, possibly infernal sources, a point underlined 
by his inability to “pronounce ‘Amen’” in response to the prayers 
of dead Duncan’s groomsmen. All these factors combine, with the 
minimal religious references elsewhere in the play, to establish a
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distinction between a Christian England and a pagan Scotland, and, 
by the end of the play, Malcolm is firmly associated more with the 
sensibilities of the former; with the English/Christian paradigm of 
chastity, rather than the Scottish/pagan one of libidinity. Any 
awareness of the ultimate end of Holinshed’s tale of Macbeth 
might serve to reinforce the significance of his chastity: Malcolm is 
succeeded, on his death, by his brother Donaldbain. To a reader or 
spectator of the play, ignorant of the quasi-elective system which 
prevailed in 11th century Scotland, the presentation of this minor 
datum could suggest that Malcolm would remain unmarried, 
chaste and untainted — and therefore a fine moral exemplar to the 
end. And through his association with a Christian England,
Malcolm also becomes connected, in the variable ‘now’ of the 
stage, with the resurgent Protestant militarism celebrated b y 
Gates and Blandy; a Protestant militarism embodied, in the 
thinking of the recent Elizabethan past, in figures like Drake, 
Raleigh, Sidney, Leicester and Essex.
5. Confusion’s M asterpiece
God hath his influence into the very essence of all 
things, without which influence of Deity supporting 
them their utter annihilation could not choose but 
follow.
Richard Hooker, Of the Laws o f Ecclesiastical Polity
(McGrade and Vickers:279)
Moreover, take away order from all things, what 
should then remain? Certes nothing finally, except ... 
Chaos ... where there is any lack of order needs must 
be perpetual conflict (Lehmberg: 2).
Bellona, following in the steps of Discord, is evidently a figure of 
chaos, and from the first her supposed bridegroom is himself 
associated with disorder. The witches’ anticipation of “hurly- 
burly” and the turmoil of battle itself align them immediately 
with the same forces of inversion and chaos which they then 
invoke; Macbeth’s place, in the middle of all of this, is extremely 
suggestive.
When we first hear of Macbeth, it is, as I have noted, in the 
thick of battle. But we soon realise that this is not unusual for 
either Macbeth or Scotland; the chaos of war is a common enough 
thing that it is hardly worth commenting on, and Macbeth’s 
association with it passes relative unremarked upon by his king
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and fellow thanes, except in the admiring way I have already 
described. As a matter of fact, it might seem, initially —despite 
the hints of the play’s opening scene —that Macbeth is associated 
with forces of order, acting as he does to defeat the rebel Cawdor 
and restore Scotland to its proper state. But the reappearance of 
the weird sisters soon allows Macbeth to begin —assuming it is 
necessary for him to do so — to change his allegiance.
The weird sisters’ second appearance confirms their status 
as agents of turmoil; they describe with malicious glee the various 
mischiefs they have been about, and when they are met b y 
Macbeth and Banquo the first comment passed upon them 
reinforces both their sexual ambiguity and their chaotic nature:
What are these,
So withered and so wild in their attire,
That look not like th’inhabitants o’th’earth 
And yet are on’t? ... you should be women,
And yet your beards forbid me to interpret 
That you are so. (I,iii,37-45)
It is noteworthy that it is Banquo who is uncertain here; in a 
remark with broad implications for his status as a defender of the 
Scottish realm, all Macbeth has seen fit to remark upon is the 
strange weather, and he does so in exactly the same terms as the 
witches, who may in fact be responsible for it. It is Banquo, too, 
whom the weird sisters seek to silence —they want to hear from
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Macbeth, and it is in answer to a question from him that they 
make their prophecies. But it is Banquo who again first responds 
to them, seeking some similar “great prediction”. Their reply is 
characteristically self-contradictory —lesser and greater, “Not so 
happy, yet much happier” — giving him little immediate 
satisfaction. Even so, they have finally said enough to provoke 
Macbeth, who queries their imperfect speaking in an almost 
sceptical manner before they disappear.
Banquo’s reference to “the insane root” is the best sense he 
can make of what has just happened, but Macbeth can cut to the 
heart of the matter: “Your children shall be kings”. It is almost as 
if he is more impressed by this that his own promise of greatness 
— and perhaps, if he is already preyed upon by the knowledge of 
his own impotence, this may be so. Again, when Ross and Angus 
bring news of the battle —and the association of Macbeth with 
“Strange images of death” — the new-named Thane of Cawdor 
immediately focuses on the core question at the heart of the 
conflict: the present status of the former owner of his “borrowed 
robes”. Since Macbeth’s reward is one that we, in the audience or 
reading the text, have had forewarning of, it is, obviously, less of a 
surprise to us than to Macbeth, and this, combined with Ross’ 
description of the “addition” as a foretaste of further 
advancement, might make us regard the Sisters’ promises with 
less scepticism than either Macbeth or Banquo. But in a subtle
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way, once Macbeth has been reassured of the fate of the traito r, 
he shows himself to be well down the path that leads to his 
destruction: He asks Banquo
Do you not hope your children shall be kings,
When those that gave the Thane of Cawdor to me 
Promised no less to them? (I,iii, 117-119)
Macbeth is sadly — and ominously —mistaken in this remark; the 
title of Thane of Cawdor was given to him by Duncan, his king, not 
by the weird sisters. As king, Duncan is the only one who can 
confer such honours, and, as I have already elaborated, they had 
to be earned, not simply given away. It is as if Macbeth has 
already forgotten the proper way of things in Scotland, in 
anticipation of the “greatest” promise made to him.
Banquo’s response to Macbeth’s query is typically upright: 
he notes both the uncertain nature of their recent vision, and the 
unreliability of the information they have heard:
... oftentimes, to win us to our harm,
The instruments of darkness tell us truths;
Win us with honest trifles, to betray’s 
In deepest consequence. (I,iii,122-5).
This leads Macbeth to muse upon the weird sisters’ words, and 
their effect upon him, now, is to throw him into confusion, into 
microcosmic disorder:
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This supernatural soliciting 
Cannot be ill, cannot be good.
... why do I yield to that suggestion,
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair 
And make my seated heart knock at my ribs 
Against the use of nature? Present fears 
Are less than horrible imaginings.
My thought ...
Shakes so my single state of man that function 
Is smothered in surmise, and nothing is,
But what is not. (I,iii,129-141)
The description of Macbeth’s “single state of man” indicates, 
according to Braunmuller, “‘unitary condition’, ‘singular existence’”. 
He notes further that “‘State’ probably evokes analogies with the 
human body, the body politic, and the macrocosm” (Braunmuller: 
117). The strange eruption in the state which Macbeth is about to 
precipitate is anticipated by his own disarray, a sensation that h e 
can only describe to himself in terms which are once again 
reminiscent of the witches’ self-contradictory rhetoric, and in his 
first dissimulation he decides to conceal his thoughts from his 
fellow thanes. Likewise, when he finally returns to the king’s 
presence, he offers what we can now see as lip-service to Duncan, 
pretending to pay homage to a man he has already begun to plot 
against. Duncan, as has been noted, is more interested, during this 
encounter, with naming Malcolm as his heir, proclaiming to the 
assembled thanes a nobleness in his son which we — and they — 
have not seen demonstrated in the manner crucial to the warrior
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ethic. Duncan describes his son’s apparent honour as shining like a 
star, eliciting from Macbeth his first explicit wish for disorder: 
“Stars, hide your fires ...” (I,iv,50).
Somewhere in all of this, Macbeth has found time to w rite 
to his wife, explaining to her all that has happened, all that has 
been “promised”. Her response is far more immediate than his, 
and far more passionate —and, again, takes the form of an overt 
wish for disorder, a displacement of the natural hierarchy of 
husband over wife and king over subject. She seeks to efface h er 
own gender, to take upon herself the characteristics both of m an 
and beast; like her husband, she also sees herself, now, as an 
agent of night and darkness:
Come, thick night,
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell,
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes,
Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark,
To cry, ‘Hold, hold.’ (I,v,48-52)
Like her husband, she is aware enough of the immorality of h er 
desires that she wishes them to be hidden, even from her own 
sight. But far more than her husband she is willing to em brace 
those forces which both of them see — wrongly — as responsible 
for the reward of Cawdor’s title: Macbeth seeks only to be hidden 
from the stars, his wife from heaven itself. Duncan’s murder is 
carried out that night.
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In that same darkness we encounter Banquo and —for the 
first time —Fleance, about the castle. Coming so soon after the 
suggestion of Macbeth’s impotence, the presence of this man-child 
with his warrior father serves to reinforce the Thane of Cawdor’s 
increasing distance from his fertile fellow-Scotsmen. As Macbeth 
and his wife have foreseen, the very stars have hidden from what 
is happening: “There’s husbandry in heaven,” says Banquo, “Their 
candles are all out.” (II,i,14-5) —Macbeth’s plot against the king 
has had an immediate effect on the natural order of things. And, 
like Macbeth later, Banquo finds he cannot sleep —he is almost 
afraid to; kept awake by some strange premonition that his king is 
under threat. In a gesture appropriate to the warrior ethic and the 
defence of the king, he draws his sword at the approach of the 
not-yet identified Macbeth, and since we know the threat comes 
from Macbeth himself, Banquo’s reaction to him is more fitting 
than he knows. The gesture also confirms, with his remarks to 
Macbeth later, that Banquo is holding true to the principles of the 
warrior ethic; sleeplessness is now all that the two have in 
common.
With Banquo’s departure, Macbeth begins to hallucinate, an 
obvious manifestation of his inner shaken state. He can
understand his present position only in terms of disorder — 
witchcraft and murder, stones ‘prating’ of his whereabouts (II,i, 
58) —and once the deed is done his mind continues to run along
5. Confusion’s m asterpiece 169
the same track. His inability to respond to the grooms’ p rayers 
and the disembodied voice robbing him of sleep are, to his wife, 
merely symptoms of ‘brain-sickness’; to Macbeth, they are signs — 
along with his bloody hands and their capacity to stain the ocean 
— of his self-derived confusion. The immediate effects of Duncan’s 
murder are, however, greater than even Macbeth him self 
suspects: the stones may not shout, but the confusion that  
Macbeth has felt about the killing of his king is now loose in the 
world:
Lennox: The night has been unruly: where we lay,
Our chimneys were blown down, and, as they say,
Lamentings heard i’th’air, strange screams of death 
And prophesying with accents terrible 
Of dire combustion and confused events,
New hatched to th’woeful time. The obscure bird 
Clamoured the livelong night. Some say, the earth 
Was feverous and did shake. (II,iii,46-53)
Macbeth’s contribution is a model of understatement: ‘“Twas a
rough night”.
At this crucial stage, Macduff — all unaware — finds him self 
at the centre of things: discovering Duncan’s body he proclaim s 
“Confusion now hath made his masterpiece” (II,iii,59). Yet who is 
the author of this work? Macbeth himself, who — to our eyes — 
weakly feigns his ignorance of the cause of Macduff’s distress. 
From the outset he has been associated with disorder, and both
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Lennox’s speech and Macduff’s subsequent dismay confirm his 
status as ‘confusion’s masterpiece’. He emphasises the present rule 
of chaos in Scotland, and his own part in it, by later lamenting that 
“from this instant,/There’s nothing serious in mortality./All is but 
toys; renown and grace is dead” (II,iii,85-7). As I have pointed out 
in the previous chapter, he also quickly indicates the uncertainty 
which now surrounds his position in a wider metaphysical 
hierarchy.
The chaos attendant on Duncan’s murder is not limited to 
Forres; the perversions of the natural order described by Ross and 
the Old Man (II,iv,5-20) — darkness during daytime, falcon-killing 
hawks, cannibalistic horses —are particularly startling; that they 
happen in the natural realm, and not the human one, makes them
all the more abominable, as if the less-than-human, less-than-
manly actions of Macbeth have degraded the entire Great Chain. A 
note of protest creeps in to things as well: Duncan’s horses, their 
master’s ‘men’, are described as “Contending ‘gainst obedience”, 
seeking almost to “make war with mankind” —as if, in fact, they 
wish to exact their own revenge on Macbeth, the architect of this 
disorder and the wellspring of new disobedience. The extremity of 
these events is reinforced by the Old Man’s “Threescore and ten”, 
the Biblical limit of a human life, and therefore, possibly, the
limits of experience. Perhaps the ensuing events of the play
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therefore take place in some semi-magical realm, outside time, 
outside ‘normal’ experience.
In a remark typical for him, Ross can only address the 
approaching Macduff with a polite inconsequence: “How goes the 
world, sir, now?” From Macduff’s reply —“see you not?” (II,iv,21) 
— we can be certain that Scotland’s disorder is manifest; he m akes 
a mockery of Ross’ question, introducing a tone of ‘things are 
exactly as they seem’. Yet to Ross at least, there is no questioning 
of Macbeth’s spin on Duncan’s death, and the convenient flight of 
the latter’s sons — “‘Gainst nature still” — both reinforces the 
theme of inversion of natural order, and encourages him to 
support Macbeth’s accession to the throne. Macduff is already 
wary, however — he withdraws to Fife rather than see the new 
king crowned, and he asks Ross to ensure that things are done 
“well”. It is curious that, if he has (unexpressed) concerns, he 
chooses to see the family he later abandons, rather than bring his 
own proper witness to Scone.
The departure of Duncan’s sons is one of the play’s great 
mysteries: why do Malcolm and Donaldbain flee Scotland? Any
number of dramatically expedient explanations could be offered, 
but none satisfactorily justify this disturbing turn in the plot, 
particularly since it is accompanied by a conspicuous lack of grief 
on the part of the two young princes. Malcolm is clear (II,iii, 113-
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4) that they should take the opportunity to speak out, perhaps 
even to accuse their host of the murder, if that is their thinking on 
the matter. Donaldbain, however, is aware that their situation is 
even more precarious than their father’s: “The murderous shaft 
that’s shot/Hath not yet lighted” (II,iii, 134-5). If Duncan’s sanctity 
could not protect him, what hope have they? What is even more 
odd, however, is that they show broader suspicions — Malcolm 
says that they should “not consort with them”, implying that he 
has his misgivings even about the other thanes: perhaps the
“undivulged pretence” of Duncan’s assassination, the lack of a new 
claimant to the throne, has fired his mistrust. The simplest
explanation for their departure is the one they themselves hint at: 
it would not be safe for them to remain in Scotland, and they 
know it. But more than this it is necessary for the brothers to 
depart so that at least one of them — almost certainly the
nominated heir — will be free to return and set things to rights.
The disordered state in which they leave Scotland would, 
according to several well-established readings of the play, have 
elicited a quiet horror from an Elizabethan audience — but, 
Tillyard’s increasingly disreputable view of things aside, there 
may be another way of looking at things, one I have drawn from a
collection of essays published in the early 1990’s. Edited by N.
Katherine Hayles at the University of Chicago, the title of the 
collection is Chaos and Order: Complex Dynamics in Literature and
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Science; a title which, I am sure, would catch the eye of anyone 
whose introduction to Shakespeare was at least partially through 
the offices of E.M.W. T illyard1. In some respects, this book 
represents an extension of one of the most rapidly growing fields 
in publishing, a field generally referred to as ‘popular science’. I t  
is not really a new phenomenon —it extends, I think, at least as 
far back as Thomas Browne or Francis Bacon — but in its m ost 
recent manifestation it can probably be said to have developed in 
the wake Stephen Hawking’s much-unread A Brief History o f  
Time. Chaos theory —the impetus behind the work of Hayles and 
company — has accounted for no small number of books in this 
field.
Hayles’ collection is by no means a major work, nor does it 
represent a new theoretical paradigm; it is simply an attempt to 
extend some of the ideas behind a relatively new scientific 
development into the domain of literature. The reason for 
attempting to do so, according to Hayles, is that
cultural traditions ... are encoded not merely into 
words but also into practices, institutions, and m aterial 
conditions ... this means that chaos theory can scarcely
1 Much of the following argument is taken from a paper presented to th e  
Australia/New Zealand Shakespeare Association biennial conference i n 
February, 1994. This paper, titled ‘The Better Concludes a Worse? 
Shakespeare, Macbeth,  and Disorder’, was published in S h akespeare : 
Readers, Audiences, Players  (University of Western Australia Press, 1998), 
edited by R.S. White, Charles Edelman, and Christopher Wortham.
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avoid having implications for culture beyond its 
technical achievements (Hayles: 4).
This is a point on which Hayles would find little disagreement in 
some circles, and indeed she and her fellow-contributors are well 
aware of the relationship of chaos theory to other postmodern and 
poststructural theories (Hayles: 5, 10-11).
Notions of chaos and order remain important 
preoccupations within Shakespearean criticism. Both old and New 
Historicists and Cultural Materialists have focussed no small 
amount of attention on the representations of chaos, and the 
endorsements of order, found in Elizabethan drama. E.M.W. 
Tillyard has famously asserted that fear of chaos, and its corollary 
desire for order, was one of the defining characteristics of the 
Elizabethan psyche (Tillyard: 25-26), but its presence in the
drama was more problematic:
the conception of order is so taken for granted, so 
much a part of the collective mind of the people, that it 
is hardly mentioned at all except in explicitly didactic 
passages (Tillyard: 18).
In this way, concepts of chaos and order constitute a kind of 
Derridan trace for Tillyard and his successors. Representations of 
disorder are, however, far more frequent in Elizabethan and 
Jacobean drama than Tillyard’s “explicitly didactic” pro-order
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passages, and New Historicism follows his lead in seeing them as 
working upon this pervasive fear of chaos, ‘rehearsing’ disorder in 
the playhouse, so as to ‘contain’ it within the playhouse 
(Greenblatt, 1988: 40). Cultural Materialism, on the other hand, 
sees the same representations of disorder as blatantly
deconstructive, since in the process of ‘rehearsal’ the order 
overturned in the playhouse is “interrogated” to the point of 
becoming subversive (Dollimore: xxi). These are, apparently, our 
two alternatives: containment or subversion; order or disorder. I n 
many ways Hayles’ book complicates this debate, since in applying 
chaos theory to literary analysis it makes the status of disorder 
itself far more complex, since it can no longer be assumed, 
according to Hayles, that chaos is negative (Hayles: 1-3).
In essence, chaos theory has two main branches: one which 
proposes that what appears to human perceptions to be chaos 
“may have deep structures of order encoded within it” (Hayles: 3), 
and another which suggests that chaos may itself lead to order. 
Hayles concedes that none of the ideas behind chaos theory are 
‘new’ (Hayles: 3), but I would like to go so far as to say that 
neither of these two main propositions are alien to Elizabethan 
thinking; it would be no great leap to see, for example, the 
connection between the ‘encoded order’ and repeated patterns of 
chaotic systems and the well-known Tillyardian ‘Great Chain’: it is 
a common conceit in the theological writings of the Elizabethan
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and Jacobean periods to assert that what appears chaotic and 
incomprehensible to Man must surely not be so to God, tying in to 
chaos theory’s notions of implicate order. But it is the other 
proposition of chaos theory —that chaos can lead to order —with 
which I am more concerned. This branch of chaos theory has, 
according to Hayles,
a vision of the world that extends its significance ... 
into the cultural realm ... It envisions a world that can 
renew itself rather than a universe which is constantly 
running down (Hayles: 12-13)
It is, in some respects, the more radical, less respectable side of 
chaos theory, and one which has significant philosophical 
implications; it goes against the grain of some of the most 
fundamental principles of modern and ancient science. It may also 
seem to be antagonistic to Renaissance thinking, but I hope to 
demonstrate otherwise.
It might seem out of keeping with the methodology I have 
applied elsewhere in this thesis to approach the ideas of chaos and 
order in Elizabethan drama through the vehicle of a late 20th 
Century scientific theory, but I have found several expressions of 
the relevant idea — that chaos can promote the formation of order 
— in Renaissance sources, one of the more obvious being the 
widespread and persisting belief in spontaneous generation, the 
idea that insects and some animals developed from inert or
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decomposing matter. An extreme example of this is reported b y 
Carlo Ginzburg in his account of the heresy trials of a late 16th- 
century Italian miller. He quotes the following extraordinary 
cosmology from Inquisitorial records:
My opinion is that God was eternal with chaos ... that 
he was made from chaos ... I believe that it was with 
God as with the things of this world that proceed from 
imperfect to perfect, as an infant who while he is in his 
mother’s womb neither understands nor lives, but 
outside the womb begins to live, and in growing begins 
to understand (Ginzburg: 54-55).
While this is hardly an orthodox view, it is nonetheless 
remarkable; it demonstrates at least the possibility of such
thinking. It also shows as much the influence of Ovid as it does of 
the scriptures, and it is Ovid who confirms that such thinking was 
not limited to northern Italy: in his notes to his 1632 translation 
of Metamorphoses George Sandys glosses Ovid’s account of the 
Creation by suggesting that the Chaos which preceded it was 
“ordered, as they say by Love”, by the Creator who “gave form to 
the deformed, and perfection to the imperfect ... The better 
concludes a worse, which was Chaos” (Hulley and Vandersall: 49). 
A more influential expression of the same idea, and one that 
would have been more familiar to Shakespeare, his audiences, and 
his players, is the following:
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that which thou sowest, it is not quickened, except it 
die. And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that 
body that shall bee ... The body is sowen in corruption, 
and is raised in incorruption ... For this corruption must 
put incorruption: and this mortall must put on
immortality. (I Cor. 15:36-53)
It is possible, of course, that it was this passage which led both 
Sandys and Ginzburg’s miller to express things the way they did; 
indeed, Sandys goes so far as to suggest that Ovid himself may 
have been influenced by the scriptures — “doubtless he had either 
seene the Books of Moses , or receaved that doctrine by tradition”.
It is clear, then, that the idea that order could grow out of 
chaos was not alien to Renaissance thinking, admittedly with the 
proviso that the divine hand always seems to be involved. This is 
the principle difference between the expression of this idea in 
Shakespeare’s time, and in our own; it is not a new idea, as Hayles 
admits, but an old one that is continually rearticulated in the 
terms of changing dominant discourses. In any case, what chaos 
theory is effecting is a change in the perception of change: chaos 
becomes a means by which significant transformations of
structure are carried out.
The perception of change in Elizabethan drama is likewise 
problematic. It is possible to see in much of the writing of the 
Elizabethan period a resistance to change, especially social or
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political change. This is intimately related to the fear of chaos: the 
social or political order of the monarchy which existed was one 
ordained by God, as the endless and often repetitive arguments of 
various authors point out. Such arguments, according to Catherine 
Belsey, depended upon the fear of chaos for their strength, 
intended, as they were, to shore up an at best shaky structure:
The arguments ... have in common a tendency to fix 
difference as antithesis, to restrict the imaginable 
possibilities to two: on the one hand, this government, 
or on the other, no government, the present order or 
its opposite, which is always chaos ... The project is, of 
course ... to close off any consideration of a third 
possibility (Belsey: 94).
In this way, fear of chaos becomes a fear of change, since any 
alteration to the prevailing structures can, in theory, have no 
result but to destroy the structures. But to suggest that the result 
would be a resistance to, or a fear of, any change at all would be 
wrong: Jonathon Dollimore has demonstrated that there was a 
clear difference in Elizabethan thinking between change-as- 
decline, and change-as-alteration — decay and mutability 
(Dollimore: 92-99). He draws a distinction between two prevailing 
philosophies which would have affected the individual’s 
perception of change. The first, which he ascribes to Augustine, 
held that the most significant event of history was the Fall: the 
universe may have been created perfect but it was corrupted by 
Man’s transgression and had been steadily declining since. The
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other, which he credits to Aquinas, acknowledges the significance 
of the Fall but held that some of the perfection which preceded it 
was recoverable; it “affirms man’s ... rational potential” and 
“exalted nature”, rather than his depravity (Dollimore: 161-166). 
The tension which exists between these two views is by no means 
unique to the English Renaissance; there will at any time, I think, 
be a balance between the belief that things are steadily getting 
worse —the ‘Augustinian’ view —and the belief that things are 
slowly getting better — the ‘Aquinian’ view. The dominance of one 
or the other of these views in a culture or an individual will affect 
how changes to society, to political or ethical structures, will be 
perceived; it would determine whether the political revolutions 
portrayed in Julius Caesar or Coriolanus, for example, would b e 
seen as changes for the better or worse. This would also depend 
on the ‘distance’ (so to speak) between the values and structures 
of the spectator, or of the audience, and those represented in the 
plays. In these and in several other Shakespearean plays it is 
possible to see a process of change via a passage from order, to 
chaos, to a re-ordering. Julius Caesar and Coriolanus are biased 
toward representing this process as a change for the worse; the 
‘new’ order which results is somehow inferior — especially on 
ethical grounds — to the one it has replaced. In most cases, 
however, the end result of the process of re-ordering is more 
ambiguous: Hamlet, Measure for Measure, and King Lear can each
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be seen as rehearsing this process of order-chaos-reorder, but the 
resulting ethical or political restructuring can be read either way.
When I first began to look at Macbeth , it was these possible 
ethical and political changes in the play that were my principal 
interest. Chaos theory has, at least peripherally, influenced the 
way I look at these changes. Disorder can operate as a kind of 
discourse within an ethical or political framework, since it is 
possible to learn more about such structures when they have 
been, as it were, torn apart. Macbeth is obviously an important 
text in this regard, since representations of disorder are more 
frequent, and possibly more significant, than in any other
Shakespearean play.
With Duncan’s murder, the ethical, sexual and political structures 
which operate in Shakespeare’s Scotland have been ripped apart, 
with visible chaos as a result. After the killing of his king, the 
usurper Macbeth is so determined to be “safely thus” that he is 
willing to wish further chaos upon the world:
But let the frame of things disjoint, both the worlds
suffer,
Ere we will eat our meal in fear, and sleep 
In the affliction of these terrible dreams 
That shake us nightly. (III,ii, 16-19)
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But does he sleep? Clearly not — he now envies the dead; he 
envies Duncan his rest, while he, Macbeth, must suffer nightly 
turmoil. And is that a royal ‘we’, or is Lady Macbeth likewise 
afflicted by dreams? Perhpas significantly, it is at this point th a t 
Lady Macbeth ceases to have any active part in M acbeth’s 
machinations, and she later shows herself to be affected by the 
same personal disorder that plagues her husband: her doctor
explains her sleepwalking by observing that “unnatural deeds/Do 
breed unnatural troubles” (V,i,61-62).
Whereas earlier in the play, before the deed was done, it 
was Lady Macbeth who could make the explicit invocation of the 
forces of darkness, it is now Macbeth who calls upon infernal 
forces:
Come, seeling night,
Scarf up the tender eye of pitiful day 
And with thy bloody and invisible hand 
Cancel and tear to pieces that great bond 
Which keeps me pale. Light thickens,
And the crow makes wing to th’rooky wood;
Good things of day begin to droop and drowse,
Whiles night’s black agents to their preys do rouse.
(Ill, ii, 46-53)
The invisible bloody hand of chaos immediately recalls M acbeth’s 
own, the same that he refused to recognise as his own after 
Duncan’s murder, the same hand he even earlier wished his eyes
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would “wink at”. It is this hand which has torn the “great bond” — 
the warrior ethic and his allegiance to the king — which M acbeth 
now feels has him pale with sickness, perhaps even cowering w ith 
fear — but it also keeps him “pale” in the sense of its being a fence, 
a limitation on his ambitions and desires. The drooping and 
drowsy “Good things” that begin to withdraw from the night 
obviously do not include Macbeth, his wife, and Banquo’s
murderers: the association of the Macbeths with night and 
darkness is clear. With the unnamed Lord’s later interpretation of 
the ‘moral’ of Banquo’s tale as “Men must not walk too late”, it is 
also obvious that it is becoming well understood in Scotland, too.
The interrupted banquet begins with a reminder of the 
order that Macbeth has subverted — “You know your own 
degrees,” he insists (III,iv,l). At this stage — despite the 
sentiments he has expressed two scenes before —he seems in ten t 
on preserving the traditional order, and yet his next sen tim ent
serves to overturn it: “Our self will mingle with society and play
the humble host”. Humble it may be to do so, but what this
supposed magnanimity really shows is that the new -crow ned 
Macbeth, a man not intended to occupy the throne, does not know 
his own place. He leaves his wife in state — itself, possibly, an 
inversion of the normal order of things — and seeks, how ever 
temporarily, to resume his former position. But he cannot — first 
the murderer and then Banquo’s ghost prevent him. Despite his
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desire to re-join his comrades, to return to the fam iliar 
environment of the warrior ethic, there is no indication th a t 
Macbeth ever manages to take his seat —Lennox, after all, invites 
him to do so (III,iv,39).
Macbeth seems to be aware of how far from the norm al 
state he has pushed things:
Blood hath been shed ere now, i’th’olden time,
Ere human statute purged the gentle weal;
Ay, and since too, murders have been performed
Too terrible for the ear. The time has been
That when the brains were out, the man would die,
And there an end. But now they rise again 
With twenty mortal murders on their crowns 
And push us from our stools. This is more strange 
Than such a murder is. (Ill,iv,75-83).
As king he is supposed to be the living embodiment of “human 
statute”, of the rule of law; he is supposed to defend the 
commonweal and its members from murder, not thrust it upon 
them. That Banquo can — to Macbeth’s eyes at least —roam, dead, 
is a reminder to him of the disorder he has inflicted upon the 
realm. Indeed, he is berated for this by his wife: “You have 
displaced the mirth, broke the good m eeting/w ith  most adm ired  
disorder” (III,iv,109-110). The imagined roving of the dead  
Banquo also reinforces the idea that Scotland is now, somehow, a 
realm outside time, beyond the normal limitations of m ortality.
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Even within this scene, the point is further reinforced b y 
Macbeth’s apprehension that he may be betrayed by natural 
forces:
It will have blood they say: blood will have blood.
Stones have been known to move and trees to speak. 
Augures, and understood relations, have 
By maggot-pies, and choughs, and rooks brought forth 
The secret’st man of blood. (Ill,iv,122-126)
Faced with her husband’s “admired disorder”, Lady Macbeth 
dismisses the thanes: “At once, good night./Stand not upon the 
order of your going,/But go at once” (III,iv,l 18-120). The broken 
meeting of the banquet ends with a clear evocation of the disorder 
which now plagues Scotland: even the normal ceremony of the 
court is thrown out.
As I have noted in the previous chapter, the reappearance 
of Banquo’s ghost becomes, for Macbeth and his unknowing wife, a 
question of his manhood: he is unable to rouse the courage to 
confront this unnatural challenge. But he is confident of his ability 
to confront natural enemies, and his subsequent visit to the weird 
sisters convinces him of his invulnerability to any but unnatural 
foes. It is a fair comment on Macbeth’s transformation —if that is 
what it is —that he now knows exactly where to find the weird 
sisters, and his ‘conjuration’ of them (IV,i,49-59) uses imagery of 
inversion and excessive destructiveness, continuing the theme of
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disorder which has become associated with him. The nature of the 
apparitions emphasises Scotland’s disordered state, particularly its 
dislocation from normal time — the spectres present images which 
resonate back and forward through the play’s action and beyond, 
placing the perspective of the witches, the usurping king and, b y 
extension, the whole of Scotland outside mere human time.
The first apparition, “an armed Head”, warns Macbeth 
“Beware the Thane of Fife” (IV,i,71). The apparition’s warning is 
straightforward enough, and after the previous confusing scene 
may serve to clarify some things in the audience’s mind. The 
appearance of the apparition is something else altogether; it would 
be obvious to see it as both a recollection of the decapitation of 
the traitor Macdonald, and an anticipation of Macbeth’s ultimate 
decapitation at the hands of Macduff. But it could also be taken as 
an image of Duncan, of Malcolm and his relationship to his 
usurped kingdom —a premonition of the restoration of order to 
the kingdom. Macbeth has cut off Scotland’s head, but it will 
return, armed, to its proper place.
The second apparition is a “a bloody Child”. Its warning 
relates intimately to the first, and yet Macbeth, unknowing, uses 
its admonition to dismiss his fears of Macduff — but he still 
decides he will kill Macduff to “tell pale-hearted fear it lies,/And 
sleep in spite of thunder” (IV,i,84-85). He will defy augury despite
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all of the prophecies which have so far come true. Again, an alert 
audience member might recall this apparition later, seeing the 
bloody child as the “Untimely ripped” Macduff, but there are other 
bloody children in the play, both seen —Macduff’s unnamed son, 
murdered by Macbeth’s assassins —and unseen —the imaginary 
baby dashed against a wall by Lady Macbeth. In the latter case, it 
is apparition which reminds the audience of her distorted 
sexuality, and the corruption of the natural order which her 
ambition and destructiveness inspire.
The third apparition, “a Child crowned, with a tree in his 
hand”, is a less ambiguously interpreted image — the untried, 
virginal and therefore child-like Malcolm, camouflaged by the 
boughs of Birnam Wood, coming to reclaim his kingdom. There 
are, in this image, obvious connections to the Green Man, to the 
spring of rebirth that will come, with the legitimate king, to return 
order to the realm, and these are connections which are proper to 
Macbeth, the witches, and the pagan Scotland they inhabit. But the 
vision also serves to anticipate something we do not yet know of 
Malcolm: his exceptional virtue. “Who can impress the forest, bid 
the tree/Unfix his earthbound root?” asks Macbeth (IV,i,94-95), 
and the answer is obvious: no normal man, born of woman or not; 
it would be an action of almost divine will, if it were to come 
literally true. The final apparition, and the words it speaks, also 
build upon the previous apparitions to suggest, again, the disorder
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that Macbeth has brought to Scotland: armed heads, bloody and 
crowned children, unborn men and walking trees are all unnatural 
events. That the apparitions’ prophecies are fulfilled in so prosaic 
a fashion is a mark of how easily Macbeth is led astray by forces 
which, like Mephistoheles to Faust, deliver none of the things they 
promise. And it is odd that, with all he has seen, Macbeth refuses 
to acknowledge the possibility of any of the newly-foretold events 
coming to pass.
The final vision, the ‘show of kings’ —the “two-fold balls 
and treble sceptres” shown to Macbeth — is significant in a 
number of ways. It certainly relates to the politics of the world 
outside the play —James’ accession, perhaps even the visit of the 
King of Denmark —but it also, arguably, foreshadows the coming 
political change within the world of the play —the accession of a 
king strongly allied to England. Macbeth’s description of the royal 
pageant has always suggested, in my mind, a kind of masque: it 
would be easy to imagine Inigo Jones’ sketches for appropriate 
sets and costumes. Given James’ fondness for ornate displays in 
masques, it possible that the infamous court performance might 
have entailed all sorts of devices and extravagances, but beneath 
them all would have been the not particularly subtle stroking of 
the royal ego.
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But to a certain extent the parade must act on Macbeth in 
such a way as to undo much of the assurance he has obtained 
from the previous apparitions. This is, after all, a vision he has 
asked for, but also one he has been, for whatever strange reason, 
warned away from. Yet he insists — and the result is a show to 
“grieve his heart”, and for which he curses the witches. It is a fte r 
this disconcerting exhibition — and the news of Macduff’s flight — 
that he vows to crown his thoughts with acts, and while action 
itself may be manly and proper, what Macbeth promises is 
intemperate, impulsive action. In short, he is now undertaking to 
visit upon Scotland and its people as much chaos as he can m uster 
to his side.
Macduff’s flight is itself a manifestation of the d isordered  
state of Scotland. His departure makes little sense to anyone in the 
play, and, despite the best efforts of decades of Shakespearean 
criticism, it makes even less sense to the changing sensibilities of 
audiences. Like the departure of Duncan’s sons, it is som ething 
that only makes sense in terms of its being dramatically expedient 
— but even that explanation introduces more complications. I f  
Malcolm’s self-imposed exile can be interpreted as a necessary 
removal from his corrupted realm, making him the focus of the  
play’s and the kingdom’s aspirations towards restored order, t hen 
Macduff’s exodus might seem redundant: one could imagine the  
returning true king confronting the usurper with self-com parisons
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and besting him, acting in his own interests to resolve the crisis 
himself. But as I have shown, the paradigm of martial skill which 
operates in Scotland does not extend to the king — he is not 
expected to fight. But even if Malcolm is not constrained by the 
separate ethical structure which surrounds him, there is another, 
perhaps even more important reason why he cannot be the agent 
of his own delivery. Though Macbeth is a usurper, he is king — 
crowned, anointed, witnessed. As such, he is granted a degree of 
sanctity and protection, whether he deserves it or not. The 
Homilies were quite clear on this point —even the most im m oral 
of rulers was to be endured:
Yet let us believe undoubtedly ... that we may not obey 
Kings, Magistrates, or any other ... if they would 
command us to do any thing contrary to God’s
commandments ... But nevertheless, in that case we 
may not in any wise withstand violently, or rebel 
against rulers, or make any insurrection, sedition, or 
tumults (Homilies: 110).
This was an issue about which James himself felt strongly, arguing 
— most notably in Basilikon Doron — against the overthrow of 
tyrants. The problem, of course, is that Malcolm does “w ithstand 
violently”. Shakespeare is treading a very fine ethical line here, 
suggesting at one and the same time that Malcolm is the true, if 
thwarted, king of Scotland —but that the usurper Macbeth is also 
a king. The latter obviously orders many things “contrary to God’s 
commandments”, but not to either Malcolm or Macduff — and in
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any case, should Malcolm have obeyed an instruction from this 
questionable king? I suspect that this is not a question that even 
the various authors of the Homilies — perhaps even Elizabeth 
herself — would have been comfortable trying to answer. For 
Shakespeare, the solution to this sticky moral dilemma is neat, if 
evasive — whatever else Malcolm does, he is not individually 
responsible for the death of a king.
If it cannot be Malcolm who kills the tyrant Macbeth, then  
another candidate must be found —and so the relocated M acduff 
becomes the instrument who, at his king’s proper direction, will 
administer the appropriate chastisement to the latest rebel — 
much as Macbeth himself did with Cawdor. But the murder of 
Macduff’s family makes his interest in Macbeth personal — it 
pushes his motivation over the line from just punishment and in 
to the problematic domain of revenge. This is where the supposed 
parallels between Macbeth and Macduff break down, in both 
Holinshed and in Shakespeare’s version of the story: Macbeth has 
no personal motivation beyond ambition in anything he does — his 
killing of the rebel Cawdor, his assassination of Duncan, his 
disposal of Banquo. Even in the case of Macduff’s family, his 
motive is hardly revenge; it is malice, pure and simple, a symptom 
of his cruelty and of his now chaotic nature. The Thane of Fife, 
through his connection with the notorious “wild justice” of 
revenge, is likewise a figure of disorder —but a very, very m inor
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one. For Macduff, there are no witches or forces of darkness —not 
even an ambitious wife — to spur him on, and whatever his o ther 
motivations, in killing Macbeth he is also carrying out the 
instructions of his true king. But he is not, as Macbeth was, seen as 
single-handedly responsible for the true king’s victory over a 
rebel; he is not, not even as Macbeth was, an agent of order: th a t 
province is left entirely to Malcolm.
Ross’ description of Scotland, when he greets Malcolm and 
Macduff in England, is more in the unnatural ev en ts /d iso rd e r 
vein:
... sighs, and groans, and shrieks that rend the air 
Are made, not marked; where violent sorrow seems 
A modern ecstasy. The deadman’s knell 
Is there scarce asked for who, and good men’s lives 
Expire before the flowers in their caps ... (IV,iii, 170- 
174)
Too polite and well-meaning still, Ross tells Macduff his wife and 
children are “well ... well at peace”. He avoids explaining this, 
choosing instead to address Malcolm — and to credit him with a 
possible positive inversion of the natural order of things:
Your eye in Scotland
Would create soldiers, make our women fight 
To doff their dire distress. (IV,iii,188-190)
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The bloodthirstiness of even Scotland’s women was legendary in 
Shakespeare’s time, but it is, perhaps, the disorder which prevails 
in Scotland that makes this particular miracle possible; either that, 
or the inspirational effect of the return of the true king. Ross’ 
remarks preface a number of scenes in which the response of 
various Scots — the thanes, the Doctor, the common people — to 
the prospect of their true king’s return are contrasted with th e ir 
increasing antipathy towards the “tyrant” .
Several of the thanes discuss their intention to join 
Malcolm’s forces. Menteith expresses his confidence in Malcolm 
and the “good Macduff’, and notes, as Ross did, Malcolm’s ability 
to inspire loyal Scotsmen:
The English power is near, led on by Malcolm,
His uncle Siward, and the good Macduff.
Revenges burn in them, for their dear causes 
Would to the bleeding and the grim alarm 
Excite the mortified man. (V,ii,3-5)
Braunmuller glosses ‘mortified’ in this case as both meaning both 
dead and insensible (Braunmuller: 221), the latter suggesting,
perhaps, that Scotland and its warriors have been numbed by the 
excesses of Macbeth’s reign. But it is the first, and, to my thinking, 
more obvious meaning he offers — dead — which is m ost 
interesting: Ross may have observed, earlier, that Malcolm could 
excite Scotland’s women to fight for their freedom, but here, we
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discover that he can inspire even the dead to rise. Edward may be 
able to heal the King’s Evil, but Malcolm can — at least 
metaphorically — defy even death — a possible indication of a 
divine connection, a heavenly anointing of him as the true king. To 
Macbeth, the revenant spirit of Banquo is a threat, but to Malcolm 
the vengeful dead of Scotland are another ally, assisting in the 
restoration of “measure, time, and place”.
The perception of Macbeth deteriorates even further; 
Caithness reports:
Some say he’s mad; others that lesser hate him 
Do call it valiant fury, but for certain 
He cannot buckle his distempered cause 
Within the belt of rule. (V,ii, 13-16)
Macbeth’s ‘cause’ is beyond rule, beyond order. Since the natural 
order of things — the warrior ethic and its expectation of 
obedience — has been disrupted by his actions, he cannot rely 
upon it helping him: “Those he commands,” notes Angus, “move 
only in command,/Nothing in love” (V,ii, 19-20). The “service” and 
“loyalty” Macbeth admits owing to Duncan are not due to him, and 
those thanes who have not already deserted him now see this (but 
why did they not before?): “march we on”, adds Caithness,
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To give obedience where ‘tis truly owed;
Meet we the med’cine of the sickly weal,
And with him pour we in our country’s purge
(V ,ii,26-28)
Again, this could be taken to suggest Malcolm’s divine nature, 
perhaps even his superiority to even the holy King Edward; the 
English king can cure his subjects, but Malcolm will ‘purge’ an 
entire kingdom. Scotland’s sickness is a reflection of M acbeth’s 
own inner turmoil, his shaken “single state of man” — both the 
body of the king and the body of the kingdom are afflicted by the 
disorder of disease, manifested within by his “heat-oppressed 
brain” and his strange fits, outwardly by the widely-noted turm oil 
in the natural world. Malcolm is the proper “med’cine” for both, 
but he will administer only appropriate physic: “so much as it 
needs,” says Lennox, “To dew the sovereign flower and drown the 
weeds” (V,ii,29-30).
The translation of the action to Macbeth’s heavily fortified 
castle continues the previous scene’s image of a diseased body 
needing treatment. Macbeth sneeringly dismisses the “false 
thanes” who have flown to “the English epicures” (V,iii,8-9); 
despite being accused of luxuriousness and indulgence himself, 
Macbeth feels free to characterise his foes as voluptuous, soft — 
the opposite, in his mind, of the battle-hardened Scots, ruled b y
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the warrior ethic he has forsaken. As I have noted in Chapter 3, 
he begins to show a kind of despair:
I have lived long enough. My way of life 
Is fall’n into the sere, the yellow leaf,
And that which should accompany old age,
As honour, love, obedience, troops of friends 
I must not look to have; but in their stead,
Curses, not loud but deep, mouth-honour, breath 
Which the poor heart would fain deny, and dare not.
(V,iii, 22-28)
The images are of decay, age, impotence and failure. In some ways 
he is comparing himself, here, to Duncan, and finding both him self 
and his rule lacking. Like Angus and Caithness, he is aware that he 
no longer has the true loyalty of his people, that same loyalty he 
gave apparently freely to his king at the play’s outset. The 
Doctor’s entry extends the disease metaphor to Lady M acbeth, 
despite his diagnosis of her as “Not so sick ... As she is troubled 
with thick-coming fancies/That keep her from rest” (V ,iii,38-40). 
“Cure her of that,” says Macbeth
Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased, 
Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow,
Raze out the written troubles of the brain,
And with some sweet oblivious antidote 
Cleanse the stuffed bosom of that perilous stuff 
Which weighs upon the heart? (V,iii,38-46)
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Assured of the Doctor’s professional impotence in this, he 
famously proclaims “Throw physic to the dogs, I’ll none of it”, and, 
resigned to no other cure, calls — for the third time — for his
armour and prepares to fight. Medicine at the time was predicated 
on the restoration of balance to a disordered body, and M acbeth’s 
lack of faith in physic reinforces — as if we needed it, at this stage 
of the play — how far from his world’s notions of order and 
regularity he has travelled, particularly since the advancing 
Malcolm, the true king, is seen as the “antidote” to M acbeth’s
poison. Yet he still seeks for some other possible, easier remedy
If thou couldst, doctor, cast 
The water of my land, find her disease,
And purge it to a sound and pristine health,
I would applaud thee to the very echo 
That should applaud again ...
What rhubarb, cynne, or what purgative drug 
Would scour these English hence? (V,iii,51-57)
The disease is, of course, Macbeth himself, and the called-for
purge is on its way — but what is odd, here, is his desire that  
Scotland be purged of the English. This may be an unnoticed
hangover from the play’s source, but a quick examination of that  
source introduces some interesting implications. In relating 
incidents beyond the end of Macbeth’s reign, Holinshed notes the  
enthusiasm with which the Scots greeted Malcolm’s successor, his 
brother Donaldbain:
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For manie of the people, abhorring the riotous maners 
and superfluous gormandizing brought in among them 
by the Englishmen, were willing inough to receiue this 
Donald for their king, trusting (bicause he had beene 
brought vp in the lies with the old customes and 
maners of their ancient nation, without tast of the 
English likerous delicats) they should by his seuere 
order in gouernement recouer againe the former 
temperance of their old progenitors (Boswell-Stone: 
42).
This is, obviously, the source of Macbeth’s dismissal of “the English 
epicures” — but it is also something which joins a long list of 
source-related questions, all of which are unanswerable without 
some idea of the familiarity the play’s various audiences may 
have had with the Chronicle. In Shakespeare, we have the 
“seuere” Macbeth wanting to expel the invading English: in
Holinshed it is the Scottish people themselves, seemingly
mourning that same severity, who want the influence of the 
English removed. But the obvious source of that influence is the 
good, virtuous and — in both Shakespeare and Holinshed — 
temperant Malcolm. The Scots — and James’ court — may have 
been notorious for their drinking, but in Holinshed it is the 
“English likerous delicats” that are cause for concern. If the court 
was at all familiar with Holinshed —and there is good reason to 
believe that many of them were —then this swipe at the English 
would have been risible, but, like Lady Macbeth’s and the Porter’s 
remarks on drinking earlier in the play, it may have also raised a
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few eyebrows. In the Globe, however, this petty put-down of the  
English may have inspired more than casual laughter — it m ust 
have been quite humorous to hear a ‘Scottish’ ‘king’ denouncing 
the intemperance of the English. Likewise, Macbeth’s expressed  
desire to have the English ‘purged’ from his kingdom could hard ly  
have gone unnoticed; there were many Londoners who felt the  
same way about James’ Scots.
By this stage of the play, Macbeth has begun to realise th a t 
his cause is hopeless, and even the news that his wife, his d ea rest 
partner of greatness, is dead, a possible suicide, cannot move him  
from the dismay which now grips him:
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow 
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day 
To the last syllable of recorded time;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools 
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle, 
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage 
And then is heard no more. It is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury 
Signifying nothing. (V,v, 18-27)
He trails off into yet another image of disorder, of m eaningless 
“sound and fury” instead of divinely mandated peace and order. 
With the news that Birnam Wood is moving towards the castle, his 
despair is almost complete:
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I pull in resolution and begin 
To doubt th’equivocation of the fiend 
That lies like truth ...
I ‘gin to be aweary of the sun
And wish th’estate o’th’world were now undone.
(V,v, 41-49)
With this final wish for chaos, he is ready to fight. With his 
departure, Siward is able to invite Malcolm into the “gently 
rendered” Dunsinane: he notes that in the chaos of battle (and, of 
course, the chaos of Macbeth’s Scotland), “The tyrant’s people on 
both sides do fight” (V,vii,26), but the thanes, with their allegiance 
to the restored king confirmed, are doing exactly what the warrior 
ethic requires of them —they “do bravely in the war”. The night 
and disorder associated with Macbeth are being overcome, and 
“The day almost itself’ aligns with Malcolm, the true king who, 
restoring order, has little to do.
There are several key elements in the play’s last scenes 
which reinforce the apparent circularity of events in Scotland. One 
of these, as I noted in Chapter 3, is the persistence or r e ­
establishment of the warrior ethic, graphically represented by the 
death of Young Siward and the way it is perceived. Another is the 
endurance of certain of the play’s paradigms of masculinity,
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although these are complicated by the contradictory expectations 
surrounding Malcolm. A third is stated explicitly by Macduff, 
seeking vengeance on Macbeth for his own peace; he declares that 
he will not fight with the “wretched kerns” Macbeth has under 
hire: like Sweno and Macdonald, the tyrant has resorted to
mercenaries. All of this has been noted by many critics, but of 
particular relevance here is the shrewd analysis of Harry Berger. 
He suggests that
Shakespeare is centrally interested ... in dramatizing 
failures or evasions of responsibility correlated with 
problematic structural tendencies that seem benign 
because it is in the interest of self-deceiving characters 
to view them that way (Berger: 3).
Even so, he questions the emphasis in much criticism of the play 
on disruption and restoration of order, disagreeing that the realm 
was governed in or by “unity and harmony”, and insisting
that there is a “settled instability” (Berger: 4), a pre-existing 
tendency toward disorder “which makes ... harm probable”.
The ‘structural tendency’ which he sees as responsible for 
Scotland’s turmoil is what I have called the warrior ethic; in 
Berger’s reading it is a lingering cause of strife, and will be so
again:
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Macduff’s killing Macbeth recalls Macbeth’s victory 
over Macdonwald [sic]: Macbeth also has Kernes 
fighting for him, and his head, Macduff threatens, will 
end up on a pole, if not on battlements. This may be 
viewed as poetic justice, the wheel come full circle. But 
it may also be simple recurrence, more of the same. In  
killing Macbeth, Macduff steps into his role. Will he 
become Malcolm’s Macbeth? (Berger: 4)
He has an ally in believing this in Marilyn Williamson, who 
suggests that “the repetition of elements raises a question about 
whether the time is truly free. The surplus of violence silently 
remains” (Williamson: 164). To suggest this, however, is to (once 
again) ignore the implications of the source material, to fail to take 
into account the understanding of it by the various segments of 
the audience: there is no hint, in Holinshed, that Macduff will go 
on to become a new threat to Scotland’s stability, that Malcolm 
will face the same challenges as his too-gentle father.
Nonetheless, the circularity is there to be seen, and, once 
seen, can easily become an overriding factor in any reading of the 
play as a whole. In many ways, Macbeth represents a kind of 
antithesis to the model of order-chaos-reorder that I proposed 
earlier in this chapter, since it could be argued that the process 
fails to operate in the play. Carolyn Asp emphasises that the play’s 
resolution does not involve a structural change to Scotland’s 
governing ethic, insisting that
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Society has not changed; it has merely eliminated two 
extremists [Macbeth and Lady Macbeth] who pushed 
the stereotype of manliness beyond the limits it was 
established to serve (Asp: 169).
In other words, if order is re-established at the play’s end, it is 
not the subtly transformed order which characterises the 
conclusion of Hamlet, or the questionable political re-ordering at 
the end of Julius Caesar or the beginning of Coriolanus. The 
process of re-ordering fails to operate any distinct change in the 
world of the play: there are only suggestions of change,
possibilities of difference. Some of these are, however, more 
obvious than others. Malcolm promises the restoration of order, of 
“measure, time, and place”. Scotland will be returned from its 
strange dislocation from human time, back in to the normal flow 
of mortality, of cause and effect. He will perform the restoration of 
order to Scotland in and from his proper place, place both 
geographical —the crowning at Scone, to which he has invited all 
his thanes (and what hint is there here that Macduff won’t turn 
up this time?) —and socio-political, with all those accompanying 
him restored to theirs. Newly hailed as Scotland’s king, he readily 
adopts the royal ‘we’ and grants to his loyal thanes a thoroughly 
Anglo-Saxon —which is to say English — title. It is this English 
influence which is the only hint of change in Shakespeare’s 
Scotland. But we hear, too, of “exiled friends abroad”, including 
Donaldbain — a future king who will, according to Holinshed, undo
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the damage wrought by “English epicures” — and the prom ising 
Fleance, ancestor to both the Tudors and the Stuarts.
Hayles notes the importance of the ideas of order and chaos 
in many creation myths (Hayles: 3-4); a deity’s preference of one 
over the other will act so as to legitimate one or the other. In the 
space of the last act, Malcolm is described as having the ability to 
inspire the dead to fight for him; to bring Birnam Wood to 
Dunsinane; to cure the sickness of his kingdom; to rout the 
infernal chaos of Macbeth and his savage allies and bring peace 
back to his country. It is almost as if something of the holy 
Edward has rubbed off on him; the divine powers granted the 
English king inspire Malcolm to perform his own, smaller miracles. 
Further, Malcolm is now firmly associated with Christian England, 
and, as I have shown from Holinshed, historically he will continue 
to be perceived as under English influence — but not, in the source 
at any rate, in any way that is to be admired. In the play, 
however, the new Christianised king has defeated a chaotic 
usurper and, by extension, the pagan forces associated with him; 
like the Young Siward, he is “God’s soldier”, a soldier of light and 
right and the restoration of (divine) order. According to M arilyn 
Williamson,
Macbeth concludes with a single ideological orientation,
through which the cultural problem of violence and
other contradictions peep, to be sure, but the end
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seems to be a victory for natural, virtuous, legitimate 
sovereignty (Williamson: 149).
In restoring order to Scotland, Malcolm duplicates the 
fundamental act of creation, and in doing so legitimates himself: it 
would be obvious that only a divinely sanctioned monarch could 
hope to achieve what he has. By the end of Macbeth the rightful 
king is on his throne, the prophecies of the weird sisters’ 
apparitions have been fulfilled in a surprisingly trivial way, and 
we can assume Fleance is off somewhere begetting kings. If, as I 
have observed, the same political and ethical structures prevail at 
the end of the play as did at the beginning, then chaos has not led 
to a new order, but the same one, reinforced. If so, then this is 
what is truly tragic about Macbeth the man, and the play named 
after him: for all his pride and ambition, for all his sin, for all the 
chaos he has caused, he has changed nothing.
I concede that, in many ways, this conclusion could be 
argued with — and I intend to address some of these arguments in 
the next, last, chapter. Nonetheless, I would maintain that the 
absence of any significant re-ordering — one which might 
otherwise result in a new order —still reveals a great deal about 
the play. Historicist analyses of Shakespeare’s plays, and the 
manner in which disorder is represented in other Elizabethan 
writing, have encouraged the view that the chaotic middle stage of 
the re-ordering process is a disaster, something to be remedied as
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quickly as possible. Chaos theory, however, suggests that the 
chaotic phase is somehow necessary, that the re-ordering which 
occurs at the end of many Elizabethan and Jacobean plays is a 
result of the disorder which precedes it.
6. The trim of the old times
I began, not with a desire to speak with the dead, but with a 
need to argue with the living.
When I first began studying Elizabethan literature in the 
early 1980s, I did so at what was — at that stage — a very 
conservative university, which taught very conservative 
courses very conservatively. Certainly, part of the 
recommended reading for any course on Shakespeare and his 
contemporaries was E.M.W. Tillyard’s The Elizabethan World 
Picture, and it was largely addressed in lectures and tutorials 
as an authoritative text, as THE Elizabethan world picture. 
Along with Bradley —and perhaps, on the rare occasion, Jan 
Kott — the book represented at the very least a good grounding 
in what was what.
In calling his work The Elizabethan World Picture, Tillyard 
was establishing a number of points before a prospective 
reader even opened the book. First, it was clear that there was 
— at least according to Tillyard —only one Elizabethan world 
picture, a single, coherent pattern of image and inter-reference. 
Second, of course, was where to find it. Here, in your hands.
What this idea and the way it was taught lead me to 
believe was not just the notion that there was a single, 
recognisable Elizabethan world picture, a Renaissance English
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mind-set, but also that this mind-set was somehow
recoverable, that if I were to immerse myself thoroughly in the 
period —its history, its texts, its own cultural and intellectual 
background — then I could somehow come to approximate th a t 
mind-set in myself, and therefore possess a better insight into 
the drama than might otherwise be the case.
Coming back to the same university to do so, a few years 
later, was a definite shock to the system. Encountering — 
relatively late — Jonathon Dollimore’s Radical Tragedy was even 
worse. Here was someone, speaking of and in and to a w ider 
discourse of which I was largely unaware, telling me (bluntly) 
that Tillyard and Bradley and their fellows were wrong , th a t 
the Great Chain and divine order and the overweening fear of 
chaos which permeated the Elizabethan mind were fictions, 
political constructs, ideological tools not only of the Tudor 
monarchs but also of the critics who wrote about them and the  
times in which they wrote.
Much of Tillyard’s argument was, indeed, based on his 
reading of Elizabethan notions of chaos and order. What he 
produced was certainly an admirable piece of scholarship, but I 
soon realised, re-addressing it armed with a new-cast arsenal 
of lit-theory weapons, that the nature of the book, and of the  
argument, was such that it could only be described as 
prescriptive: it set out to give the (decidedly male) reader all 
he needed to know about the background to Elizabethan dram a, 
and, at the same time, to convince him that here was all he
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needed to know. That a number of subsequent critics, and 
critical schools, have seen fit to take Tillyard to task is not, 
therefore, really surprising; as criticism spirals up and away 
from some numinous point of conception —turning and turning 
in the widening gyre, so to speak — it covers old ground merely 
by encompassing it, and perhaps it is inevitable that there 
should develop an antipathy toward what has gone before, 
towards (in this case) Tillyard’s style of monolithic, prescriptive 
reading.
What I did find surprising, however, was the realisation 
that Dollimore et al were not really so far from Tillyard as they 
imagined. Dollimore criticises — perhaps rightly — the over- 
prescriptive, single-minded readings of early critics, but only, it 
seems to me, to replace their readings with his own. Consider 
this: early in his argument in Radical Tragedy, Dollimore sets 
out what is, I think, his central idea in that work. He asserts 
that
a significant sequence of Jacobean tragedies, including 
the majority of Shakespeare’s, were more radical than 
has hitherto been allowed (Dollimore: 3).
As far as I can tell, Dollimore follows up this statement-of- 
position with a fairly repetitive analysis of a variety of Tate’ 
plays, and in which he continually re-asserts his claim of a r e ­
discovered radicalism. The arch-conservatives of Tillyard’s old 
world order are unexpectedly shown to be cunning 
subversives, the red lining on their robes suddenly showing 
through.
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It is never made clear, in the course of Radical Tragedy, 
exactly what Dollimore means by “sequence”, or even b y 
“significant”. It could be said that the significance of the plays 
he analyses lies principally in their impact on his argument: 
Lear and Antony and Cleopatra aside, most of the plays he 
focuses attention on are second-stringers at best. In his preface 
to the second edition he tempers his position somewhat when 
he concedes that
A particular play might offer a radical critique of 
providentialist ideology while being inherently 
conservative in other respects (Dollimore: xxi).
In saying this, he acknowledges an essential conservatism in 
theatrical practice in Jacobean London, while still asserting that 
some playwrights, particular plays, were subversive.
Dollimore nonetheless believes still that there was a “crisis 
of confidence in those holding power” which made “effective 
ideological control” an imperative. He is certain of the 
importance of this control, of a suspicion of the theatres and the 
performers which led to there being arrayed against them a 
whole mechanism of repression:
That the theatres in early seventeenth-century 
England were a potentially subversive context is 
evidenced by the fact of their censorship (Dollimore: 
2 2 ) .
He attempts to convince the reader that repressive mechanisms 
existed at least in part by using the word “censorship”, fully
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aware of all that the term implies and the reactions it is likely 
to provoke. This issue of subversiveness proven by so 
categorising the extant mechanisms of control in Jacobean 
London is one I shall return to shortly.
But Dollimore and other Cultural Materialists are not the 
only recent critics to address the legacy of Tillyard and Bradley. 
Set against his radical subversion we have Stephen Greenblatt’s 
belief that “Shakespeare’s plays are centrally, repeatedly 
concerned with the production and containment of subversion 
and disorder” (Greenblatt, 1980: 40). Subversive readings are 
possible, he says, only because they are immediately contained, 
the ideas they represent shown to be disastrous, even 
unthinkable:
Criticism can legitimately show that Shakespeare 
relentlessly explores the relations of power in a given 
culture. That more than exploration is involved is 
much harder to demonstrate convincingly (Greenblatt 
1980: 254).
Greenblatt’s image of early modern England is of what he calls 
a Totalizing society’,
one that posits an occult network linking all human, 
natural, and cosmic powers and that claims on behalf 
of a ruling elite a privileged place in this network 
(Greenblatt 1988: 2).
Behind the pageantry which propagandised this myth, 
however, were —according to Greenblatt —“anxious rhetorical 
attempts to conceal cracks, conflict, and disarray”, and it was
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this fear of disorder —pace Tillyard —which led to the period 
being one of “censorship and repression”. Like Dollimore, he 
believes that restrictive control was a feature of the practise of 
Shakespearean drama.
And also like Dollimore, Greenblatt suggests that his
reading is a rediscovery of the ‘truth’ about Elizabethan drama. 
Dollimore asserts that the ‘majority’ of Jacobean plays were 
subversive, Greenblatt that they were quite the opposite. And
not only do these readings seem to me as monolithic as
anything proposed by Bradley or Tillyard, they are in some
ways far more sweeping, far more generalising. Are we to 
believe, with Dollimore, that all the fellowship of Jacobean 
playwrights were, at some stage, undermining the social 
structures which furnished the demand for their plays, which 
built their playhouses, which —in short —lined their pockets? 
Are we to believe, with Greenblatt, that in all of this 
‘exploration’ of “the relations of power”, Shakespeare never 
once crosses the bounds of orthodoxy?
Delight in disorder
Both Cultural Materialism and Greenblatt’s New Historicism are, 
as I have indicated, interested in very much the same issues as 
Tillyard: issues of order and chaos, and their conflation with a 
whole range of binary oppositions, not the least of which bleats, 
like Orwell’s sheep, ‘order good, chaos bad’. But ‘order’ is a 
slippery term in Tillyard’s (and Dollimore’s, and Greenblatt’s)
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analysis; it does not merely indicate structure, or control —the 
divine order of the Great Chain — but also the in te rre la ted  
network of political order, social order, moral order, a whole 
comprising a kind of metastructure, an ethos, from which it is 
difficult to separate individual components. Tillyard and his 
successors have focussed upon the traces of this m etastruc tu re  
within the drama, but the problem with reading these signs 
arises from their very tenuousness: what you see of these signs 
depends very much on where you stand.
Consider Macbeth as an example: at the beginning of the  
play a political order is clearly established; a feudal m onarchy 
represented initially by Duncan, and which is underlined by his 
naming of his son Malcolm as his successor. In the course of the  
play this political order is overturned by a violent m urder, 
which leads to further strife, order corrupted and turning again 
to chaos. At the end of the play political order is re-estab lished  
by the accession of the named successor to the throne. The 
relation of this political order to any kind of social or ethical 
order is, as I have said, a complicated one. But what order is it 
that is restored? Is it the same one that prevailed at the  
beginning of the play? It is, after all, the nominated successor-  
son of the old, dead, thoroughly legitimate king-who is off to 
Scone at the end of the play. But on the other hand, there is the  
question of this new king’s alliance to England, and his overt 
undermining of the old order by declaring his loyal thanes to 
be earls.
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It would be easy to guess at how either Jonathon Dollimore 
or Steven Greenblatt might address the play. But either, in 
doing so, would, I suspect, arrive at a single conclusion, 
sweeping aside a plurality of interpretations in their pursuit of 
some ideological/methodological truth.
Both critics and their respective camps are well-enough 
established that other critics have addressed this feature of 
their work. Walter Cohen, for example, lumps both New 
Historicism and Cultural Materialism together as historicist 
analyses, and ascribes to both a basis in the work of Michel 
Foucault, leading, he says, to an over-dependence on “ideology”:
The obvious question with both the conservative and 
the subversive Foucauldian readings is whether the 
initial methodological orientation predetermines the 
political outcome of the empirical analysis (Howard 
and O’Connor: 29).
The privileging of ideology over text is certainly a feature of 
both these approaches, although Stephen Greenblatt seems to 
be less than comfortable with it. His inclination, his training, he 
says, is more toward the text, but he never explicitly claims not 
to privilege ideology. This practise is, on the other hand, self- 
justifying in Cultural Materialism, through its claim to (and 
pride in) political awareness —or is it simply that it does not 
(like its fore-runners) claim to be politically neutral?
More recently, and at greater length, Graham Bradshaw 
has addressed the critical impact of Dollimore and others in his
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book Misrepresentations: Shakespeare and the Materialists.
Much of his prologue focuses on the inconsistency of, or 
“contradiction” in, Materialist analyses of Shakespeare. But 
even this has its down side: Bradshaw may address the 
monolithic interpretations of arguably ideologically over­
committed critiques, but only to take them to task for revising 
— as Dollimore evidently does, in his preface to the second 
edition of Radical Tragedy —their earlier position. Where is it 
written, however, that the Critic must be consistent? And in 
these criticisms, where is the allowance for evolution in the 
Shakespearean’s thinking, even if only an evolution within a 
rigid ideological framework? And if we are to allow for an 
‘evolution’ in the thinking of the Critic, how much more 
important is it that we allow it in the thinking of the Dramatist? 
There must be space for both. We cannot, as Dollimore 
Greenblatt do, insist that Shakespeare was always thus. And if 
there is a single point I would like to address in the course of 
this thesis, it is this: that there is more than one way to skin the 
textual cat.
The repress ive  hypothesis
Both Cultural Materialism and New Historicism follow Tillyard’s 
lead in focussing on the idea that the plays of Shakespeare and 
his contemporaries were sites of ideological contestation in a 
struggle to preserve some kind of moral, political or social 
order. Both suggest that an important manifestation of this 
struggle was the mechanism of control which grew up around
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and alongside the drama, a mechanism involving the licensing 
of plays by the Master of Revels and the very real danger of 
painful punitive measures if some ill-defined line was crossed; 
that both Thomas Kyd and Ben Jonson and others ended up 
falling foul (to greater and lesser degrees) of a censorious sta te  
is proof enough of this. For Dollimore, as I have said, the 
existence of this mechanism is both a necessary and sufficient 
proof of his hypothesis.
What both Dollimore and Greenblatt seem to be convinced 
of is the essentially and inescapably repressive nature of any  
articulation of state power. If, as Cohen suggests, part of the 
foundation of both schools lies in the work of Michel Foucault, 
then this conviction is, arguably, a little odd. Foucault himself — 
at least at one stage of his explorations of the subject — 
“doubts” that “the workings of power ... really belong prim arily  
to the category of repression” (Foucault: 10). There is more to 
the exercise of state power that the boot-heel.
Nonetheless, Dollimore’s way of looking at the m echanism s 
of licensing and control surrounding the practise of dram a 
Shakespeare’s time remains a prevalent one. Even G reenblatt 
agrees: he goes so far as to suggest that an author of a
potentially subversive text may have been much absorbed into 
the dominant ideologies of the time that he would be unaware  
of his text’s potential subversiveness — witness Thomas Kyd. 
Recent non-literary studies in the period have more than 
amply demonstrated that Elizabethan and Jacobean England
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was both censorious and repressive, particularly when
compared to ‘modern’, supposedly more liberal perspectives. 
But recent work by Richard Dutton suggests that even if formal 
censorship was practised, its primary purpose may not have 
been to prevent the circulation of ‘dangerous’ ideas. I n 
Mastering the Revels, he seriously questions the idea of a 
repressive structure governing all public performance in 
London. It is true that to get a play onto the stage in 
Elizabethan and Jacobean London both the company and the 
theatre had to be licensed, and the play itself passed by the 
Master of Revels, but the objective of this practice may not 
have been formal censorship, at least as we at the tail-end of 
the twentieth century might understand it: the Master was, 
according to Dutton,
a consensus figure, there to filter out contentious 
material or over-personal comment but not to stifle all 
debate (Dutton: 47).
Indeed, the primary interest of those granted a patent as 
Master of Revels may have been in the income to post could 
generate for them — while still, of course, keeping the Lord 
Chamberlain happy (Dutton: 3). Furthermore, the patents to act 
as Master of revels were granted, with consistent terms, to 
specific individuals, and “The powers of dramatic regulation 
and censorship were never vested in a court or state post as 
such” (Dutton: 49). He notes as well that the relationship 
between the players and the Master was a mutually beneficial 
one (Dutton: 45), and one which neither party could have been 
too interested in upsetting. The ‘fact’ of ‘censorship’ may be
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established, but it is questionable if the intent —and, therefore, 
the effect? — was as repressive as Dollimore supposes.
If the milieu in which Shakespearean drama evolved and 
matured was, in fact, so repressive, then a number of
interesting questions arise, principal among them being one 
raised by Dutton: if the Master of Revels and his superiors were 
so intent upon stamping out unorthodox ideas in the theatre, 
why didn’t more plays, more playwrights, fall foul of them? If 
Dollimore’s thesis of radical subversion is correct — if
Greenblatt’s belief in unconscious subversion is tenable —why 
didn’t more plays earn their authors a summons before the 
Privy Council? Some plays did run into trouble, and we have 
adequate documentation of this, if not the texts of the plays 
themselves. And all evidence indicates that early modern 
audiences were at least as sophisticated as ‘readers’ as their 
critical successors three-and-a-half centuries later — in some 
ways, more so. As Leah Marcus notes:
State censorship can itself be understood as an agenda 
for stabilizing meaning, at least in the sense that a 
play licensed for production is officially declared free 
of a whole range of potentially subversive
significations. But censorship was as erratic as the 
interpretation it sought to control, and did not 
necessarily dampen the fervour for interpretation 
(Marcus: 28).
Given this, it seems to me that if a ‘modern’ reader is capable of 
generating a subversive reading of a Jacobean play, then the 
groundlings in the Globe and the Master of Revels in his
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chambers must also have been capable of doing so. Certainly, 
developments over the past three centuries allow the 
Bardolatrous hordes in their universities a greater range of 
radical readings to choose from, but there is still great scope for 
subversive readings of Shakespearean drama within the 
epistemological limitations of the age. Yet so few dramatists 
ended up in ideological hot water.
Or so it might seem. The problem with this idea is that it is 
contingent on the plays being read. How they were heard may 
be different, as Andrew Gurr has pointed out. After a long 
discussion on the dramatists’ understanding and expectations of 
their audience, he reminds us that the plays were after all 
primarily an oral art, intended to be spoken, intended to be 
heard. He also points out that a densely layered text of Classical 
allusions and Latin quotations — and he takes Webster to be an 
example of this kind of writing — would have been fully 
accessible to only a small segment of the audience; to the rest, 
such craftsmanship would have been so much verbiage. And 
after saying so, he takes a lead from Richard Levin in pointing 
out that, if nothing else, this “casts doubt on the existence of 
predominantly allegorical or allusive reading of the drama b y 
Shakespearean playgoers.” Contemporary scholars —by which 
he means that small and relatively well-defined section of the 
playwright’s audience who bought copies of the plays — may 
have been able to note and remark on such allusions, but not a 
play goer, “Reading being a more leisured form of assimilation” 
(Gurr: 99). The implication of this for recent and current sub-
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textual readings of the plays are clear: it is difficult to assert 
that a given work, or even a given scene, is subversive, if m ost 
of the audience would not have recognised it as such. In any 
case, it would have been the more educated members of an 
audience who would have been the most capable ‘readers’, and 
therefore the most likely to be able to spot — or imagine — 
subversive sentiments. But they were also the members of the 
audience who were most likely to feel threatened by theatrical 
subversion: their own dependence on the existing political and 
social structures was too great. If Dollimore’s understanding of 
things is correct, there should have been a queue of m ortified 
nouveau riche outside the Master of Revels’ door. Then th e ir 
were the interests of the players themselves: Dutton suggests 
that the practise of patronage and licensing meant that the 
actors themselves had a vested interest in maintaining o rder 
(Dutton: 24-25).
Dutton also considers the suggestion made by earlier 
scholars that the accession of James to the throne was followed 
by a relaxing of some of the strictures governing the licensing 
of plays — but he rejects the idea. If anything, the opposite was 
the case — and this, in itself, raises another interesting point. 
The players and playwrights of Elizabethan and Jacobean 
London seemed to accept the Master of Revels — Jonson, for 
example, actively sought the post for himself. The office had  
been continuously occupied since 1545, growing out of the 
earlier position of the Master of Tents and Revels created  
during the reign of Henry VII. During the period 1540-1577,
6. The trim of the old tim es 221
for comparison, the post of Lord Chamberlain had been vacant 
twice, for up to seven years. This is not to suggest that the 
Revels office was a more important one than the office of 
Chamberlain, but it does, nonetheless, represent an integral 
part of the court structure, and one which almost pre-dates the  
flowering of secular public theatre in London. It could be said, 
therefore, that the playwrights and their companies had little 
choice in the matter: the oversight of the Master of Revels was 
something the dramatists were used to, no more seen fit to 
question, perhaps, than the Court itself.
What may appear to be another aspect of the ‘repression’ 
of the theatre — the limiting of the number of licensed 
companies — was, as much as anything else, another m easure 
that operated to the advantage of both the players and the  
Master. Nonetheless, there were limitations, but they obviously 
had their compensations. In 1603 the company that had been  
operating under the patronage of the Lord Chamberlain — 
Shakespeare’s company — became the King’s Men. The 
tragedian Edward Alleyn became rich enough — and 
respectable enough —to found a school, and Shakespeare was 
able to successfully complete his father’s abandoned pursuit of 
a coat of arms. Some players, in short, became gentlemen. An 
unforgiving judge could say that they had sold out — or that the 
mechanisms of repression were so effective that the en tire  
practice of playing was arrogated into those mechanisms, and 
that those who controlled the mechanisms knew, as all 
autocrats must, how and when to reward a faithfully bow ed
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neck. To such a reading the inventiveness of the ‘authorities’ 
could even provoke a kind of admiration: so pervasive and
persuasive was their influence that even the plague was 
incorporated into these mechanisms of repression and control.
Perhaps so. But even if the censorship of the drama was 
this effective it is arguable whether the measures employed 
were, as I have indicated, intentionally repressive. Certainly 
the theatres were seen as potential sources of unrest — the 
Lord Mayor and many other notables of the town wrote several 
times to the Privy Council, the Lord Chamberlain, and others at 
court to complain about the “vagrant persons, masterless men 
and other idle and dangerous persons” who frequented the 
theatres, venues which also drew “apprentices and other 
servants from their ordinary works” (G.B. Evans: 6). The 
distracted apprentices rioted more than once, and the theatres 
were perceived as a cause. The intention of the Master of 
Revels may not have been to censor the plays — but some 
critics believe it was. The intention of the playwrights may not 
have been — almost certainly was not, in my view —to provoke 
the groundlings to revolt —but revolt they did. The measures 
that were put in place to control playhouses and plays were, 
primarily, measures of control, and not censorship: the cause of 
the unrest was not —was never suggested to be — subversive 
ideas.
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The purposes o f playing
The association of the theatres with social unrest was at the 
centre of a protracted debate which lasted right up to the 
closing of the theatres in 1642. On one side were those who 
condemned the theatres as centres of vice and corruption, of 
immorality, of “vagrant persons”. On the other were the 
playwrights themselves, the poets, noblemen, and apologists, 
who all argued in favour of some moral or didactic purpose to 
the theatre: Thomas Nashe wrote that
they show the ill-success of treason, the fall of hasty 
climbers, the wretched end of usurpers, the misery of 
civil dissension, and how just God is evermore in 
punishing of murder (G.B. Evans: 14).
To one side, a Machiavellian figure on-stage represented a 
serious challenge to the moral paradigms of the age, a kind of 
negative role-model. To the other it was just a tool to show the 
inevitable workings of divine punishment, a moral exemplar of 
a more orthodox sort.
Strangely enough, there are few explicitly positive role- 
models in Shakespearean tragedy: if there is a moral purpose 
operating in these plays, it operated (or sought to) by aversion. 
In the Histories, however, fine examples of upright, noble, God­
fearing men abound, kings and princes all. But what kind of 
example was this to provide an apprentice, a servant, or a 
vagabond? If the drama of the period was seeking “to conceal 
cracks, conflict, and disarray”, as Greenblatt puts it, then it does
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so — according to some arguments — by representing an 
ordered society with a divinely-ordained structure and a 
determined place for every individual. One thing this kind of 
‘totalizing’ society prohibits is any kind of social mobility, any 
kind of movement between levels. What was the point of 
representing to such a society’s lower castes a king, a prince or 
a noble warrior as a role-model? It was certainly nothing they 
could aspire to. And yet the kind of social mobility contradicted 
by the theories of absolute monarchy (or at least feudalism) 
and the myths the Tudor regime was, in fact, going on, and was 
evidenced by the very means employed to refute it. The 
position of players, of merchants or entrepreneurs, even, to a 
certain extent, courtiers, was ambiguous at best — certainly 
never clearly understood or defined. Yet they could, as I have 
noted, achieve some degree of upward mobility; the ideological 
use of the theatre became the source of a paradox.
What this reveals to us, four centuries later, is that the 
society, the structure which was being defended by the drama 
no longer existed, or was at least a politically useful illusion. 
Dollimore uses notions derived from the work of Raymond 
Williams to describe Jacobean England in terms of dominant, 
residual, and emergent cultural elements, and in these terms 
the social stratification espoused by the Tudor theorists was 
certainly residual — a hangover from a lost age. The role models 
represented for the edification of apprentices and servants 
were also a residue from this bygone era: great men, perhaps, 
but not — or no longer — real men. But a similar problem
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applied to ‘real’ people — Sidney or Spenser or (for a while) 
Essex, though admired, were, I think, seen as exceptional even 
in their own time, and even the actors, “the abstract and brief 
chronicles of the time”, may have felt that these were
unreachable — and therefore unrealistic — role models. Even 
with the example of men like Bacon, Drake or Raleigh, who rose 
from common origins to become men of note, the distance 
between what was being represented on stage and the ‘real’
world must have been perceivable, if not confusing. This
‘distance’, and the difference in social standing between himself 
and the drama’s characters could have as easily frustrated a 
restless apprentice as it may have inspired him. Perhaps the
Lord Mayor was right in supposing the theatres a source of 
unrest — but not for the reasons he believed.
S ig n ify in g  som eth in g
A further problem with the use of the stage for didactic 
purpose was the nature of the representations it employed. 
Audiences were surely accustomed to ‘reading’ what they saw 
on-stage as fiction, though a problem here is the uncertain 
nature and status of ‘fiction’ at the time. The Mystery plays, for 
example, were a significant influence on the development of 
Elizabethan drama, and in this tradition what was represented 
in performance was literally true —it was, after all, from the 
Bible — at the same time that it was a story. A similar 
ambiguity may have surrounded the performance of a secular 
history play. In the Graeco-Roman dramatic tradition, tragedies
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were, similarly, literally true; comedies certainly were not. Yet 
all were stories, known by both actors and audience to be 
inventions, perhaps by one of their own number. As fictions the 
plays become morally questionable; the issue is not simply the 
moral use or significance of drama alone, but of fiction and 
storytelling and legend. History, at least, was, to many 
Elizabethan thinkers, less didactically suspect.
But the status of a play as a fiction also poses a threat to 
the ‘playwright as subversive’ theories of Cultural Materialism. 
If, because of the mechanisms of ‘repression’ that existed, the 
only place that radical (by Elizabethan standards) ideas — moral 
relativism, for example, or republicanism, or atheism — could 
be entertained was on stage, then these ideas are compromised 
by their association with an art form which presents them as 
fictions, as, essentially, unreal, unachievable, and therefore, 
perhaps, undesirable. The drama itself becomes a means of 
subverting its own subversion.
A similar problem with ideologically driven interpretations 
of Shakespearean drama lies in the nature of the material being 
examined. Take, for instance, the issue of plays such as 
Eastward Ho or Sejanus, plays which provoked the arrest of 
their authors: the surviving relevant documents may tell us 
what happened, but the texts that occasioned the exercise of 
the full force of state censure have not survived, perhaps 
because of the effectiveness of the measures of ‘repression’. It 
is, therefore, impossible to guess what it was about the texts
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that elicited such a response: Jonson very carefully (and very 
politely!) passes the buck on the issue of who was responsible 
for the objectionable parts of Sejanus in the introduction, To 
the Readers’, of the 1616 edition. Any speculation about the 
nature of the objectionable material in this or any other 
suppressed play would be entirely derived from the ideological 
bent of the critic.
Which is not to say some constructive conclusions cannot 
be drawn from other plays. Unfortunately, a great deal of the 
material of the period that would support the belief in Jacobean 
theatrical subversion (as read by either New Historicism or 
Cultural materialism) is ideologically ambiguous. Take, for 
instance, the later pamphlet Hie Mulier: or, The Man-Woman, 
published in 1620. How does one approach this text? Was it 
really serious, proposing a removal of deterministic gender 
barriers, using clothes as a metaphor for social position, and 
suggesting that things should change? Obviously not, since the 
pamphlet never really shakes off the idea that the masculinized 
woman and the effeminized man who debate the issue are 
more than faintly ridiculous. Yet the pamphlet was taken 
seriously enough at the time to provoke a response, itself 
ambiguous: Haec-Vir: or, The Womanish-Man, in the same year. 
If one were looking for subversive opinions in the literature, 
then the latter and supposedly more ‘orthodox’ of these two 
pamphlets is a prime source:
Bondage or Slavery, is a restraint from those actions, 
which the minde (of it owne accord) doth most
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willingly desire: to performe the intents and purposes 
of anothers disposition, and that not by mansuetude or 
sweetnesse of intreatie: but by the force of authoritie 
and strength of compulsion (Haec-Vir: sig. B.r).
This condemnation of “the force of authoritie” is certainly a
remarkable (and subversive) opinion, if honestly expressed — 
but it is fiercely contested later in the same pamphlet. Selective 
quotation would certainly be useful here. Nonetheless, the fact 
that the earlier piece did occasion such a response indicated 
that it was capable of being read subversively even it the time
it was produced, a point which reinforces the reading of
Jonathon Dollimore and Cultural Materialism. But can such a
text be taken as significant to an analysis of (earlier) Jacobean 
drama? Since both pamphlets post-date most of the plays 
examined by Dollimore it could be said that they are less than 
useful. Logic might insist that one should only consider 
contemporary or earlier material as giving some indication of 
the historical-textual background to a play; yet one could argue, 
equally logically, that a later text will also provide useful 
insights, since it grows out of the same material conditions 
which produce the early text under consideration. This raises a 
particular methodological issue, one I do not intend to try and 
resolve here.
Furthermore, the ambiguity of the material creates a 
problem of proof in any analysis of Shakespearean literature. 
Arguments depending on ideology are, to all intents, non- 
verifiable, even non-falsifiable outside their own ideological 
context. In as subjective a field as literary criticism, however, it
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is questionable whether it is worth getting hung up on issues of 
‘proof; truthfully, it is difficult to prove  anything, when so 
many of the facts in any case are contestable. This tilting at 
proof is not a feature of Cultural Materialism alone, but it does 
seem to me that Shakespearean Negotiations, as an example of 
a New Historicist text, makes a more concerted attempt at 
‘proving’ its case than Radical Tragedy. Nonetheless this is an 
issue, and one which any critic must eventually engage: in 
analysing a text, arriving at particular conclusions, and holding 
forth on them in an article, a conference paper — or even a 
doctoral thesis — there is the constant concern with backing 
them up, with justifying your own conclusions by relating them 
— if only antithetically —to other texts: to other plays, to other 
materials, to other critics. This, in itself, can have an profound 
effect on the nature of the conclusions reached, as well as the 
means employed to get there.
T hese few precepts
Writing of “Marlovian rebels and skeptics”, Greenblatt notes 
that
they simply reverse the paradigms and embrace what 
the society brands as evil. In so doing, they imagine 
themselves set in diametrical opposition to their 
society where in fact they have unwittingly accepted 
its crucial structural elements (Greenblatt 1980: 209).
Immorality, then, is no morality; or at least, it is no n ew  
morality. If there is a kind of subversion in Sejanus’ 
manipulations or Tamburlaine’s destructive glee, then it must
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be a rather frustrating one; it presents no real alternative to 
the structure it seeks to undermine; it indulges itself in hollow 
—and fairly pointless —rejection. This is not subversion. It is 
simply discontent.
A slightly different version of Greenblatt’s point can be 
turned back against him, against the Materialist thesis of 
subversion and the Historicist insistence on containment. I n 
seeking to overturn or correct what may have gone before, 
critically speaking, one still has to accept the earlier paradigms. 
Dollimore in particular seems reluctant to acknowledge this, 
despite the fact that much of the early part of Radical Tragedy  
is an elaboration, from a Marxist, Foucauldian, post­
structuralist perspective, of Tillyard’s ideas about order and 
chaos and providentialist ideology —his first chapter, after all, 
he calls ‘Contexts’.
Dollimore’s portrait of the Jacobean context — the ethos, the
milieu — rests on some of the same premises as Tillyard, but his
interpretation of those premises is, as I have indicated above, 
coloured by his ideological position. But I do not think that he 
makes it clear what his pet dramatists are subverting, any 
more than Greenblatt makes it clear what is doing the 
containing. Their focus on the overtly political in the plays is,
perhaps, too narrow, since the political comprises only part of
an interrelated network —the metastructure or ethos I have 
referred to earlier. In another, equally specialised sense the 
plays are even more confusing; as Greenblatt indicates, there is
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no morality, no ethical structure being represented in the plays 
but the one which surrounds them: the ethics of Shakespeare’s 
age, whatever they may be, that produce the plays and the 
players and their audience, and govern all interaction and 
communication between them.
I am not clear what the ethics of Renaissance England 
were, or even if they were the same as those which seem to 
operate in Shakespeare’s plays. I have an idea about what some  
of them may be — which suggests, I suppose, that I do not think 
that there is a single set, a single ethical discourse which 
governs (or tries to) all the attitudes and actions of king and 
courtier, player and playwright, warrior and noble and peasant, 
either on-stage or off it. Such is the case: to me it seems 
obvious that one cannot talk about Shakespeare’s ethics, 
without first explaining which play(s) one is referring to. And 
beyond that: that one has to clarify which character is being 
considered, since I believe that any Shakespearean text will 
contain a multiplicity of ethical frameworks, associated with 
individual characters and determined by their gender, their 
position in a social or political hierarchy, and what kind of 
hierarchy it is —perhaps even their age, their nationality, the 
condition of their birth (legitimate or otherwise). What I hope I 
have done over the course of this thesis is to provide a partial 
proof of this idea —while still acknowledging the impossibility 
of proving anything. I say partial, because rather than embark 
upon painting some grand canvas, I have focussed instead upon
6. The trim of the old times 232
a synedochal miniature: showing how the various hues of what 
I call the warrior ethic hint at the stronger colours of the whole.
Expectations of greatness
Imagine a graph, a plot of values over time, a smooth curve 
recording how those values might change from some point in 
the past, through a nebulous now and away into the future.
Now imagine that, at some point in time, those values 
change abruptly, so that instead of a smooth curve there is a 
sudden change in value, without any transition. I n
mathematics, such a change is called a discontinuity, and if we 
could plot the changes in English moral or ethical values over 
time, we might find such a discontinuity hovering around the 
first few years of the 17th Century. At one of those vague 
historical points like the start of a war or the end of an era, 
almost everything changed; many of the certainties of life the 
English had grown to appreciate under the old queen had been 
thrown into doubt.
The death of Elizabeth and the accession of James to the 
throne of England stands as a point of discontinuity in the 
development of certain ideas and their representation in the 
drama of the period. Macbeth the play itself represents this 
discontinuity —it represents this process of change from one 
ruler to another, from one form of rule to another, from one 
ethic of ruling to another. It represents this transition not only
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in the sense that it is a product of that transition, but also in 
that the action of the play itself, the movement from the rule of 
Duncan, through that of Macbeth, to that of Malcolm is, in a 
way, a representation of the transition from the rule of 
Elizabeth to the rule of James. Under Duncan, Scotland 
experienced — knew, understood, and appreciated — a rule 
dependent on expectations of duty and obedience, with proper 
performance of a subservient role being recognised and 
rewarded with public praise and an increase in honour. Under 
Malcolm ... well, the loyal thanes were rewarded for their 
loyalty and sacrifice, but not in quite the same way, and, as I 
have shown, there were open questions in Holinshed — and 
perhaps subtle ones in Shakespeare’s version — about whether 
things were quite up to the old standard under this new, 
untried king. Really, no one hanging around after the death of 
Macbeth could have known what to expect.
Under Elizabeth, England experienced —knew, understood, 
and appreciated —a rule dependent upon her ability to keep 
conflicting forces within the court and the country balanced 
against each other, a feat of prestidigitation she managed for 
more than forty years. Through a combination of open 
consultation, prevarication, careful preferment, casual dalliance 
and outright deceit, she managed to steer her realm through a 
succession of crises, and to do all of this when, particularly with 
the example of various Marys before them, a significant 
proportion of the English people remained unhappy with the 
fact that they were being ruled by a woman. Under James ...
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who was an ardent proponent of an absolute monarchy and 
was to remain — as was his successor — in constant conflict with 
Parliament ... well, again, no one could have known, in the first 
few years after his accession, quite what to expect.
In his diary entry describing the news of Elizabeth’s death, 
the lawyer John Manningham reported the way James’ 
nomination as successor was received:
The people is full of expectation and great hope of his 
worthiness, of our nation’s future greatness; everyone 
promises himself a share in some famous action to be 
hereafter performed for his prince and country. (G.B. 
Evans: 185)
Even for a lawyer —that most contemptible of people to the 
warrior Geffrey Gates — the possibilities inherent in the 
accession of a new king were seen in terms of an “action” to be 
“performed”. There is, here, a hope for a distinctly martial 
action, leading to the recognition and advancement that the 
performance of some notable deed could earn. But events were 
to show that this was a false hope: James’ fondness for the 
masque and the unusual peace the country experienced during 
his reign meant that the best action an ambitious man could 
hope to perform would be theatrical.
James soon became a source of disappointment, attracting 
(quiet) criticism on a number of grounds. The martial 
expectations of everyone from John Manningham to Sir Walter 
Raleigh — among others — were to be defeated by James’
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pacifism, and he soon became known instead for his 
extravagance, his constant financial difficulties, and favouritism  
even more galling than Elizabeth’s. Thomas Howard, writing to 
Sir John Harrington, notes that the King seemed particularly — 
if not overly — interested in his courtiers’ attire, and suggests — 
very carefully — that this might indicate the King was less than  
interested in “the endowments of the inward sort, wit, valour, 
or virtue”:
the King saith, he liketh a flowing garment; be sure it 
be not all of one sort, but diversely coloured, the collar 
falling down somewhat, and your ruff well stiffened 
and bushy. We have lately had many gallants who 
failed in their suits for want of due observance of 
these matters. The King is nicely heedful of such 
points, and dwelleth on good looks and handsom e 
accoutrements. (G.B. Evans: 193)
Howard also describes the unsuccessful petition of another 
courtier, whose sin was to fail to notice —and praise —the new  
gilt trappings on the King’s favourite mount. He also makes a 
telling comparison between James’ rule, and Elizabeth’s.
You have lived to see the trim of old times, and w hat 
passed in the Queen’s days; these things are no m ore 
the same. Your Queen did talk of her subjects’ love and 
good affections, and in good truth she aimed well; our 
King talketh of his subjects’ fear and subjection, and 
herein I think he doth well too, as long as it holdeth 
good. (G.B. Evans: 194)
Love and affection versus fear and subjection — a fam iliar 
contrast to any reader or spectator of Macbeth.  The ruling ethic
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James established certainly held good long enough for him, bu t 
not for his son.
The royal play
Throughout the first decade of the 17th Century, the character 
of the drama itself changed, and changed in quite fundam ental 
ways. Arguably, in the evolution from ‘Elizabethan’ to 
‘Jacobean’ drama, English theatre ceased being a public th ea tre  
— or at least became much less so. After the accession of James, 
and certainly after the elevation of the Lord Chamberlain’s Men 
to the status of King’s Men in 1603, the drama of Shakespeare 
and his contemporaries became much more a court drama. The 
Master of the Revels was no longer necessarily the man who 
gave them license to perform — that came from the King — 
though he was the instrument by which a play might be 
performed before the court. Certainly before this date court 
performances on demand were not uncommon, but is does 
seem that they became far more common during James’ reign. 
Gary Taylor and John Jowett note, among other innovations, the 
increasing use of intervals and the performance of music 
during them, and the King’s Men’s move into the form er 
children’s company theatre at Blackfriars’ in 1608/9 (Taylor 
and Jowett: 5-25; 30-37). In their analysis, the use of an indoor 
theatre had an almost immediate effect on the character of the 
performances, leading even to changes to matters like plot 
structure (Taylor and Jowett: 40-42). The use of indoor
performance spaces also leading to the use stage m achinery,
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lighting and so on. Certainly, the changes that came about in the 
form of the drama itself were, at least partially if not 
principally, the result of evolutionary processes which had 
already been set in motion by the time of James’ accession, but 
it is possible that the fundamentally different character of
James’ court — and his style of rule — accelerated this process of 
change, as well as encouraging mutation (so to speak) into other 
forms. It is perhaps significant that particular genres of the 
drama — most notably the revenge tragedy — reached their 
zenith during James’ reign. The sudden and quite elaborate 
development of the masque is also indicative of this evolution 
in the drama; it is particularly telling that the masque form 
often used members of the court and the royal household itself 
as performers, and it could be the case that this association of 
dramatic performance with the royal court was a factor in the 
later closure of the theatres by parliament.
Strange days
Macbeth is an important play in that it is far more directly 
intimately associated with the reigning monarch than any other 
of Shakespeare’s works (with the possible exception of The 
Merry Wives of Windsor). This may be an indication of the 
uncertainty that dramatists and —perhaps —the society as a 
whole felt towards this new ruler, this strange Scottish man. 
Because he was strange: he was nothing like Elizabeth. This was 
widely known even before he arrived in London during mid- 
1603. Elizabeth herself knew as much; some four years earlier,
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before she had made up her mind to grant him the succession, 
she wrote to him in anger at his assertion of his right to it. 11 
was to his ‘discredit’, she said, that he even brought the m atte r 
up: “I see well,” she wrote, “wee two be of very d ifferen t 
natures” (Strachey: 105).
James was Scottish, and the Scots had a particularly bad 
reputation with the English, their long alliance with France 
being a particularly sore point. An account of James’ trip back 
to Scotland in 1617, attributed to Sir Anthony Weldon, 
describes the Scots in no glowing terms:
They christen without the cross, marry without the 
ring, receive the sacrament without reverence, die 
without repentance, and bury without divine service: 
the keep no holy-days, nor acknowledge any saint b u t 
St Andrew ... They hold their noses if you talk of b ea r- 
baiting, and stop their ears if you speak of play; 
fornication they hold as but a pastime, wherein m an’s 
ability is approved, and a woman’s fertility discovered; 
at adultery they shake their heads; theft they rail at; 
murder they wink at, and blasphemy they laugh a t 
(Brown: 101).
Weldon must have been a complex man indeed, if he could 
condemn the Scots for both their irreverence and their dislike 
of “play”, and about the only accusation he does not level a t 
them —drunkenness —is well-remarked upon elsewhere. The 
rise in duelling in London— lamented by Bacon and the Star 
Chamber in the Charge Touching Duels — and the general 
increase in violence in and around the court were seen b y
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many as inevitable, given the barbaric and treacherous nature 
of the Scots.
Far more significant, however, to the way the English 
received their new King —perhaps uneasily —was his gender. 
Elizabeth’s sex, according to some historical readings of the 
period, was something the English were never entirely 
comfortable with. There were a great many excuses, apologies 
and arguments made in favour of Elizabeth as a queen , but 
their character often boils down to an emphasis on her 
masculine qualities —her self-proclaimed manliness somehow 
erasing her womanhood. Invidious comparisons with Lady 
Macbeth could obviously be made here, a point which makes 
the notorious court performance of Macbeth all the more 
intriguing.
But then, after years of arguing their way in and out and 
around all of this, the crown’s supporters and apologists are 
suddenly confronted with a man on the throne again —and a 
virile man at that, a sire who already has heirs, so his sexual 
potency — his manliness — is, in this respect at least, proven. He 
therefore brings with him almost a guarantee that the 
aberration of a woman on the throne need not happen again; 
that the trouble and turmoil — the chaos — that seemed to 
attend Elizabeth’s reign will not return. But he is also a man 
who — unfortunately — complicates things by being an 
intellectual, with his own very clear opinions on a range of 
subjects from witchcraft to the divine right of kings. And any
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uneasiness this might engender is exacerbated by his overt 
pacifism. His conciliatory attitude towards the Spanish won him 
no friends among the militant Protestant faction which had 
enjoyed reasonable success under Elizabeth. He must have 
created more than a little discomfort as well, through the 
excessive (especially by comparison to what had gone before) 
homosocialization of his court. He was known to have his male 
favourites, and competition between them was often a source 
of strife in the court, much as it had been for his predecessor. 
Some historians of the period are certainly inclined to see 
homoerotic elements in James’ relationships with these
favourites, much as many have read strong sexual —physically 
sexual —characteristics in Elizabeth’s dalliances with Raleigh, 
Essex and Leicester. There is little wonder so many English me n  
transferred their hopes — soon dashed — to the young, 
physically active and martially inclined Prince Henry.
More than anything else, the accession of James created a 
great deal of ethical uncertainty, an uncertainty which 
manifests itself in Macbeth, both the character and the 
eponymous play. As I hope I have demonstrated, the play can 
be read as a thoroughly orthodox endorsement of the warrior 
ethic, and of particular noble and kingly values. Indeed, it is 
almost as if the play is trying to reinforce these values; is 
trying, in fact, to defend these values in the face of their assault 
by the unruly court of the new king. On the other hand, it is 
also possible to read the play as subverting these ideas, as 
suggesting that the warrior ethic is an altogether too gruesome
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thing. The gentility of Duncan and Malcolm, and the civilising 
influence that the English have obviously had on the latter, 
suggest that the aggressive Scots temperament is something 
that needs to be reformed. The question of the warrior 
nobleman defending the crown, and yet at the same time being 
a threat to it, reveals itself as an issue to be addressed, as does 
the contradiction inherent in a warrior ethic which endorses 
prowess in battle above all else, but which is exercised —both 
within the play and without —in defence of a king who does 
not fight.
For most of the audience, whether at Blackfriars’ or the 
Globe, the figure whom these contradictions would have 
immediately called to mind was the late Robert Devereux, Earl 
of Essex. A well-connected and personable young man, he was 
an almost instant hit at court, despite the disadvantages of a 
chequered family history. He was intelligent, physically (and 
almost certainly sexually) active, an ardent Protestant and a 
capable soldier; as a result of his bold —if impulsive —actions 
during the 1596 raid on Cadiz, he became a popular hero and 
an icon of English militarism, and English manhood.
But impulsive he was, and though a capable soldier he was 
a terrible general, responsible for spectacular —and expensive 
—failures in both the Canaries and Ireland. He was too willing 
to exploit both his position at court and his popularity; at court 
he consistently underestimated the queen’s strength and 
overestimated her patience; his popularity was to prove,
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eventually, a chimaera. He was proud, arrogant, and thin- 
skinned; he appeared to deeply resent his necessary
subservience to a woman while being more than willing to 
participate in the subtle, flirtatious dance she expected of him; 
his stated belief in the fallibility of princes was the least of the 
opinions counted against him. In terms of the warrior ethic, 
Essex was a mass of inconsistencies: puissance, courage and
fortitude he may have possessed, but patience, meekness, and 
obedience were notably absent from his character. Yet it must 
be said that some of these inconsistencies were inescapable for 
a man of his position at the time, largely the result of the 
tension between a highly gendered discourse of honour and 
valiant action, and an aging, demanding queen who could not 
let her manly favourites stray too far from her side.
Essex bargained, entreated, cajoled and threatened 
Elizabeth for several years, desperate for an opportunity to 
prove his manly and martial worth in some “famous action”. 
When she did finally release him to the field —invariably after 
changing her mind several times —he was only to make her 
regret giving in to him; but though his martial exploits were to 
earn him the admiration — deserved or not — of the nation, 
Essex was never to earn the esteem and gratitude of the fount 
of all honour, his prince. Like Macbeth, he would fight in 
defence of crown and country, only to become a serious threat 
to both himself: to all appearances his self-control and sanity 
declined rapidly in the last year of his life, leading him,
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ultimately, to an abortive coup and an appointment on Tower 
Hill.
Writing of England’s descent into political chaos in the 
1640’s, Mark Kishlansky notes that
Royalists fought for the traditions of religion and 
monarchy that their ancestors had preserved and 
passed on to them as a sacred inheritance. They 
believed in ... the divine right of kings ... Their 
fundamental principle was loyalty — an instinct deeply 
etched in the patriarchal nature of their society. 
Disloyalty was base —a violation of a code that made 
oaths as strong as contracts, voluntary obedience more 
dependable than law, and self-sacrifice was a 
welcomed duty. (Kishlansky: 151)
In short, according to Kishlansky at any rate, the Royalists in 
the Civil War fought for the very principles embodied in 
Malcolm and Duncan and so violently overthrown by Macbeth. 
Shakespeare’s Scotland goes through a period of immense 
turmoil, experiencing threats which England itself faced, but 
never actually had to confront: foreign invasion, assassination, 
civil war — perhaps even religious strife. On the one hand, it is 
possible to argue that this disorder in Scotland makes no 
difference, that the essential values of the warrior ethic, of the 
king and his thanes, have not changed. The same values —in a 
warrior particularly — are, as I have indicated, espoused at 
both the beginning and the end of the play. And yet things do 
change: there is a fundamental political change, intimately
related to Malcolm’s sojourn in the civilising English court, and 
there is some hope that this new king will not make the same
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mistakes as his too-trusting father. Harry Berger may believe 
Macduff may turn out to be Malcolm’s Macbeth, but Macduff 
has been subjected to a test by his king which —as far as we 
know — the “dead butcher” never experienced at Duncan’s 
hands. Nevertheless, some uncertainty remains: what guarantee 
of the succession is there in a king unknown to woman, and 
seemingly proud of it?
Things are the same. Things are different. Which is it? 
Well, it doesn’t necessarily have to be one or the other; it can, 
in fact, be both. The transition from Elizabeth’s rule to James’ 
created a great deal of uncertainty, which Macbeth represents 
by allowing both readings, without really preferring either. 
Could we say, then, that underneath this arguably positive 
uncertainty, there is a nervousness, a desire for firmer moral 
ground, perhaps even new moral ground? And perhaps, 
beneath this uncertainty, there is the apprehension that this 
new Scottish king is not going to be the one to provide it.
P urposes  mistook
I used to think that there was a single, ‘right’ interpretation of 
Shakespeare; that it was recoverable, accessible through a kind 
of total immersion in the period. By trying to become a 
‘Renaissance Man’, one could come close to recovering 
something of the original meaning(s) of, say, Macbeth — by 
speaking with the dead, as Stephen Greenblatt puts it. I am not, 
for various reasons, disposed to believe this any more —but I
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am still inclined towards historicist approaches as the best (for 
me) methods of generating such readings. I accept that the 
range of possible meanings associated with, or generated by, a 
text are not/no longer limited to those which may have 
prevailed at the time — but it is still possible to get off-track, to 
invent readings which bear little relation to the text. In a 
historicist approach, the age itself becomes the text, the ‘meta- 
text’. The whole range of material conditions governing the 
production of the individual literary entities we are accustomed 
to calling ‘texts’ become the instrument that generates meaning 
to the historicist critic.
In historicism, there seems to be a continuum between 
monolithic, prescriptive readings of the kind generated b y 
Tillyard, Dollimore, or Greenblatt, and the kind of plurality 
described by Terence Hawkes, namely, as he says in the 
abstract to Meaning by Shakespeare, “that Shakespeare’s plays 
have no essential meanings, but function as resources which we 
use to generate meaning for our own purposes”. A smear from 
one meaning, to several, to many, to so many that there may as 
well be none — but, all being equal in an intellectual climate, no 
one of these positions is any better than another. I am 
sympathetic to this idea; I resist the idea that Shakespearean 
drama is only ever trying to do one thing, but I am also and 
equally antagonistic to interpretations which allow the plays to 
mean any old thing at all.
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What I am most interested in, despite their ambiguity on a 
number of terms, are the moral or didactic uses to which the 
drama was (intentionally or otherwise) put. Specifically, l a m  
intrigued by the representation of role-models of manhood, of 
the whole issue of ethics and its relation to gender, to 
masculinity, in Shakespearean tragedy. I believe I have had to 
limit my consideration of this issue to tragedy for several 
reasons, not the least of which is the sheer volume of material I 
would have to consider otherwise. Any issue — but most 
particularly those related to matters of gender — is often 
treated differently in Shakespearean comedy; an added 
complication, but not an irresolvable one. It could be argued 
that the Comedies, by providing a kind of distorted reflection of 
the age in Hamlet’s mirror, could as usefully furnish some 
insight into the operations of gender and masculinity in the 
drama as any of the Tragedies. But a boundary has to be drawn 
somewhere.
For me, the exact position of this boundary is, the above 
notwithstanding, difficult to site/sight/cite. In a more 
ambitious work it might be possible to develop, before even 
approaching any plays, a kind of map of the territory, a map of 
concepts rather than topography. By looking at other, non- 
dramatic material from the period dealing with manhood, 
specifically the man-as-warrior, it might be possible to develop 
some better notion of the range of ideas about the man-as- 
warrior which operated in the period, and any thoughts about 
this issue which might be generated from the plays would have
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to be justified by the ‘meta-text’ as I have described it above; 
they would, in short, be interpretations which would fall within 
the boundaries of the map. But of necessity such a ‘map’ would 
have to be limited —we do not, after all, have access to all the 
material which might define its topography, and in any case it 
would probably be beyond the capabilities of any one work, of 
any one critic, to produce such a map. I considered trying to do 
so myself —but eighteen months down this side-track left me 
no clearer about the terrain than when I set out.
Perhaps the territory of masculinity in early modern 
England was not that well defined. This admits the possibility 
that a play representing ideas about masculinity, one which 
admits of a reading of ‘there’s got to be more to it than this’ (for 
example), may not go so far as to suggest an alternative. 
Perhaps the ideas of alternatives, or the words for them, did 
not exist? A Sidney or a Spenser would, by virtue of (superior?) 
education (to say the least), be aware of alternatives — but may 
not have been any more able than the groundlings in the Globe 
to express them, to act on them. If there is such a questioning 
of ideas, a searching for alternatives, it would settle a suspicion 
of mine about the character, the ethos, of Renaissance England: 
I cannot help but feel that it was, ethically, a transitional phase 
between older, more rigid and deterministic ethics, and more 
sophisticated models, ones which, due to the events of the late 
1620’s, did not achieve any definite final form.
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It remains to be seen —but not in this thesis —whether 
questions of notions of manhood, interrogations of the warrior 
ideal, lie within the boundaries of an ideological map. If these 
questions exist, do they fit within a wider tendency to 
interrogate the world? Do they fit within the sense of crisis and 
dislocation described by Dollimore and Greenblatt — a 
Lyotardian mistrust of metanarratives, perhaps? If this 
interrogation exists, then its character is yet to be determined 
— but it must be remembered that criticism does not imply 
subversion. In looking at historicist criticism of Shakespeare, I 
have tried to apply something of its methods and, where 
possible, shed some light from outside the theatres on the text 
in hand.
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